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Economics of Contracts and Risks
Francis Annan
Abstracting from potential incentive costs, both theoretical and applied research on contracts
and contract choice suggest that bundling multiple contracts may be optimal. With the
abundance of risk and uncertainty, especially among low-income environments that are often
ill-prepared, the design and commercial success of contracts for mitigating these risks remain
crucial. This dissertation brings together applied microeconomic theory along with careful
empirical analyses to study three issues about contracts and risks, with implications for
the functioning of markets, financial inclusion, unequal impacts of climate extremes and
the design of insurance and financial contracts aim at mitigating environmental risks that
confront society.
Chapter 2 studies the potential moral hazard and welfare consequences of interlinking
credit with insurance market contracts, establishing that interlinking these two markets
not only increases insurance demand, but induces large moral hazard effects in develop-
ing countries. Chapter 3 examines environmental risks and their differential impacts on
human capital investments, specifically, documenting how Harmattan-induced “Meningitis”
outbreaks potentially explain the observed gender gaps in educational attainments in Niger.
Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of informal risk-sharing schemes on the adoption of “index”
insurance contracts aimed at mitigating climate risks among low-income societies. Two com-
peting forces are identified to show that informal network schemes have ambiguous effect on
the demand for formal index insurance, which provides novel explanations for two empirical
puzzles about index contracts along with an experimental evidence from rural India. The
third project connects the first two via contracts and environmental risks, respectively.
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Theoretical and applied work on contracts and contract choice have noted that market
arrangements that interlink multiple contracts are optimal. Among other things, the jus-
tification for bundling contracts is that it overcome problems of imperfect information and
enforcement, induce optimal investment of effort [in principal-agent settings], and relax other
contractual frictions such as credit constraints and present-biasedness (e.g., Braverman and
Stiglitz 1982, 1986; Bose 1993; Carter et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014; Casaburi and Willis
2017). Next, uncertainty is everywhere, and play a central role in the decision-making en-
vironment of society (e.g., Gollier 1995). Notable examples include potential risks related
to climate and weather events, especially in poor and vulnerable settings, externalities from
automobile collisions, sudden health and disease events, risky assets under price uncertainty,
to potentially catastrophic risks of greenhouse effect, nuclear Armageddon and genetic ma-
nipulations. Exposure to risks poses significant burden (e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2013) but can generate opportunities (e.g., World Development Report
2014), especially among low-income environments where financial and insurance markets are
incomplete (e.g., Townsend 1994; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011).
With these mind, this dissertation brings together applied microeconomic theory along
with careful empirical analyses to answer three sets of questions about contracts and risks.
First, what are the potential tradeoffs of interlinking credit with insurance contracts (i.e.,
Demand versus Incentive and Welfare costs)? Second, how does environmentally-induced
1
disease events affect human capital investments, and how are the impacts distributed across
society? Third, what formal insurance and financial contracts are available for societies
to mitigate environment and climate risks, and how does the choice of these instruments
interact with existing informal risk-sharing schemes. Each chapter is devoted to a question
as explained below.
In the first project (Chapter 2), I study the moral hazard and welfare consequences
of interlocking credit with insurance market contracts. Consumers in developing countries
often buy insurance on credit. These are arrangements between insurers and consumers
that allow consumers to get coverage now and defer their premium payments to a future
period—an analog of interlocking credit with insurance. I show that such arrangements
not only increase insurance demand, but induce large moral hazard and net-welfare losses.
The approach to this research is to combine a mixed model of adverse selection and moral
hazard with theoretical restrictions from agency theory and a shock in the choice of insurance
contracts to learn about moral hazard and its effects. First, I show that a simple difference
estimator gives a lower bound on the effect of moral hazard, allowing for adverse selection
of any form. The shock in contracts come from an unexpected regulatory reform in Ghana
that made it impossible to buy insurance on credit, creating an exogenous variation in
contract choice: consumers responded by switching to contracts with less coverage. Second,
I combine this result with unique administrative data on car insurance contracts to analyze
moral hazard; finding robust evidence of moral hazard effects. The estimated cost of moral
hazard, averted by the regulatory reform, is about 12 percent of insurance company profits,
translating to a total loss of GHC52,703,889 (USD17,567,963) for the insurance industry
between two contract periods. Finally, I use back-of-the envelope calculations to compare
the loss in consumer welfare attributable to the regulatory reform to the gain in producer
welfare. I find that the welfare loss is about 11% of the gain in welfare; suggesting that the
reform is not welfare-decreasing, overall.
There are at least three potential mechanisms through which the regulatory reform may
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have shifted choices of insurance contracts and thus moral hazard: binding credit constraints,
financial “savviness”, and changes in relative prices. I test for these individual channels using
detail data on insurance premiums, credit and premium debt records, finding evidence in
favor of credit constraints. In particular, there is evidence that moral hazard is larger
for the more credit-constrained consumers based on heterogeneity analysis. I discuss the
applicability of these results to the design of other types of insurance: personal insurance,
social insurance programs and weather index-based insurance, including the implications for
policy.
This work makes three contributions: It advances the study of market inter-linkages by
providing a first-line evidence of the moral hazard consequences of bundling credit with
insurance contracts. Such potentially negative effect of bundling these two markets has been
so far ignored in the literature. Additionally, the proposed mixed model together with the
bounding analysis provides a useful benchmark to evaluate the effect of moral hazard—
and to conveniently assess the consequences of abstracting from one informational friction.
Finally, by exploring the potential channels, this research documents a possible link between
credit constraints and moral hazard. While reducing credit constraints may be good, it
shows where such policies will create significant inefficiency.
There are several natural extensions of this paper. First, I aim to consider the impli-
cations of the proposed approach and findings in other developing countries that currently
have similar insurance reforms in force: Nigeria and Gambia. Evidence from these contexts
will provide additional external validity and a further evaluation of the growing insurance
policies. I also plan to examine the co-impacts of this automobile insurance policy on lo-
cal air quality by appealing to the literature on the effects of regulation on air pollution.
I have done some preliminary analysis using high resolution satellite data from National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which points to modest reductions in air
pollution as measured by particulate matter at the policy cutoff. This reduction in pollution
may be attributed to decreases in driving speeds resulting from general fall in coverage and
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accident rates. Next, I plan to investigate whether interlinking credit with insurance mar-
ket contracts can induce adverse selection, and the implied welfare implications. There are
indications from preliminary analysis that consumers who bought insurance on credit signal
as bad risk-types, as compared to their counterparts who paid contracts upfront.
In the second project (Chapter 3), Belinda Archibong and I study the potential unequal
gender-impacts of climate-induced disease outbreak “Meningitis” on educational investments
(preliminary version published in AER P&P 2017). Persistent gender gaps in educational
attainment have been examined in the context of differential parental costs of investment
in the education of boys versus girls. In this project, we examine whether disease burdens,
especially prevalent in the tropics, contribute significantly to widening gender gaps in ed-
ucational attainments. We estimate the impact of sudden exposure to the 1986 meningitis
epidemic in Niger on girls’ education relative to boys. Our results suggest that increases
in meningitis cases during epidemic years significantly reduce years of education dispro-
portionately for school-aged going girls in areas with higher meningitis exposure. There is
no significant effect for boys in the same cohort and no effects of meningitis exposure for
non-epidemic years.
We use theory to explore different channels, highlighting income effects of epidemics on
households and early marriage of girls in areas with higher exposure during epidemic years.
We also use National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) data to investigate
the relationship between climate variables and the meningitis epidemic and explore how
climate change could potentially worsen social inequality through widening the gender gap
in human capital investment. Our findings have broader implications for climate-induced
disease effects on social inequality.
In the third project (Chapter 4), Bikramaditya Datta and I investigate the impact of pre-
existing informal risk-sharing arrangements on the take-up of weather index-based insurance
contracts, simply termed “index insurance”. In this work, we develop a model that consid-
ers the case of an individual who endogenously chooses to join a group and make decisions
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about index insurance. We show that the presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrange-
ment reduces his risk aversion, termed “Effective Risk Aversion”— a sufficient statistic for
index decision making. Appealing to such reduction in risk aversion, we show that informal
schemes may either reduce or increase the take up of index insurance, providing alternative
explanations for two empirical puzzles: unexpectedly low adoption of index insurance and
demand being particularly low for the most risk averse. The main intuition follows from the
simple observation that in the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement, an individual’s risk
tolerance is increased compared to the absence of the group. This has two implications for
the take-up of index insurance. First, the individual becomes more tolerant to basis risk,
an inherent risk in index contracts, and so is more likely to take-up. Second, the individual
being more risk-tolerant makes him sensitive to the price of insurance and so less willing
to take-up the index cover, thus generating two opposite effects on the decision to purchase
index insurance.
Our model provide testable hypotheses with implications for the design of index insurance
contracts and the commercial success of such innovative financial products. We draw on data
from a panel of field experimental trials in India to document evidence for several predictions
that emerge from our analyses. First, we provide empirical evidence that the overall effect
of informal risk-sharing on the take-up of index insurance is ambiguous. There is evidence
that informal risk sharing schemes may support take-up, finding that when downside basis
risk is high, risk-sharing increases the index demand by approximately 13 to 40 percentage
points. In addition, there is evidence that the existence of risk-sharing arrangement makes
individuals more sensitive to price changes, with an estimated increased elasticity of about
0.34. Our analysis documents that the effective reduction in risk aversion following individu-
als’ exposure to risk-sharing group treatments explains these findings. Finally, we show that
an increase in the size of risk-sharing groups decreases take-up. This effect is stronger once
we have conditioned on basis risk – a counter force. Strikingly, this result stand in contrast
to standard information diffusion models, in which an increase in exposed group size should
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facilitate uptake of index insurance (e.g., Jackson and Yariv 2010; Banerjee et al. 2013).
In ongoing research, we aim to test the predictions from the model in the laboratory. Fur-
ther, we plan to draw on the literature on network analysis and multi-dimensional matching
to analyze the interactions between index insurance and informal arrangements to inform
the design of policy and index contracts. Our results will have broader implications for the
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The standard insurance contract requires upfront payments by consumers to protect against
potential future losses. However, consumers in developing countries often buy insurance on
credit. While this may allow consumers facing credit constraints to acquire more coverage,
it might amplify moral hazard with implications for welfare. I evaluate the effect of this
moral hazard by exploiting an unexpected regulatory reform in Ghana that made it illegal
to buy car insurance on credit, creating an exogenous variation in contract choice: consumers
responded by switching to contracts with less coverage. I formulate a model that allows for
selection and moral hazard, and show that if contracts with higher coverage only increase
claims, a simple difference estimator gives a lower bound on the effect of moral hazard. I
combine this result with unique administrative data on contracts to document three addi-
tional sets of findings. First, there is evidence of moral hazard in the market which was
averted by the regulatory reform. Second, moral hazard is responsible for the reduction in
average size of claims and the number of claims by 46% and 22% respectively, leading to
a 12% increase in insurance company profits. Finally, I show that abstracting from selec-
tion while learning about moral hazard leads one to substantially over-estimate its effect.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations assuming risk aversion and limited enforcement of credit
arrangements suggest that the loss in consumer welfare attributable to the regulatory reform
do not outweigh the gains in producer welfare. These results have wider applicability to the
study of market inter-linkages, bundling and credit-constraints.
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2.1 Introduction
Consumers in developing countries often buy insurance on credit. These arrangements be-
tween insurers and consumers allow consumers to get coverage but defer premium payments
to a later period. Such deferral is similar in principle to interlinking credit and insurance
markets. The view that market inter-linkages act as mechanisms to mitigate problems of
imperfect information, enforcement and to co-develop markets has long been emphasized.1
In turn, this has led to a growing empirical research that bundles credit with insurance and
vice versa, finding either increases or decreases in take-ups, respectively.
When credit is bundled with insurance, the effects on insurance demand have been un-
ambiguously positive. For example, Liu et al. (2016) find that delaying premium payments
for livestock mortality insurance increases the take-up of insurance in China; Casaburi and
Willis (2017) find even larger increases in take-up rates for a crop insurance product in
Kenya.2 However, by bundling credit with insurance, particularly, it may increase demand
but induce moral hazard in insurance, a trade-off that I study. This potentially negative
effect of interlinking these two markets has so far been ignored in the literature.
I document that insurance arrangements that defer some proportion of premium pay-
ments to the future increase insurance demand, and argues that such contractual arrange-
ments can lead to substantial moral hazard and welfare losses. I evaluate an insurance policy
experiment that made it impossible to buy car insurance on credit. Car insurance is cru-
cial for businesses to develop, especially in developing countries where many people operate
transport vehicles as small and medium enterprises.3 It forms a large private market, but
1Early works date back to Braverman and Stiglitz (1982, 1986) who show how a principal may interlock
two contracts to induce more favorable outcomes. For example, a trader-lender may offer a farmer who
borrows from him lower prices on inputs (seeds; fertilizers), since the probability of default is reduced when
such inputs are used. Relatedly, Carter et al. (2013) show that interlinking credit and insurance contracts
allow both markets to co-develop, as compared to when the markets are in isolation.
2When insurance is bundled with credit on the other hand, the effects are mixed. Banerjee et al. (2014)
find that by requiring loan clients to purchase health insurance at the time of renewing their loans, many
(16 percentage points) borrower clients dropped out of borrowing in India; Karlan et al. (2014), however,
find significant increases in the take-up for credit in Ghana.
3The employment-gains from car insurance may also be exemplified by a recent innovation in the car
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may fail to function and grow due to frictions such as moral hazard and other inefficiencies.4
The reform allows me to see the change in contract choice that follows the end of the credit
market and associated claims. This allows me to characterize how the access to credit in the
previous regulatory framework induced moral hazard.
The regulatory reform I study was unexpectedly imposed by the National Insurance
Commission (NIC) of Ghana. The reform is called “no premium, no cover” and requires
insurance firms to collect premiums upfront before providing insurance coverage. Prior to
the change, insurers were allowing customers to purchase insurance coverage on interest-free
credit and to pay later; so the reform made lower coverage more attractive.
To learn about moral hazard, I formulate a model that allows for selection and moral
hazard and derive bounds on moral hazard. This formulation recognizes the complex in-
terplay between multidimensional selection and moral hazard in insurance. With selection,
individuals are heterogeneous in their unobservable attributes such as risk type and risk
aversion, and thus self-select into different kinds of contracts. The bounds are based on
restrictions that stem from agency theory and exogenous variation in contract choices in-
duced by the policy reform. Following the seminal work of Holmstrom (1979), most of the
contracts and moral hazard literature has assumed the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
(MLRP), which requires that better outcomes are likely due to higher effort. I combine
the MLRP with two other conditions. The first is that the actual timing of the reform is
business sector, called “work n pay”. Slightly different from sharecropping, work n pay are contractual
arrangements that allow commercial drivers and the young to acquire cars and work with it, while making
payments for the car within a period of time—typically two and half years. The arrangements are such that
the drivers make part payment of the cars and work to pay the rest in installments. Private conversations
with work n pay drivers in Ghana suggest that (i) common challenges to this business are accidents and
robbery, but (ii) the availability and provision of insurance for the cars largely influence their decisions to
sign up for such arrangements. Even, major insurance companies (and the government) have recently taken
up the initiative to offer work n pay schemes under soft re-payment terms with full insurance coverage. See
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/200-new-vehicles-for-Youth-in-Driving-265953
4A vast theory shows that frictions from information asymmetries (traditionally, moral hazard and
adverse selection) limit the ability of formal insurance and credit markets to function (Rothschild and
Stiglitz 1976; Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray 2000). This has led to a careful empirical research seeking to
learn and overcome the various informational asymmetries like moral hazard, but with a substantial focus
on developed country contexts. Thus, little is known about the relative significance of moral hazard in
developing countries, a gap I will fill.
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uncorrelated with individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity; the second is that customers who
select higher coverage contracts will not supply more effort. In the spirit of Manski (1990),
these conditions allow me to derive bounds on moral hazard. I show that a simple difference
estimator yields a lower bound on the effect of moral hazard. The economic model and
restrictions provide micro-foundations for the econometric model and empirical exercise.
I leverage a rich set of customer level insurance and credit records that span 2013–2015
and come from the administrative files of the largest branch of the largest General Business
insurance company in Ghana. Two unique features about the data are that: (i) it spans a
period before and after the reform that made it impossible to buy insurance on credit; and
(ii) it allows one to track customers across contract years. In doing so, I observe who used
to buy insurance on credit, and who switched either from higher to lower coverage. The
use of administrative data sets on insurance contracts is common for research in developed
countries, but in developing countries, data of this kind have historically been unavailable for
research. The combination of rich customer level administrative data and quasi-experimental
variation from an insurance policy reform enables me to evaluate moral hazard’s effect and
the possible linkages with credit constraints in a developing country setting.
I start by asking how the introduction of the reform impacted customers’ choice of insur-
ance coverage. There are two choices in the contracts menu: basic, which is legally required
and provides only third party protection, and comprehensive/higher coverage, which insures
against all responsible liability. I find that the policy reform led to a 6 percentage point drop
in the share of comprehensive contracts. I also show evidence that consumers who bought
comprehensive contracts were more likely to buy on credit than those who only bought basic
coverage, and switched to lower contracts after the reform removed the possibility of buying
insurance on credit. The overwhelming majority (99.5%) of consumers who used to buy
comprehensive insurance on credit switch to cheaper basic-liability insurance, with less than
1.6% dropping out of insurance altogether after the reform
I then exploit the plausible assumption that the actual timing of the policy reform is
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uncorrelated with individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity to construct a simple and general
test of the presence of moral hazard. The idea behind the test is that, under the null of no-
moral hazard, a change in insurance coverage induced by the reform, and not selection, should
not cause a change in claim amounts or occurrence of loss. This follows from Escanciano,
Salanié and Yildiz (2016), who show that exogenous variation in contract menus allows for a
test of moral hazard under selection. Both graphical and formal tests suggest the existence
of moral hazard in this market. This existence test, although simple and clean, only provides
inference about whether or not moral hazard is absent; it is unable to evaluate the effect of
moral hazard.
I proceed to investigate moral hazard and its effect using the derived bounds. Consistent
with the results of the first test, I find strong and convincing evidence of moral hazard. The
evidence is robust across various definitions of insurance outcomes. Moral hazard induced
significant leakages in insurance claims. The empirical results suggest a lower bound moral
hazard estimate of (i) GHC52 (USD18), which translates to 46% of the average size of claims;
and (ii) 22% of the number of claims between two contract years. These moral hazard effects,
averted by the policy reform, correspond to a 12% increase in average firm profits for the
company’s auto-business line.5 Beside the increase in firm profits through reduction in moral
hazard, the switch to contracts with lower coverage due to the policy reform may lead to
loss in consumer welfare. Under various assumptions about risk aversion, enforcement and
repayment of premium debts, I conduct back-of-the-calculations of the welfare loss, and
gains from making it impossible to buy insurance on credit. I find that the loss in consumer
welfare is about 11% of the gain in producer welfare, suggesting that the regulatory reform
is not welfare-decreasing overall.
There are at least two potential channels through which the reform may have shifted
5The estimated total cost of moral hazard, averted by the regulatory reform, is about GHC52,703,889
(USD17,567,963) for the insurance industry. Expected revenues and costs associated with providing in-
surance are simply derived using realized premiums and indemnities from the insurer’s policies data, re-
spectively. This calculation allows for an insurance loading of 25% (reflecting the administrative costs of
processing claims) but ignores any direct returns on company investments of collected insurance premiums.
12
choices of insurance contracts and thus moral hazard: binding credit constraints, and changes
in relative prices. The analysis establishes that the results are likely driven by credit con-
straints. In particular, moral hazard is much larger for the group of consumers who tend to
buy insurance on credit. However, the decision to buy insurance on credit could either be be-
cause the consumers are actually credit-constrained, or financially “savvy” with no intention
of repaying their premium debts. I find as high as 79% repayment rates for premium debts,
which is inconsistent with the latter. Why repay debts before the expiration of insurance
contracts, if the goal is to take advantage of the credit provision? In contrast, the evidence is
consistent with credit constraints: consumers who switched to contracts with lower coverage
after the regulation were those who bought contracts with higher coverage earlier and with
credit. Next, if insurance firms were to adjust premiums in response to the policy reform
then it will be unclear whether or not the moral hazard results are also driven by changes
in relative prices. I find evidence against such alternative channels. I thus document the
significance of the possible effect of credit constraints on moral hazard, in particular in the
context of a developing country.
I contribute to several strands of literature. First, I contribute to the literature that ex-
amines the importance of inter-linked markets in developing countries.6 This line of research
has appealed to the use of inter-linkages to overcome the inefficiencies from incomplete mar-
kets (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982, 1986), along with the development of the various markets
(Carter et al. 2013). Many experimental studies have bundled insurance with credit, finding
either increases or decreases in the demand for credit (Gine and Yang 2009; Banerjee et
al. 2014; Karlan et al. 2014). Others—experimental and quasi-experimental— have bun-
dled credit with insurance, finding significant increases in the take-up of insurance (Liu et al.
2016; Casaburi and Willis 2017). I document the moral hazard and net welfare consequences
of bundling credit with insurance, suggesting the difficulty of developing both markets.
Second, I add to the growing empirical literature on testing for the existence of asym-
6Bardhan (1980), Bell (1988), and Bardhan (1989) provide surveys about market inter-linkages.
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metric information in both private and social insurance markets (Chiappori and Salanié
2000; Finkelstein and Poterba 2002; Krueger and Meyer 2002; Cohen and Dehejia 2004;
Cohen and Einav 2007; Einav, Finkelstein and Levin 2010; Einav et al. 2013; Hendren 2013;
Hansman 2016; Kim 2017 and many others). Major parts of this literature have focused
on (i) insurance markets in developed economies; less so for developing country settings,
and (ii) testing the existence of asymmetric information in general by exploiting correlations
between insurance purchases and claims; mostly in the spirit of the “positive correlation”
tests of Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Chiappori et al. (2006). This paper contributes
by separating moral hazard from selection, as well as estimating the size of its effect7 in a de-
veloping country. The simple way to think about moral hazard’s effect is the loss in average
profits to insurers or in parts of social value due to its presence. Estimated quantities can
be informative in thinking about how to quantify the welfare implications of moral hazard
and potential public policy interventions.
Methodologically, this paper differs from the above literature. I develop and use a bounds
approach to detect moral hazard, where unobserved heterogeneity or adverse selection is
allowed to impact the response function in an unrestricted manner. The unobserved het-
erogeneity is allowed to be a vector of hidden information without any restriction on the
dimension.8
There are papers that focus on one informational friction such as adverse selection by
7One exception to estimating moral hazard’s effect is Schneider (2010), who provides a conservative
estimate of moral hazard (about 16%) increase in the accident rate for drivers who own versus lease their
taxicabs in New York City. Unlike Schneider (2010), the empirical approach here is nonparametric and
focuses on both loss occurrence and claim outcomes. I take advantage of these two outcomes to investigate
whether moral hazard is due to occurrence of losses or a shift in the distribution of claims, respectively. Re-
latedly, Gerfin and Schellhorn (2006) used deductibles as an excluded instrument and statistical restrictions
to bound moral hazard. Their outcome variable was the probability of a doctor visit in Switzerland. But
unlike Gerfin and Schellhorn (2016), I combine microfounded restrictions with an exclusion from a policy
reform restricting the sale of insurance on credit which permits potential linkages between moral hazard and
credit constraints, akin to low-income environments. To put the results into context: I provide moral hazard
estimates that are 1.5-3.0 times larger than estimates from developed countries.
8A policyholder may be characterized by multi-dimensional selection attributes including risk types and
risk preferences, and empirical work has shown evidence from different contexts (Finkelstein and McGarry
2006 in long-term care insurance; Cohen and Einav 2007 in car insurance; Davidoff and Welke 2007 in reverse
mortgage; Fang, Keane and Silverman 2008 in Medigap health insurance). Yet, an identifying framework
that accounts for these adverse selection attributes in an unrestricted manner is still unavailable.
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abstracting from moral hazard (e.g., Cohen and Einav 2007). The proposed approach allows
me to evaluate the implication of this. Suppose I assume away selection, then I find huge
moral hazard effects which are larger than the credible estimates by substantial magnitudes:
4-7 times larger. This exercise documents that abstracting from one dimension can have large
and nontrivial consequences. Taken together, the proposed approach provides an alternative
benchmark to evaluate the effect of moral hazard, and can be applied to study moral hazard
in other insurance and financial market contexts.
Finally, this paper is related to the broader literature that studies the economic impor-
tance of credit constraints. Our knowledge about credit constraints is important for the
optimal design of private and public programs, as they tend to alter the potential behav-
ioral response to these programs. In developing countries, many papers have shown that
liquidity constrains the demand for agricultural insurance (Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al.
2014), health products such as anti-malaria bed nets (Cohen and Dupas 2010), and induces
motives for precautionary saving (Lee and Sawada 2010). In developed countries, liquidity
constraints have been shown to limit investment in human capital (Dynarski 2003), and
to cause significant response to unemployment insurance durations (Chetty 2008) and con-
sumer bankruptcy decisions (Gross, Notowidigdo and Wang 2014). Since the moral hazard
results are explained by credit constraints, this paper establishes a possible link between the
two strands of literature on credit constraints in developing countries and market failures
through incentive effects, particularly the private insurance sector. In particular, while re-
ducing credit constraints may be good, I document a situation where such a reduction may
lead to inefficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on
the setting and policy reform. Section 3 builds an economic model to highlight the complex
interplay between selection and moral hazard. Section 4 discusses the data and research
design; 5 presents a test and results for moral hazard based on the research design and
formulation in section 3. Section 6 lays out the bounds analysis and presents the bounding
15
results on moral hazard. The possible explanations, caveats and implications are discussed in
section 7. Section 8 concludes with applications, extensions and policy dimensions. Details
and some proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 Setting and policy experiment
I discuss the details of the institutional setting, policy reform and reasons underlying the
motives of insurance firms in lending premiums in this section. I had extensive personal
conversations with insurance companies. The findings, which are largely consistent with the
empirical evidence are presented to motivate the research approach.
2.2.1 The legal environment
Automobile insurance is compulsory in Ghana, as in other countries.9 By this, all individuals
operating a car are legally required to purchase insurance. This is usually for two principal
reasons. First, compulsory insurance ensures that some compensation is provided for those
who are injured in automobile accidents. Second, it forces drivers to internalize part of the
externality imposed on others by their driving, especially in the case where drivers have
bounded assets (Cohen and Dehejia 2004).10
In Ghana the specific types of auto insurance contracts can range from “third-party”
liability to “comprehensive” coverage. The minimum requirement by law is the third-party
which provides protection to others when accidents occur. Comprehensive contracts, on
9Compulsory insurance regulation was first introduced in Ghana in 1958. The Motor Vehicles (Third
Party Insurance) Act 1958, ACT 42 makes it illegal to drive a motor vehicle on public roads without insurance
covering third-party liabilities, at a minimum.
10In low-income and developing country contexts, individuals likely have very limited assets. This may
provide more justification for compulsory automobile insurance laws in such contexts.
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the other hand, provide coverage for all responsible claims. Enforcement of the compulsory
insurance law embody two dimensions: automobile drivers are required to report their in-
surance status at the time of an accident, and penalties can range from large fines to jail
terms when the driver is unable to show proof of coverage. Even so, enforcement can be
limited. For instance, it is estimated that about 20-36% of cars in Ghana are uninsured.11
2.2.2 The market, regulation and why it was introduced: in brief
The insurance industry in Ghana has undergone many periodic modifications through the
passage of various acts and reforms. The industry in its current state is largely governed
by Insurance Act 2006, ACT 724. Act 724 is a national act and complies with the Core
Principles of International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) as well as providing
regulatory powers to the National Insurance Commission (NIC 2011; NIC 2015). ACT 724
made the insurance industry more regulated, where the NIC is granted powers to regulate
and control the business of insurance markets in Ghana. A significant feature of this market,
particularly for car insurance contracts, is that the NIC regulates and effectively sets the
premiums for policies by providing a uniform price formula to all insurance firms.
On April 1 2014, the NIC introduced a reform called “no premium, no cover”. Figure
28 in the Appendix shows the timeline of the policy. The regulators agreed on the policy
11Data about uninsured cars are, of course, not available. I estimate the fraction of uninsured using the
following back-of-envelope exercises. For 2012: The National Insurance Commission (NIC) of Ghana issued
759,691 stickers to identify cars that have legitimate insurance cover. But the Driver and Vehicle Licencing
Authority (DVLA) reported that 946,284 vehicles were inspected for roadworthiness. This means that
about 186,593 vehicles on the roads did not have insurance cover; suggesting a 19.72% uninsured rate. See
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/200-000-cars-without-insurance-270312 For 2014, I
estimate that about 36% of all registered cars are uninsured: I collected data from the National Road Safety
Commission (NRSC) about total number of registered cars (1885836). I then estimated the total number of
insured cars in Ghana (~1190476). I estimate this by dividing the number of insurance policies at the end
of my sample (~30,000) by the product of the share of the market for the company that provided the data
(21%) and the best guess of the share of policies from the company’s headquarters branch (12%) where the
contracts data came from. Finally, I divided the difference between the total number of insured cars and
the total number of registered cars by the total number of registered cars; yielding about 36.01% uninsured
rate.
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on October 12, 2013, and then announced and implemented it on April 1, 2014—resulting
in an implementation lag of seven (7) months. This policy reform requires all insurance
firms to collect premiums upfront before providing insurance coverage. People were able
to buy coverage on credit and pay later before the reform began. The reform marked the
end of the credit market for auto insurance premia, and directly implies that insurance
companies will no longer be able to sell insurance products on credit to customers. The
sale of insurance on credit created an accounting problem: premium payments were delayed
leading to a mismatch in the actual re-payment times and the preparation of balance sheets.
All unpaid premiums at the time of preparing financial statements are declared outstanding.
This made it difficult for insurance companies to pay their reinsurance premiums on time
since most premiums remained outstanding. In turn, the reinsurers were unable to pay their
retrocessionaires on time; exposing the entire industry to substantial liquidity risk.
2.2.3 Pre-policy regime: stylized facts
Before the introduction of the reform, insurers were essentially serving a dual role: loss-risk
takers and premium-lenders. Enforcement of lending or credit arrangements is based on the
direct repeated interactions between the insurers and consumers. In addition, insurers use
market intermediaries (i.e., insurance brokers and agents) to enforce credit arrangements
as many insurance contracts are acquired through the intermediary channels. As shown in
Figure 2.1, about 53 percent of all contracts sold prior to the reform were through interme-
diaries. Intermediaries have a better motivation to collect premium debts, as most insurance
companies would not pay all commissions12 due unless the premiums are paid.
From the consumers’ side, they were able to enjoy flexible payment terms by deferring the
payment for their policies to a later date. In instances where there is a loss while the premium
12The commissions averaged about 5% per unit premium.
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is still outstanding, consumers are required to settle the premium arrears in full before the
loss is paid. In other instances, however, the premium outstanding is deducted from the
loss payment before payment to the policy holder. In part, this uncertainty combined with
the crucial role of trust in insurance transactions explains why only 27 percent of consumers
acquired insurance on credit prior to the regulatory reform. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b show
the take-up of credit to buy insurance over time prior to the regulation. Both figures are
based on a probit regression of whether or not a customer purchased insurance on credit.
Figure 2.2a includes only monthly dummies as regressors, whiles Figure 2.2b adds a linear
control for time trend and customer characteristics. The take-up of insurance on credit is
stable across the various months before the policy’s implementation. This suggests that the
implementation of the no-credit policy was unexpected by consumers.13
From the side of insurers, it was common for firms to report outstanding premiums on
their annual financial statements. Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) show the distribution of premi-
ums in debt prior to the regulation. The figures reflect the amount of premium (GHC) and
its percentage as a share of actual premiums at the time contracts are signed, respectively.
For customers who bought insurance on credit, there is evidence of substantial premium
debts, ranging between 0.2-100% of premiums. Together, the total debt represents 64.2% of
actual premiums for consumers who took insurance on credit. Expressed as a share of all
premiums for the auto-business line, this is about 33.3%.
Given that many insurance contracts were sold through market intermediaries, I superimpose
the distribution of premiums in debt across the two sources of selling insurance policies in
Figure 2.4. There is evidence that consumers are more likely to initiate contracts on credit
13It is reassuring that consumers did not anticipate the actual implementation or announcement of the
regulation. This is useful in Section 4, where I argue that the actual timing of the policy is exogenous and
uncorrelated with unobserved consumer attributes.
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through the intermediary channels.
Finally, as discussed earlier, enforcement of credit arrangements relies on direct repeated
interactions and the use of market intermediaries. I assess this in Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b)
showing the repayment rate of outstanding premiums. Figure 2.5(a) indicates that 21.3%
(out of 27.0%) of customers who purchased insurance on credit repaid their premium debts
before their contracts expired; this translates to a repayment rate of about 79.0%. The
repayment rate is not significantly different if I look at the actual amount of premiums in
debt. Figure 2.5(b) shows that about 24.4% (out of 33.3%) of the total premium debts
were repaid prior to the no-credit policy. This implies a repayment rate of about 73.2%.
Both results point to a high repayment rate of outstanding premiums prior to the policy’s
implementation, suggesting a low credit risk/delinquency for allowing consumers to buy
insurance on credit.
Why were companies willing to accept credit payments before the
reform?
It is surprising that the insurance firms were lending premiums. What is especially striking
is that they were accepting credit payments at interest-free rates. I summarize the two
principal reasons below.14
Competition under regulated-prices As discussed earlier, the NIC effectively sets the
premiums. So the insurance firms were essentially selling regulated-price contracts, with no
room to directly influence how their prices are set. Thus, giving credit was considered a way
to indirectly influence or reduce prices to maintain their market share. The zero-interest rate
can be understood formally in a simple model of two competing firms who take premium as
given, and then compete over credit. Applying Bertrand strategies, I find that zero or even
14Several possible reasons are discussed, but the first two presented here are the primary explanations,
and the rest are relegated to the Appendix. These discussions yield testable implications that future work
will aim to explore.
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negative interest rates are possible equilibrium outcomes. An illustration is provided in the
Appendix.
Application of accounting standards and reserve requirements Operating within
accounting frameworks, it is assumed that once someone owes the insurance company, it
is an asset for the insurance company. The outstanding premiums actually make the com-
panies’ accounts look more attractive on the surface, regardless of the opportunity costs:
forgone investments, earning a positive return. For companies to formally operate, they are
required to meet certain capital and reserve requirements set by regulators. Hence, providing
coverage on credit was considered a good strategy to circumvent such reserve requirements.
Furthermore, most of the outstanding premiums were eventually recovered later. As a result,
selling insurance on credit was deemed less risky (i.e., low credit risk).
2.2.4 Post-policy regime: stylized facts
The policy mandate disallowed the purchase of insurance on credit: consumers cannot defer
or owe any portion of their premiums. In addition, firms were required to write off all
premium debts from their books.
The reform was strictly enforced. Since its introduction, the NIC undertook occasional
unannounced visits to audit insurance company records. The penalty of noncompliance is as
high as ten (10) times the amounts in outstanding debts, forcing the insurance companies to
comply with the reform’s requirements. The no-credit reform system ultimately helped to
cut down the rising outstanding premium profiles of insurance companies. At the same time,
it ensured that the companies had enough capacity to honor their reinsurance obligations.
There were two additional effects: (i) policyholders who could afford full payment but were
taking advantage of the credit-based system had to pay in full; and (ii) those who were credit
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constrained and could not afford higher coverage had to cut down coverage. I discuss these
two effects as candidate mechanisms underlying the results.15
Finally, most countries in the west-African sub region have embraced similar market
policy reforms. For instance, Nigeria and Gambia have followed with similar no-credit regu-
lations in 2014 and 2015, respectively. These regulations have been projected to have positive
implications for the balance sheets of underwriting companies and the overall financial health
of the insurance industry.
2.2.5 Private conversations with company
To better understand the impact of the reform16, I had private conversations with staff and
managers of the insurance company that provided the data. Some extracts from the personal
conversations follow:
“The April 2014 reform triggered some important changes. Par-
ticularly, it made insurance unaffordable to clients in that most
folks dropped from more generous [Comprehensive] to basic [Third
party] plans.”
“Some of our clients switched from Comprehensive to Third
Party plans because the reform made the insurance purchasing
rule more stringent.”
The quotes resonate with economic intuition as the reform imposed additional liquidity-cost
on the purchase of insurance. There are potential income effects from constraints in liquidity
15Section 2.3 suggests a low credit risk due to the higher repayment rates of premium debts, 79%. This
will seem imply that the latter effect (credit-constraint) dominates. I explore this in more detail in Section
7.
16All insurance products, excluding life insurance, are broadly classified in the industry as General Busi-
ness. The analysis utilizes a rich set of individual level auto-insurance records (spanning 2013-2015) that
come from the administrative files of the largest General Business insurance company in Ghana (about 21%
of the entire market in 2014; the data description is contained in Section 4). The company offers different
insurance products through their business lines e.g., automobile, workman compensation, bonds, marine,
and etc. I focus on the automobile insurance line which accounted for 55.4% of their net premium holdings.
In addition to the simple nature of auto-contracts, automobiles pose environmental consequences that will
be studied later as an extension to this paper.
22
which affects insurance purchase as a normal good. Figure 2.6 provides supportive evidence
from the insurer’s data
This figure is based on a simple frequency estimator. First, the figure demonstrates that
the market share of comprehensive cover is significantly lower due to the introduction of
the reform. Second, the drop in probability of the purchase of comprehensive contract is
substantial, about 6 percentage points. It is useful to note that most of the comprehensive
policyholders credit prior to the reform, and so were directly affected by the reform. This
can be seen from the transition matrix displayed in Table 2.1. In particular, over 99.4% of
consumers who purchased insurance on credit (27%) switched from comprehensive to basic
contracts after the no-credit regulation. Most notably, customers who acquired comprehen-
sive contracts were much more likely to do so on credit, compared to customers who bought
minimal coverage. The reform provides plausibly exogenous variation in customers’ choice of
contracts: basic versus comprehensive insurance. The background of this research’s design
is based on the major policy change, in which that policy change is used as an instrument
for contract choices.
In the next section I present a simple economic model that illustrates a selection problem
confronting the analysis of moral hazard, to guide the empirical analysis moral hazard and
its linkages with liquidity via the policy reform.
2.3 Mixed economic model and effects
I consider a typical insurance market set-up where consumers have asymmet-
ric information, which allows for adverse selection and moral hazard. Two
economic actors enter into a contract: the principal, or the insurer, and the
consumer, or the insuree. Multiple contracts may be offered. I “black box” the
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principal’s role and focus on the consumer. A key feature of the set-up is that
consumer’s private information matters to the principal but is unobserved to
the principal.
2.3.1 Background model
Index a consumer by i and consider a population of insurance customers whose observed
characteristics are denoted by Xi. The observed characteristics of customers are assumed to
be exogenous. I will ignore conditioning on Xi for convenience.
Technology & Contract Formally, the consumer i owns the following production technol-
ogy
Yi = g(ei, α
y
i , εi)
where Yi represents the insurance outcome. εi is a random variable that may capture random
circumstances in the production technology, e.g. weather, and ei denotes the customer’s
choice of effort, capturing the prevention of accidents or limiting their severity; and αyi
captures hidden information that enters the customer’s productivity. The principal observes
the outcome Yi but not the customer’s effort ei or random variable εi. The consumer chooses
his ei before the realization of εi occurs. I will sometime refer to g(.) as the structural response
function.
Index a contract type by d. Define an insurance contract as Cd = {Πd, Id(L)}. This pair
specifies the insurance premium Πd ≥ 0 and indemnity Id(L) ≥ 0 for some loss size L. Let
Di denote the customer’s choice of contract. I shall restrict attention to binary contracts
Di ∈ {d : 0, 1}, to be consistent with the empirical setting where consumers choose either
basic or comprehensive contract cover, respectively. In this case, Π0 is the premium for basic
contract and Π1 is the premium for comprehensive contract.
24
Timing & Model Let αui be hidden information that enters the customer’s utility function
u, capturing preferences and risk aversion, and define αi = (αyi , αui ). The vector αi can
be thought of as customer’s unobserved heterogeneity. To derive the model that guides
the subsequent analysis, consider the following sequence of customer’s moves. First, the
consumer i privately observes his type αi. Second, conditional on his type, the consumer
makes a contract choice over Di = 0, 1. Third, suppose that the consumer chooses Di. Then
conditional on (Di, αi), effort levels are respectively chosen as17




u[R(Yi,Π0, I0)]|ei, αi − ei
)




u[R(Yi,Π1, I1)]|ei, αi − ei
)
where u[] is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that satisfies standard conditions.
R(Yi,Πd, Id) denotes the net income flow from buying insurance and expectations are taken
over the random shocks ε.18 Here, the consumer will optimally choose his level of effort to
maximize his expected utility less his disutility from effort. Effort ei has been normalized so
that one unit of effort translates into one unit of disutility in expectation.









u[R(Yi,Πd, Id)]|ei, αi − ei
)
This implies that Di = σ(αi) and ei = e∗i (Di, αi). Together, the implied model can be cast
as a triangular system
Yi =g(e
∗




17A summary of the model’s timing is provided in Figure 2.25 in the Appendix. There is a uniform menu
of contracts across all firms in the empirical environment so direct competition (e.g., via price; product),
which could permit consumers to strategically seek for “better” priced-contracts across firms, is of little
concern. The insurance market is highly regulated and controlled by the government, as discussed in Section
2. The model set up is a recursive problem, where in principle the customer will also choose the contract
Di = 1 if and only if its net flow utility is the highest among the other feasible candidate contracts.
18Note the difference between αyi and εi: α
y
i are all productivity shocks available to the consumer before
contracts are established (e.g., pre–contract weather realizations), but εi does not come in until efforts are
made and thus beyond the customer’s control (e.g., post–contract weather realizations).
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Discussions The model formally shows how ei maps into Di and αi = (αyi , αui ). First, note
that consumer i’s contract choice is not randomly assigned. This crucially depends on his
type, as illustrated above; hence the observed random variable Di is potentially endogenous.
The endogeneity of Di may also arise through the correlation of the unobservables (αi, εi).
In this mixed model, it is difficult to learn about moral hazard alone because the choice
of contracts that will create incentives for effort choices are also determined by unobserved
heterogeneity or some exogenous, third factor.19 One possible solution would be to assume
that unobserved heterogeneity αi, which structurally leads to nonrandom sample selection,
is some additive term in a model that is linear in outcomes and contract choice, and then
use fixed effects to control for this. But clearly controlling for fixed effects by differencing
out additive αi terms may be inadequate.
I explore the idea of instrument exclusion from a regulatory change to learn about moral
hazard, in which the change exogenously modify the contract choice and incentives. The
following discusses the regulatory change approach and how it is used to quantify the effect
of moral hazard.
2.3.2 Effects and definitions
To cast the problem using counterfactual notation as in the treatment effects literature, that
is, the outcome that would have been observed if the consumer i with unobservables αi and
εi had been assigned the contract d, I fix d. This means that the customer’s level of effort
can be written as e∗i (d, αi). The corresponding production technology is
Yi(d) = g(e
∗
i (d, αi), α
y
i , εi)
One needs an instrument Z, which is uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity; with
19A naive test for moral hazard in the mixed model will either directly exploit the correlations between
the customer’s outcome Yi and contract choice Di, or between the outcome Yi and the level of effort e∗i (., .).
But unfortunately, neither of these two approaches yields reliable inference since the correlations may be
due to adverse selection αi.
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Di = σ(αi, Z) to exogenously shift the σ(., .) function. In the empirical analysis, Yi repre-
sents insurance claims or loss occurrence and the instrument Z represents policy changes
that exogenously induce changes in choice of insurance contracts. Di = 0 corresponds to
compulsory or basic contracts. These are mandatory contracts that drivers are required to
purchase by law. Under this contract, only third party protection is provided for responsible
claims. Di = 1 corresponds to comprehensive contracts, where protection is provided for
all responsible claims. Intuitively, a typical comprehensive contract covers all loss events
that the basic contract covers (e.g., third party injuries), in addition to other events that
are not covered under the basic contract (e.g., missing own vehicle parts, crash in a tree).
Hence, different contracts present different incentives for consumer actions and outcomes;
with comprehensive contracts providing lower incentives for desirable outcomes, as compared
to basic contracts.
Moral hazard defined Following Escanciano et al. (2016) and Salanié (2005 Ch. 5), I
define moral hazard as the causal impact of contracts. This embodies all non-contractible
actions that affect the occurrence and distribution of losses or claim outcomes due to the
terms of the contract. Specific examples include costly parking at safer places, wearing a
seatbelt, and other negligence, whether it is strategic or mechanical. With this definition,
two potential sources of moral hazard are possible: “ex-ante” moral hazard which occurs
through changes in unobserved preventive efforts and “ex-post” moral hazard that arises
when customers under-report claims by withholding claim or loss information strategically
(Cohen and Einav 2007).
Formally, suppose there is no moral hazard, then it must be that Yi(d)
dis
≈ Yi(d′)|Zi
∀d 6= d′ where dis≈ is the shorthand notation for “has the same distribution as”. Suppose there
is moral hazard, then Yi(d)|Zi should increase with coverage (d), where d corresponds to
a contract choice. In this case Yi(d)|Zi increasing in coverage implies that worse outcomes
are exogenously realized under higher coverage. I observe an IID sequence of observations
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{(Yi, Di, Zi)i : i = 1, ..., I}. Identifying moral hazard in the mixed model of moral hazard
and selection is equivalent to examining changes in the joint distribution of (Y,D)|Z. The
focus will be on
E[(Y,D)|Z]
I drop the subscript i for easy illustration. The key point is that there exists a causal chain
where Z exogenously shifts the distribution of σ(.) (i.e. equivalently E[D|Z] ) which will in
turn shift the distribution of Y via e∗(., .). More generally, I define the average structural
function ASF (Blundell and Powell 2003) as
µz(d) = E[Yi(d)|Z = z] ≡
∫
g(e∗i (d, αi; z), α
y
i , εi)dF (αi, εi), d = 0, 1
where F (.) represents the joint distribution of the unobservables αi and εi. Next I can
define the average treatment effect ATE of Di = 1 versus Di = 0 to be
∆ = µz(1)− µz(0) > 0,MH
∆ essentially quantifies the average effect of exogenously shifting all consumers from the
treatment status Di = 0 to Di = 1. As indicated above, ∆ > 0 is required for moral hazard
(MH). The presence of moral hazard leads to worse outcomes, which is measured by the size
of 4; I call this the moral hazard effect (MHE). I derive bounds for the three objects µz(1),
µz(0) and ∆. The approach utilizes a model that is nonseparable in unobservables (αi, εi)
along with a plausibly random and exogenous policy instrument to eliminate contaminations
that may be due to adverse selection.
2.4 Data, measurements and research design
This section describes the data and main research design, which requires the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity to be similar before and after the reform. I carry out several
checks showing the validity of the policy instrument and research design.
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2.4.1 Data
As mentioned in Section 2, I combine data from two major sources: administrative data
and surveys.20 The surveys embody private conversations with drivers and staff from the
insurance company that provided the administrative data. From the administrative data,
I observe the complete contract profile for each policy holder i in the insurer’s files across
two contract years t (2013/14 and 2014/15). Notable features of the data is that it spans
a period before and after the policy reform and allows me to track customers over time. I
define the following set of variables based on information from the data.
Treatment: Dit = 1 [Comprehensive] is an indicator for the choice of insurance contract,
where basic contracts correspond to Dit = 0 and comprehensive contracts correspond to
Dit = 1. The definition is guided by the nature of the Ghanaian automobile insurance
market where consumers choose from the contract menu: basic versus comprehensive. As
discussed in Section 3.2, basic contracts cover damages only for others, while comprehensive
contracts cover all responsible claims when accidents occur.
Policy Instrument: Zit = 1 [τt > τ¯ ] equal to 1 for the contract period τt after the major
National reform τ¯ . This construction follows because the introduction of the policy reform
created an exogenous variation that induced changes in consumers’ choice of insurance con-
tracts. Since I exploit an instrument which comes from the reform changes before and after
τ¯=April 1 2014, the identifying variation is essentially from a pre- and post-design, although
different customers, particularly those who bought comprehensive contracts, were largely
affected by the policy change, yielding an analog of difference-in-differences.
Policy instrument’s relevance Figure 2.6 documents the relevance of the policy instru-
ment. It demonstrates that contract choices changed dramatically following the reform.
Although skipped here, it is straightforward to formally test for relevance under the hypoth-
esis that the reform does not affect insurance choice.
20Additional data about industry aggregates are obtained from the annual reports of insurance companies
and the NIC. Traffic information about overall accident rates and registered vehicles are also obtained from
Ghana’s National Road Safety Commission of the Ministry of Transportation. http://www.nrsc.gov.gh/
29
Outcome: Yit denotes either claim amount or loss occurrence that is realized by customer i
at time t. These are the two main outcomes of interest. The claim outcome is defined as the
per period insurance claim received by a policyholder. There are two contract years spanning
the days between April 1, 2013 - March 31, 2015. Claims (or loss occurrence) cannot be less
than zero so I treat all negative outcomes in the data set (<0.001% of sample) as missing at
random, as these are likely errors.21
Controls: It is important to condition on all publicly observed customer characteristics
(Chiappori and Salanié 2014) that either determine or do not determine insurance prices.
The data set includes a rich set of individual level information from the insurance company.
These include the following variables: (I) Level of no-claim-discount NCD: This measures the
amount of premium discount that the policyholder receives from the company. In practice,
customers receive a discount in period t for a no loss record in t − 1. The discounts are
adjusted accordingly once the customer gets an auto accident that triggers an insurance
payout. To prevent under-reporting of claims, discount amounts are typically less than
claims amounts.22 While I do not have enough data to explicitly model dynamics, I believe
the NCD variable possibly captures how customers respond to losses and discount across
different contract periods. (II) Riskiness/loadings: This is an industry measure useful for
the determination of premiums. It reflects the firm’s perception about customers riskiness
21(i) Summary statistics of the data are presented in Tables 17-19 in the Appendix. (ii) The overall
claims ratio is 22%. This reflects the amount paid out to insureds in comparison to premiums received by
the insurer between April 2013 to May 2015. That is to say just GHC22 was paid out of every GHC100
paid in premiums, suggesting that “poor value for money” is given to policyholders. This number is by far
below internationally accepted standards of 60%-80%. Clearly, under this schedule, it will be difficult to win
the confidence of an average Ghanaian into insurance. This alleviates potential concerns about the entry of
new customers. (ii) It can be misleading to directly compare claims for basic contracts to comprehensive
contracts since insurers data for the former typically exclude some liabilities of own damages, in part. I
address this following Chiappori et al. 2006. The details are in Appendix A.3.
22One can imagine that insurees may fail to report claims in order to receive discounts and get lower
prices, especially after the regulatory change. This is less likely since discounts are set to be less than claims.
As I also show empirically, pre-regulation discounts and prices are distributionally similar to post-regulation
discounts and prices – an evidence that speaks against potential under-reporting. Such information-hold up
is usually termed “ex-post” moral hazard. The empirical analysis suggests that ex-post moral hazard is less,
as compared to ex-ante moral hazard (unobserved loss preventive effort or behavior).
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and the expected size of liabilities in case accidents occur. (III) Year of car manufacture:
This provides a measure of the age of insured cars. The range for this variable is between
1957-2015 in the sample. Thus the sample span a mix of both old and new cars. (IV)
The make of car, body-type, coverage certificate-type as well as the transmission system are
available.
I denote by Xit the vector of all controls. The control variables are helpful for improving
the empirical analysis. The variables in category (IV) are available to the insurer, but these
are not used in the pricing of insurance and therefore can be used to control for potential
selection along such observable dimensions. One additional advantage is that the variables
allow me to circumvent an empirical challenge which is discussed in Appendix A.3. Next,
part of the discussions about plausibility of the instrument’s exclusion exploit changes in the
distribution of these observed vector of characteristics.
Credit records: Finally, data on customer credit histories and outstanding premiums are
available. Both the discussions and illustrations in Section 2 utilize this data.
2.4.2 Research Design: Strategy, exclusion Z, and balance
Strategy: In an ideal experiment designed to evaluate the effect of moral hazard, I would
observe insurance outcomes for two similar consumers, then randomly assign one from com-
prehensive to basic contract (“treatment”), maintain the other on the comprehensive contract
(“control”) and then compare changes in their insurance outcomes. The regulatory reform
helps to mimic this condition. The no-credit regulation made one group of consumers switch
to basic contracts (switchers or “treatment”), as exemplified by the remarkable decline and
switch in purchases for comprehensive contracts in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.1. The rest of the
consumers remained unaffected by the regulation (no-switchers or “control”).
Exclusion and balance: With this strategy, it is crucial that the policy “instrument” be
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excluded, that is, conditionally independent of insurance outcomes.23 An alternative way to
state this is:
Z |= [α, ε]|(D,X)
In words, this says the distribution of the pair [α, ε] does not change after the reform,
conditional on the relevant characteristics. This condition cannot be tested, so I will run
robustness checks to show that the empirical design is valid.
Perhaps the most important concern is that the actual timing of the regulation may have
been anticipated by consumers and so they might have reacted to it. For example, credit
constrained customers can change their choices and other characteristics to make the effective
difference in price between high and low coverage contracts negligible. Such responses can
threaten the validity of the policy instrument and research design. Analogous to standard
regression discontinuity RD design (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010), one
can think of time as a running variable. This requires consumer characteristics to be similar
at the policy cutoff to be valid. First, as shown in Figure 2.2, “representative” consumers did
not expect the actual announcement of the regulation as average credit decisions remained
largely stable across the various months prior to its implementation. Second, Figures 2.7-
2.10 jointly indicate a strong balance on the set of relevant control variables.24 Specifically,
the various distributions are not distinguishable at the policy cutoff.25 Both lines of evidence
23First, note that this set up allows for adverse selection of any form, but the actual timing of the policy is
unaffected by it. Second, this independence condition provides a direct means of (1) testing for the absence
of moral hazard (Escanciano, Salanié and Yildiz 2016) and (2) bounding moral effects. In Section 5, I exploit
this condition to construct a simple and general test for moral hazard’s existence, while in Section 6 I use it
as an exclusion for selection to derive worst-case and tight-bounds on the effect of moral hazard.
24These controls include variables that are used to price insurance and those that are not but observed.
If the distribution of α (e.g., risk aversion) changes as a result of the reform, such changes might reflect in
consumers characteristics. It is reassuring that observed consumers characteristics did not change around
the policy. With the validity of the instrument’s exclusion, I argue the reform “only” induced exogenous
assignment of contracts which in turn affected customers’ effort and other hidden actions.
25In a heterogeneity analysis, I estimate a simple model (riskinessit = µ + θrSwitcherit + it) that
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suggest that the regulation was not anticipated.26
Another concern is that the timing of the regulation may correlate with current macroe-
conomic conditions and other factors that influence insurance claims. Notice that the data
covers only two contract years, spanning contracts before and after the reform — implying
a short period of time. First, I did a careful search of all related policies, and the records
show that no other insurance reforms took place at around same time. Both α and ε can
change if other insurance reforms took place over the period.
Next, the regulatory decision may reflect current economic conditions and have confound
the estimates. This would be an important concern if the reform could be implemented
quickly. In practice, however, the implementation of insurance policies typically occurs
with a substantial lag. For the no-credit regulation, there was a seven (7)-month lag in its
implementation as shown in Figure 2.28, further strengthening the case for the validity of
the policy change as an instrument.27
Consumer preferences αui over insurance can change if customers switched to other insur-
ance companies or insurers. This is less likely because prices are regulated and thus similar
across firms, creating less incentives for consumers to move to other firms. As I discuss
further in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, per-unit premium and market share for the company that
provided the data remained unchanged after the policy. In addition, the no-credit regulation
was a national reform that affected all companies so there is little reason for consumers to
compares the distribution of consumer riskiness score across switchers versus non-switchers, and find no
significant differences between them (θˆr = 57.1 and SE(θˆr) = 66.8), as expected.
26Notice that if consumers anticipated the reform, they may have begun to alter their choices and other
relevant characteristics prior to the reform. But if this were true, it would likely cause me to underestimate
any effect the policy reform might have had because pre-reform claims would look more similar to post-reform
claims behavior.
27(i) Reassuringly, the main results are robust to narrow time windows around the reform’s introduction:
±4 months before and after the regulation. (ii) The timeline of the regulatory reform is illustrated in Figure
2.28 of the Appendix. As shown, the NIC agreed on the policy on October 12, 2013. The implementation
or announcement took place on April 1, 2014, yielding an implementation lag of about 7 months.
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switch.28
Finally, individual heterogeneity that comes from the production function αyi and ε can
change if relevant macro conditions such as recessions and floods occur, respectively. Major
recessions for instance may lead to changes in gas prices and therefore could cause customers
to switch to different cars (e.g., to more efficient cars). While fluctuations in weather are
common, no major floods occurred in the study area during the relevant period. In addition,
I show in Figure 2.27 that changes in gas prices (direct pump prices) were not significant to
actually induce customers to switch to different cars. In particular, the average and standard
deviation for gas prices before the reform were USD/L 1.06 and 1.04, respectively. Similarly,
the average and standard deviation for the prices after the reform were respectively USD/L
1.02 and 1.03; suggesting no significant changes.
2.5 A simple and general test of moral hazard
Section 4.3 argued that the variation induced by the introduction of the policy reform is
conditionally independent of insurance outcomes: the timing of policy is uncorrelated with
unobserved heterogeneity. In this section I use that exclusion condition to develop a simple
generalized test for the absence of moral hazard in the insurance market. The analysis
document evidence of moral hazard; baseline results that will supplement the subsequent
results on moral hazard effects.
2.5.1 The moral hazard test
Consider the baseline set-up in the model, from Section 3. The independence assumption
provides a direct means of testing for the absence of moral hazard. To see this, assume that
28Consumers who were owing companies might want to move to other firms. However, this seems unlikely
given the higher repayment rate of premium debts and the fact that firms had to write-off all premiums
outstanding after the regulation. From the sample, exiters represent only about 1.5% of customers. This is
extremely low, as compared to the number of un-insured vehicles in Ghana (of about 21-36%), for example.
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Dit = σ(αi, Zit)
; Yit |= Zit|Xit
Without moral hazard, a change in coverage Dit induced by the reform Zit and not by
selection does not induce a change in outcomes Yit. Thus, one can test for the absence of
moral hazard by testing for the independence between Yit and Zit conditional on all premium
and non-premium determining consumer characteristics. In the implementation, Yit is either
continuous or binary while Zit is binary. In what follows, I present a nonparametric testing
procedure that I propose. Results for other candidate testing procedures are also reported.
I denote the conditional distribution function of Yit given Z = z by F (y|z) and that given
Zit = z
′ by F (y|z′). Similarly, let the unconditional distribution of Yit be F (y). Then by
definition: Yit and Zit are independent if F (y|z) is equal to either F (y|z′) or F (y). I exploit
the use of this definition in the testing procedure described below. Denote the sum over all
the binary values of Zit by
∑
Z and let pi(z) be the probability of realizing z. Then to test
the hypothesis that there is no moral hazard 29 against the alternative that there is moral








Fˆ (y|z)− Fˆ (y|z′)
)2}]
where Fˆ (y|z) and Fˆ (y|z′) are simply nonparametric empirical estimates of the conditional
distributions which were predicted using the instrument Z, along with the relevant control
variablesXit. In effect, the test statistic averages over the distribution of the decision variable
Zit and over the predicted outcomes Yit (loss occurrence or claim amounts) of all the squared
discrepancies between the two estimated distributional objects. The test allows the various
values of Zit to take different weights since they might occur with unequal chance.
29The null hypothesis can be stated as H0 : {F (y|z)− F (y|z′) = 0} for any z, z′ and y.
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The null is rejected for large values of T ; in practice I derive the p-value of the test
under the null hypothesis that there is no moral hazard using the nonparametric bootstrap.
The bootstrap inference is conducted at a significance level of 5%. One shortcoming of this
“Moral Hazard Test” is that it only provides inference about whether or not moral hazard is
absent: it does not deliver a measure of the size of the effect of moral hazard when the null
hypothesis of absence of moral hazard is rejected. This caveat should be kept in mind when
evaluating the implied results. Note here that the results from the proposed test and two
other candidate procedures are complementary to the subsequent results on moral hazard.
2.5.2 Results
I begin by providing graphical evidence of the “Moral Hazard Test”. First, the instrument
and vector of controls are used to predict the conditional distribution of claim outcomes.
Next, consider the various discrete values that the regulatory variable Zit take. I divide
the predicted sample of insureds into two groups based on the binary nature of the policy
reform. I then define the claim distributions from the two groups as Fˆ (y|z) and Fˆ (y|z′)
where z and z′ values correspond to pre– and post– National insurance reform, respectively.
To fail to reject the underlying null hypothesis of “no moral hazard”, it must be that these
two distributions are equivalent.
In Figure 2.11 I plot the implied empirical cumulative distributions of claim outcomes
pre– and post– insurance reform. This Figure provides visual evidence of the changes in the
conditional distributions of claim outcomes. The graph in Figure 2.11 illustrates that there is
a considerable difference between the distribution of predicted claim realizations before and
after the reform. I can therefore reject the null hypothesis of no moral hazard.30 In addition
30The inference is the same for alternative visual tests. In Figure 2.12, I compare the empirical distribution
of claims (1) Fˆ (y|z) versus Fˆ (y) and (2) Fˆ (y|z′) versus Fˆ (y). In both cases, there is substantial difference
across the distributions; leading to a rejection of the null of no moral hazard. Notice that since the test must
hold generally for all values of (y, z), once can explore different support values of the insurance outcomes to
illustrate the distributional difference, as a visual test.
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to the visual evidence of differences between distributions, the pre–reform distribution of
claims tends to dominate that of the post–reform counterpart; suggesting that claim records
became better due to the National reform. Altogether, the graph in Figure 2.11 provides
a strong visual evidence of distributional inequality, and thus a rejection of the no moral
hazard condition in this insurance market.
Finally, I evaluate the robustness of the graphical results by implementing the formal
nonparametric L2-Type test proposed above.31 I also considered a comparable nonparamet-
ric test of equality of distributions: Kolmogorov–Smirnov, along with other semiparametric
methods i.e., OLS. The results are reported in Table 2.2. In all cases, the “Moral Hazard
Test” strongly rejects the hypothesis that moral hazard is absent in this insurance market
at conventional significance level of 5%. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test provides similar in-
ference. Overall, the results robustly suggest the existence of moral hazard. The following
section investigates this further by bounding its effects.
2.6 Bounding moral hazard under policy’s exclusion
This section analyzes the separation and bounding of moral hazard effects. First, I build
on the background formulation in Section 3 and policy’s exclusion in Section 4.2 to provide
identification results on moral hazard. Second, combined with the administrative data,
I present the bounding results and discuss several dimensions of heterogeneity in moral
hazard–important for insurance policy design.
2.6.1 Bounds on moral hazard effect
To conserve space, I summarize the main conditions and results. All details are relegated to
the Appendix. The bounds set up embodies a triangular system in insurance outcomes and
31The distribution of test statistic T is provided in Figure 2.26 of the Appendix.
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contract choice, as shown in the model section. Choice of contract depends on the exogenous
policy or regulatory instrument, whereby it became impossible to buy insurance on credit.
The restrictions required for the bounds are three-fold. The first is a weak–monotonicity
condition, which requires that exerting higher levels of effort for a sub group of customers
will not increase average claim outcomes. Such condition is a direct consequence of the
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property in Incentive Theory (Holmstrom 1979). The second
is an independence condition, which implies no direct causal effect of the policy instrument
on insurance outcomes, while the third condition requires that customers who select higher
insurance coverage will not increase their supply of effort.
The starting point of the bounding exercise is to rewrite the average structural objects as
a weighted average of observed and unobserved potential insurance outcomes, using insights
from standard missing outcomes representation (Manski 1990; Manski and Pepper 2000).
Introducing the instrument, which is independent of the potential outcomes, one can put
bounds on the unobserved potential insurance outcome using the stated three conditions.





{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]} − inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
= sup
z
{E[Yi | Z = z]} − inf
z
{E[Yi | Z = z]}
∆u = inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + (1− P (z))Gu} − sup
z
{P (z)Gl + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
The derivation of proposition 1 is provided in the Appendix. First, proposition 1 shows that
the lower bound on moral hazard’s effect is a simple difference estimator. Second, the bounds
are made up of three estimable terms which include an insurance choice probability object
P (z) and two conditional expectations. I apply the results to credibly test and quantify the
effect of moral hazard. The restrictions provide useful improvements to identify the lower
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bound ∆l, so that will be the main object of interest. Before presenting the evidence, I
briefly discuss motivations for the bounding approach in the following.
2.6.2 Why the bounding of moral hazard
The bounds are meant to nonparametrically identify and capture the range of moral hazard
that cannot be explained by the usual point estimates approach, although the latter could
provide exact statements about moral hazard e.g., I am able to characterize the minimal
extent of moral hazard using the bounds. The bounds approach is motivated by the following
logic. First, nonparametric point identification of moral hazard is hard to achieve under
significant selection in and out of insurance without stronger and perhaps non-verifiable
assumptions (additivity of selection αi, for example). This becomes even more difficult
when the dimension of selection in multidimensional (e.g. heterogeneity in risk aversion,
riskiness), which is natural in an insurance setting. Second, the bounds allows me to also
learn about the population. This provides a useful way to evaluate the impact of moral
hazard, which is crucial particularly for the implied policy analysis that I illustrate later in
this paper.
The proposed bounds approach allows unobserved heterogeneity, a vector of hidden in-
formation, to impact insurance outcomes in an unrestricted manner. I am therefore able to
characterize moral hazard by fully accounting for differences across the individual customers
insurance choice while allowing for arbitrary correlations with the insurance choice, and thus
accounting for adverse selection.
2.6.3 Estimating the moral hazard effect
The focus is on bounds to the average treatment effects ATE, the measure of moral hazard
effect, under the agency theory-inspired inequality restriction. Estimating the bounds re-
quires two sets of intermediate estimators, one for the “insurance” probability and the other
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for the conditional expectation objects. In what follows, I briefly describe the estimation
procedure that I employ.
As in the Sections 3 and 4, I index an customer (insured) by i and time (contract date)
by t, and let hatˆdenote estimated objects throughout. Then the probability of “insurance”






t 1(Dit = 1)1(Zit = z)∑
i
∑
t 1(Zit = z)
where 1(A) is an indicator that is equal to 1 whenever A holds and 0 otherwise. To estimate
the conditional expectation objects, I use sample-analog-type estimators




t yit1(Dit = 1)1(Zit = z)∑
i
∑
t 1(Zit = z)




t yit1(Dit = 0)1(Zit = z)∑
i
∑
t 1(Zit = z)
where all notations match with those in Section 4 and the Appendix. The version of these
quantities that condition on the conditioning vectorXit, including Eˆ[YitDit | Zit = z,Xit = x¯]
and Eˆ[Yit(1−Dit) | Zit = z,Xit = x¯] are equivalently estimated using standard techniques.
Yit should be taken to be either claim outcomes or loss occurrence realized by customer
i at time t. Next, the estimated objects above are then substituted into the identified
best possible bounds for the average treatment effect ∆. This derives estimates of the
lower and upper bounds under the agency theory-inspired inequality restriction, ∆ˆl and ∆ˆu,
respectively. Appendix A.1 provides an illustration of the various terms.
To conduct inference, I construct the confidence intervals for the parameters of interest
∆l and ∆u using a nonparametric bootstrap. In general, the bootstrap relies on continuity.
This should be valid here since the estimated objects correspond to functionals for which
regularity conditions for the bootstrap are met and I apply the sup and inf operators over a
binary/finite support variable. Here the sup and inf are essentially max and min operators
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given the finite support of the instrument Z. In practice, I conduct the bootstrap inference
at 5% level of significance while fixing the number of bootstrap resamples to 999 throughout.
2.6.4 Results
The main empirical results are reported in this section. The baseline estimates of average
treatment effect, the measure of moral hazard effect under the agency-theory inequality
restriction are presented. More specifically, Table 2.3 reports both the lower and upper
bound estimates on moral hazard for two insurance outcomes.
Estimates that correspond to loss probabilities are displayed in the left panel, while
those for insurance claims are presented in the right panel of Table 2.3. The 95% confidence
intervals which are based on the nonparametric bootstrap are also reported in the last
column of each panel. As shown in Section 3.2, evidence of moral hazard requires the average
treatment effect which measures moral hazard to be greater than zero. This is equivalent to
saying that customers’ claim outcomes (or loss occurrence) increase with respect to insurance
coverage on average after selection is eliminated. Similarly, the effect of moral hazard e.g.,
minimal or maximal extent can also be deduced by looking at magnitudes of the estimated
quantities.
2.6.4.1 Evidence of moral hazard and effects
More generally, the estimates in Table 3 provide strong evidence of moral hazard in the
insurance market. In particular, I find evidence of moral hazard for both outcomes of
interest: loss occurrence and insurance claims. The estimated lower and upper bounds on
moral hazard are GHC52 and GHC108172, respectively for claim outcomes. The estimated
lower and upper bounds on moral hazard are 1% and 77%, respectively for loss occurrence.32
32The upper bound is very high because the identifying restrictions do not improve the terms that comprise
it. It is rather made up of objects that reflect the empirical maximum for claims, which can be higher.
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The 95% confidence intervals around the estimates are quite narrow.
Section 6.1 and Appendix A.2 show that the identifying power from the inequality restric-
tion improves only the lower bound of the unknown quantity E[Yi(1) | Di = 0, Z = z] and
the upper bound of the unknown E[Yi(0) | Di = 1, Z = z]. In turn, these two improvements
together provide a lower bound estimate on moral hazard. Restricting attention to the
lower bound, moral hazard effects are derived as follows. For claim outcomes, the minimal
moral hazard estimate of GHC52 translates to about 46% of average claims over the sample
period. In other words, moral hazard accounted for at least 46% (lower bound) increase
in realized mean claims. The same reasoning mutatis mutandis implies that moral hazard
was responsible for at least 22% of the probability of loss occurring over the period (using
the moral hazard estimate of 0.87%). These results point towards a strong moral hazard
effect and suggest moral hazard affects changes in claim amounts “as much as” occurrence of
losses. Overall, the moral hazard evidence is robust across various definitions of insurance
outcomes.
2.6.4.2 Sources of moral hazard, visually: ex-ante versus ex-post effects
Section 3.2 points to two potential sources of moral hazard: ex-ante and ex-post aspects. I
assess these visually by looking at observed changes in the type of claim events before and
after the policy reform. Figure 2.13 (a) and (b) show how the claim events not covered under
basic contracts and those covered under both contracts are distributed, respectively. The
results suggest about 35.8 percent drop in the set of claim events that are covered by only
comprehensive contracts after the regulation. Such policy-induced reduction likely reflects
ex-ante moral hazard (i.e., unobserved preventive actions) because all things being equal,
it seems reasonable that under-reporting of claims is less likely for comprehensive contracts
that provide coverage for all responsible losses.
There is evidence that claim events that are covered under both basic and comprehensive
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contracts dropped by 29.6 percent after the policy. This drop likely reflect ex-post moral
hazard (i.e., under-reporting claim or information) along with with ex-ante effects. Overall,
the results indicate that both sources of moral hazard are present. However, observe that
ex-post moral hazard has an opposing effect on the “frequency” of reported claim events. In
part, this explains why the reduction in claim events that are covered under both contracts
(29.5%) is lower than those covered under only comprehensive contracts (35.8%). With this,
only 6.3% drop in claim reports is attributable to ex-post moral hazard; suggesting that
under-reporting is less severe. Finally, note that since basic-liability reports involve third
parties, it is difficult for consumers not to report such events.
2.6.4.3 Conditional estimates: moral hazard effects
Some papers study one informational friction (say, adverse selection) by abstracting from
the other. For example, Cohen and Einav (2007) abstracted from moral hazard and focused
on adverse selection in auto insurance contracts.33 Since the background model allows for
both moral hazard and adverse selection, I can conveniently analyze the implications of such
abstractions. To do this, I assume that adverse selection is absent, and then estimate moral
hazard. Without adverse selection, the lower bound on moral hazard is a “naive” estimator
which takes the form
≡ max
d
E[Yi | D = d,X = x¯]−min
d
E[Yi | D = d,X = x¯]
The results are reported in Table 2.4 separately for loss and claim outcomes. Both
indicate large and significant moral hazard effects. Strikingly, compared to the main credible
estimates of moral hazard, these results are 4-7 times bigger. In addition, the selection effect
which captures the bias introduced by not randomizing contracts is large. This is about
0.03 for the occurrence of losses, and GHC320 for claim amounts. This analysis show that
33Adverse selection is modeled as unobserved heterogeneity in risk preferences (riskiness and risk aversion)
from the choice of deductible in contracts using data from Israel.
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assuming away adverse selection have nontrivial effects and vice versa. Moral hazard is
over-estimated in substantial magnitudes, but this may depend on the direction of selection.
2.6.4.4 Heterogeneity in moral hazard
The moral hazard estimates may be heterogeneous in at least two observable dimensions (i)
private versus commercial vehicle drivers, and (ii) different quartiles of discounts–reflecting
the relative position of customers on the distribution of premium discounts that customers
receive from the company. Private vehicles embody individual and corporate vehicles, while
commercial vehicles are mostly taxis and mini-vans. Notably, individual vehicles usually
contain the vehicle’s owner and his driver. I assess such potential heterogeneity by providing
lower bounds on moral hazard by driver type and by quartile of discounts – the results of
which can help guide policy design and discussions about the automobile insurance market
as well as simulate further related research.
In Figure 2.16 of the Appendix, I show the heterogeneous estimates on moral hazard.
Similar to the main results from Table 2.3, I can reject the null of no moral hazard at 5% level
of significance across all driver types and quartiles. The moral hazard estimates are larger
for both commercial vehicle and lower quartile discount drivers, which in turn suggest that
commercial drivers and low premium discount customers are less responsible. In this case,
corrective policies to influence moral hazard can include schemes that make basic insurance
contracts more attractive to the subgroup of customers associated with commercial vehicles,
e.g., weighed against the potential cost of subsidizing insurance for this group.
Next, the heterogeneous results can be related to the concept of monitoring and moral
hazard. Private vehicles usually operate with two people, typically the car’s owner (who
may act as a “monitor”) and his driver.34 For commercial cars, this is not the case as they do
not run with the owner. In this case, the availability of a “monitor” in private vehicles can
34The owner of the vehicle do not only observe and serve as a “monitor”, but can also fire the driver when
he drives recklessly at a low to zero firing cost.
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explain why private drivers are more responsible than their commercial counterparts. As a
result, the heterogeneous findings generally imply that “monitoring” can be an effective tool
in curbing moral hazard, which is consistent with theoretical results in Holmstrom (1979)
and others.
2.7 Mechanisms, caveats and policy implications
In this section, I discuss the role of two potential channels for contract choice and their
importance for shaping the estimated incentive effect: moral hazard. These include liquidity
constraints and changes in relative prices. There is evidence in favor of the former, and
not the latter. First, I illustrate that moral hazard increases with the probability of buying
insurance on credit; providing additional evidence of heterogeneity in moral hazard. I then
discuss how this heterogeneity is consistent with credit constraints. Next, I carry out an
array of tests to verify that the main results are robust to several caveats. The broader
implications of the estimated quantities are also presented.
2.7.1 The role of credit constraints
Before presenting the evidence, I note why borrowing may be limited for the customers
who bought insurance on credit. First, there is evidence indicating that the customers who
purchased insurance on credit switched to contracts with lower coverage after the reform.
So if they could borrow before the reform, they would have done it to seek contracts with
higher coverage after the reform. In addition, interest rates are high in Ghana, at least
compared to interest rates in developed economies like the United States and Canada over
the period. For example, interest rates in Ghana averaged about 20% between May 2013
and April 2015, compared to the United States average rate of < 1%.35 This removes the
35For example, see https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/interest-rate for Ghana, and
https://www.oanda.com/forex-trading/analysis/historical-rates for the United States and Canada.
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incentive to borrow to buy higher contracts.
I now document the relation between moral hazard and the purchase of insurance on
credit. There are potentially multiple ways to investigate how the provision of credit ulti-
mately shape the estimated moral hazard effect. The direct approach will be to split the
sample into sub groups of customers who bought insurance on credit and those who paid
insurance upfront, and then estimate moral hazard for each sub group. The second approach
involves using information about the credit-purchases/history of consumers to identify the
distribution of those who are likely impacted by the regulation, and then compare moral
hazard effects across this distribution. Here, I follow the latter approach because implemen-
tation of the former is limited by the way the policy instrument Z is constructed and the
fact that after the reform’s introduction consumers could no longer buy insurance on credit.
I am also able to examine whether or not changes in the moral moral effect is monotonic
along the distribution of credit decisions.
Denote by P (cr;x) the probability that a customer with observable characteristic x = Xit
acquires insurance on credit. Extremely low P (cr;x) corresponds to customers for which
credit is not important; and thus will not be affected much by the reform. Equivalently,
high values of P (cr;x) correspond to customers for which credit is important. I proceed in
two interrelated steps. First, I estimate P (cr;x) by estimating a probit regression model of
whether or not an customer purchased insurance on credit against the observable vector of
individual characteristics. This estimation is done using the universe of customers in the
sample for both contracts, Dit = 1 and Dit = 0. The estimated credit probabilities are
displayed in Figure 2.14(a). The figure shows a range of probabilities that lie between 0%
- 41%, with a median of about 8%. This means that the median consumer with observable
characteristic x is 8% likely to purchase insurance under the credit schedule. Also, in Figure
2.14(b) I display the distributions of estimated credit probabilities across the two contract
types. There is evidence that consumers were more likely to use credit to purchase contracts
with higher coverage before the no-credit regulation.
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In the second step, I investigate the effect of buying on credit by estimating the lower
bound on moral hazard (i) separately for the group of customers who fall below versus
above the median credit probability, and then (ii) across the different quartiles of the credit
probabilities. The results are displayed in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. First, there is
evidence that the moral hazard effect is larger for the customers below the median probability,
compared to those above. For claim amounts, this is about 5 times larger, while for loss
occurrence it is about 2 times larger. Second, the effects across the credit distribution is non
monotonic, but much of the moral hazard is concentrated in the upper credit quartiles as
expected.
These results are intuitive. Credit matters more for consumers in the upper quartiles since
they are likely credit constrained. The impact of the no-credit regulation should be more
binding for this group. As illustrated in Figure 2.14(b), the customers who were purchasing
comprehensive insurance more likely do so on credit than those who were buying the basic
contracts. This explains why most customers switched from comprehensive to basic contracts
following the reform (see Figure 2.6 and Table 2.1). The incentive to shirk is higher under
the comprehensive contract. These results support the hypothesis that consumers responses
to the reform likely through the “liquidity” mechanism. Finally, note the primary trade-off
of sub sampling customers based on credit quartiles for the analysis: uncertainty increases
because the size of the sample is reduced drastically.
Discussions: Are these effects due to credit constraints or financial saviness? In
principle, consumers’ credit decisions can reflect the two, so both explanations are possible.
The latter will mean that customers were gaming the system of buying on credit, with no
intentions to repay their accrued premium debts. If this was the case, then that will imply
possibly another moral hazard via defaults/delinquencies from the credit side. However, the
evidence is more consistent with credit constraints as discussed below.
Credit constraints are a natural reason for explaining the drop in insurance demand
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after the reform and thus the moral hazard results. This is for several reasons. First, as I
argued earlier, the policy reform tightened liquidity and affected consumers who were buying
insurance contracts on credit prior to the introduction of the reform. In particular, over
99.4% of consumers who were buying insurance on credit bought higher-coverage contracts
and switched to contracts with lower coverage after the regulation. So, consumers’ responses
to the reform most likely operate through this “liquidity” mechanism.
Second, there is much evidence that people in developing countries face liquidity con-
straints (Banerjee 2001, Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Karlan et al. 2014). For example, Karlan
et al. 2014 documented credit constraints in northern Ghana.36 Third, as I documented in
Section 2, the repayment rates for premium debts are substantially high. For example, 79%
of customers who bought insurance on credit repaid their outstanding premiums before their
contracts expire. Similarly, over 73% of all outstanding premiums are paid before the end
of the insurance contract. These results are less consistent with financial saviness, lending
further support to the credit constraints channel.
2.7.2 The role of firm price response
In principle, insurance firms may respond indirectly in multiple ways to the National reform
via the differential pricing of contracts e.g., indirectly increase overall premiums to maintain
certain levels of profit; decrease premiums for comprehensive coverage to encourage their
take up; discourage basic contracts through increases in price for such coverage; or employ
other response strategies that will manifest through prices. Such supply side responses can
reflect the moral hazard results. I document that the insurance company did not significantly
adjust per-unit premiums following the introduction of the reform. This finding helps to shut
36Theoretically, the credit-constraints channel can be understood formally in a model where consumers
make insurance and effort decisions today subject to the risk of a liquidity shock tomorrow, akin to the
setting of the policy reform (similar to Deaton 1991). The simple intuition is that because the agent cannot
borrow to buy more insurance when the liquidity shock arrives and effort is costly (in monetary terms),
the agent likely demand more insurance today and exert less effort. In that case, accumulated net income
transfers from insurance can be used to smooth future consumption.
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down the possibility of an alternative mechanism (“price”) and lends further support to the
“credit” channel argument.
I begin with a descriptive analysis of the changes in prices. In Figure 2.15, I show both
the distribution and differential changes in insurance premiums before and after the policy
reform. In the first row, the first item scatters realized premiums over the period, while
the second centers these at the policy date. The scatter has been jittered to make it is
easier to see where the mass is located. There are two important observations: the mass is
evenly distributed and there is no evidence of significant differences in premiums around the
reform’s date. To account for the possibility of differential pricing across contracts, I show
changes in realized premiums for the two contracts in the second row. However, the changes
are also visually insignificant.
Next, I evaluate the robustness of the descriptive evidence using a model that links
changes in premiums to contract years and coverage. For consumer i in contract year t, the
simplest model that I estimate is:
ρit = µi + δPolicyt + it
where Policyt = 1[Date > April 2014]. Figure 2.16 displays the distribution of premiums
after customer-level fixed effects µi are removed from the data (distribution of δPolicyt+it).
This is shown for the period before and after the 2014 insurance regulation. The figure
demonstrates limited evidence that premiums changed following the policy, similar to the
descriptive evidence. The estimated δˆ is 18.67 and insignificant at conventional levels. I
modify the baseline model to investigate differential pricing using:
ρit = µi + β[Dit × Policyt] + γXit + it
where Dit and Policyt are respective indicators for higher coverage and post regulation
period. The model essentially interacts the two indicators. β, the main parameter of interest,
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captures the sign, size and significance of any differential pricing by contract-type following
the reform. All relevant control variables are housed in the vector Xit (i.e., the list of
observed characteristics discussed in Section 4.1).
The results are reported in Table 2.7. Different columns correspond to different model
specifications, based on the inclusion of the various control variables. The coefficient on
the interaction term is negative and insignificant at conventional levels in the preferred
specification, column 3 where all premium-determining characteristics are included. Results
indicate that on average firms did not alter the premiums deferentially, all else equal. Taken
together, these results provide suggestive evidence of no significant price responses. This is
expected given that the NIC strictly regulates the pricing of insurance products. Results
reinforce the explanation that the estimated moral effects are driven by credit constraints.
2.7.3 Robustness Analysis
Threats from sample selection: The “ideal” data set to evaluate moral hazard will
embody the universe of contracts data across all firms in the insurance industry. In this
paper, I mimic this using customer-level data from the single largest firm: largest branch
(headquarters) office records. A drawback of this approach concerns the representativeness of
the sample due to potential exits and entries of customers across insurance companies. More
specifically, the sample suggests about 1.5% and 3.7% rate of exits and entries, respectively.
First, what works is that relevant changes in the industry and aggregate outcomes are
largely consistent with evidence from the sample. As shown in Figures 2.17-2.19: (i) the mar-
ket share of the study-company remained stable at 22% between 2013 and 2014; suggesting
less drastic movements in and out of the firm overall; (ii) consistent with the sample, there
is evidence of overall reduction in motor crashes or losses between 2013 and 2014; and (iii)
there is evidence of general reduction in claim amounts and increased profits between 2013
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and 2014 as in the sample. This line of aggregate evidence is re-assuring and lend further
support for the empirical results. Second, the baseline results are stable using a restricted
sample of customers who existed in the data before and after the policy (balanced sample;
see analysis below). The implication of this result is that potential entry of new customers
likely have less severe effects on the main moral hazard results.
Entry & exit of new customers In practice, different customers could either enter or exit
the insurance pool after the reform’s introduction. I investigate how this, particularly entry,
might affect the results by limiting the estimations to the set of customers that maintained
the same policy numbers before and after the policy reform. As shown in Section 4.2, (i)
pre-reform distributions of customer characteristics are similar to post-reform distributions
and that (ii) it is unlikely for customers to leave the insurance pool for other insurance
companies since prices are the same across firms, so I do not expect significant changes to
the results. Figure 2.20 shows the conditional distribution of predicted claims, while Tables
2.8 and 2.9 present the bound estimates for moral hazard and across the group of customers
below and above the median credit probability. In all cases, the evidence is qualitatively
similar. Notably, there is evidence of larger moral hazard effect for customers below the
median credit probability (constrained) as compared to the unconstrained.
Restricting the analysis to only third-party events In Appendix A.3, I discuss the
approach used to recover comparable claim records for basic-liability contracts, since the
insurer data typically do not capture own damages directly for customers with basic-liability
insurance. But because the insurer data includes damages for third-party events which are
covered under all contracts and directly available, I evaluate the robustness of the main
results by limiting the analysis to only third-party claim events. As shown in Table 2.10, the
estimated moral hazard effects are near and well within the confidence intervals of the main
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estimates. For the size of claims, the lower bound estimate translates to 39.10% of mean
claim amounts, while for the number of claims, it translates to 16.58% of loss probabilities.37
Narrowing the window of analysis Section 4.3 appealed to the short period of data
coverage to argue for the reform’s independence to selection. As an alternative, I examine
the stability of the baseline results using data right before and after the policy reform. This
minimizes the influence of realizations that occurred far from the reform, but implies a drastic
reduction of the sample size. Instead of the full sample, two time windows are considered
(i) ±8 months and (ii) ±4 months windows around April 2014. Figure 2.21 displays the
distribution of predicted insurance outcomes for the different windows; a test for moral
hazard. The bounds on moral hazard are summarized in Table 2.11. The graphical evidence
suggests stronger rejection of no moral hazard, but qualitatively these results are similar
to the main findings. The bound estimates are very close and well within the confidence
intervals of the main estimates.
Effect of outliers and tail events I winsorize the data to reduce the influence of extreme
claim and loss realizations. All observations in the data below the 2.5th percentile are
set to the 2.5th percentile value, and those above the 97.5th percentile are set to the 97.5th
percentile value. This approach minimizes the influence of extreme observations, but censors
the data. I replicate Figure 2.11 and Table 2.3 using the winsorized data. Results pertaining
to the moral hazard test are shown Figure 2.22, while the bound estimates are contained in
Table 2.12. Both the graphical and bounds evidence are near and consistent with the main
findings.
Effects from externalities [and exogenous spillovers] The model and bounds assume
37Such evidence is consistent with less-severe under-reporting of claim events (as discussed in Section
6.4.2) in the baseline analysis that uses events under comprehensive contracts to recover claims for basic
contracts for comparison. This may be explained by the nature of third-party events: they involve other
customers, making it difficult for responsible policy holders not to report their occurrence. It also helps
to alleviate potential concerns that the baseline exercises are just picking up less reported but not actual
damages. Finally, note that since the baseline analysis combine all claim events (third-party and own
damages), it is expected that limiting the estimations to only third-party damages will yield slightly lower
estimates for moral hazard.
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independently distributed accidents. In practice, however, external effects from others driv-
ing activity can violate this independence. For example, one consumer can hit another and
then run away. First, this would be a major concern if such external effects vary with switch-
ers versus non-switchers (or the quasi-assigned contracts). In particular, the main estimates
will be biased downward if the external effects for non-switchers are systematically larger
than the switchers and vice versa.38 But to the extent that these externalities are possibly
random, that seems unlikely. Second, when an accident occurs, there is often one party who
is at fault (or the liability is shared) based on the legal statutes. The functioning of legal
systems in low-income environments may be weak, but existence of such legal arrangements
help to internalize part of the external effects.
Third, I use the following back-of-envelope calculations to assess the potential magnitude
of such external effects. The effects correspond to the additional costs of accidents beyond
observed claims. Following Cohen and Einav (2007), I estimate this by dividing the (i)
total accidents (18,050 in 2013; 14,895 in 2014), and (ii) accidents with fatalities (1,898
in 2013; 1,806 in 2014) in Ghana39 by an estimate of the total number of auto insurance
claims (48,809 in 2013; 45,238 in 2014) in Ghana.40 For 2013, I find that 36.9 percent
of claims involve reported accidents, and 3.9 percent involve accidents with fatalities. For
2014, 32.9 percent of insurance claims involve reported accidents while 3.9 percent involve
accidents with fatalities. This implies that the majority of insurance claims embody small
unreported accidents,41 perhaps because the additional external effects are often small. In
38Equivalently, the estimates will be biased download if the external effects before the policy are larger
than effects after the policy. This can be seen from a modification of the lower bound estimator: 4l +
{E[Ez0]}−{E[Ez1]} = 4l∗ where E[Ezj ] corresponds to the average external effects before (j = 0) and after
(j = 1) the policy reform, and 4l∗ is the true population parameter of interest.
39Accidents refer to crashes resulting in injury, death or property damage and involves at least one vehicle
on a public road. These are reported to the police and a police officer arrived at the scene. The data come
from the National Road Safety Commission (NRSC) http://www.nrsc.gov.gh/
40The total number of car insurance claims are estimated by dividing the total number of insurance
policies at the end of the sample (~30,000) by the product of the share of the market for the company that
provided the data (21%) and the best guess of the share of policies from the company’s headquarters branch
(12%) where the contracts data come from. I then multiply this by the insurance claim or loss rates before
and after the policy: 0.041 in 2013 versus 0.038 in 2014, respectively (see Tables 18 and 19 of the Appendix).
41Note the consistency of with the initial evidence in Section 6.4 that under-reporting is likely less severe.
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addition, the calculations indicate modest reductions (but insignificant) in external effects
after the regulatory reform, perhaps suggesting that the main estimates are (negligibly)
biased downward. Finally, I compare the average claims for the subset of consumers who
enrolled in comprehensive contracts in both regimes but never acquired insurance on credit.
The pre-reform average claims are similar to that of post-reform, an evidence inconsistent
with exogenous spillovers.
2.7.4 Welfare implications: moral hazard and policy
2.7.4.1 Estimating foregone claims bill due to moral hazard
The baseline lower bound estimate of moral hazard is informative and has important broader
implications first on the insurance market, and second on the National reform itself in gen-
eral. More specifically, the reform-identified estimates generate impacts that are of further
economic significance. The Cedis GHC52 sounds small but actually it is not because it
represents a large fraction of average payouts over the period γˆMH = 46%, which is further
explored below.42 As an illustration of the welfare significance of the GHC52 estimate, let’s
suppose customer i has a basic contract Di = 0, and let the insurer randomly assign this
customer to the comprehensive contract Di = 1. Then the GHC52 is the added loss that
the company will have to cover. This follows because all losses are covered under the com-
prehensive plan. The above process could translate into large actuarial losses and thereby
limit the soundness of the actuarial process.
To illustrate and put the results into context, I examine (the mean of) observed indemnity
payments that may be attributed to moral hazard using the lower bound estimate of moral
hazard. Since actuarial indemnities are largely based on claim outcomes which in turn reflect
insured private information, I generally define the indemnity function as
42The GHC52 estimate also translates to about γˆMH =12% of firm’s average profits. Here, average profits
is given by Ω = E¯(ρit)− E¯(ιit)× (1 + λ) using a simple back-of-envelope calculation. λ = 0.25 denotes the
loading on payouts. To get this, the observed premiums and indemnities from the insurer’s data set are
directly used to compute expected revenues E¯(ρit) and expected costs E¯(ιit), respectively. This calculation
ignores any direct returns on company investments of collected insurance premiums.
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ιit = hit(Yit|γMH , αAS; ε)
for customer i at contract year t, where αAS and γMH correspond to the vector of hidden
information as discussed in the model section and estimated moral hazard, respectively.
Then to obtain the average of indemnities for the population of insured, I take expectations
over i and t to get
E(ιit) =
∫
hit(Yit|γMH , αAS; v)dH(Yit|γMH , αAS; ε)
where H(.|., .; .) is the conditional claim distribution. Obviously, one needs to estimate
this object in order to compute the average of the indemnities which is fraught with much
difficulty. Instead of directly estimating that, I utilize the actual paid indemnities in the
sample. In estimating the effect of moral hazard, I jointly allowed for an unrestricted selection
in and out of insurance: this significantly controls for/eliminates adverse selection and other
important drivers of the indemnities. This therefore permits me to compute the fraction of
indemnities paid to customers due to moral hazard using the sample analog43






where bars¯are used to denote sample realizations here. γˆMH stands for the estimated moral
hazard as a fraction of realized mean claims over the period. The implied dollar values are
directly derived–reflecting the corresponding actuarial losses due to moral hazard.
Moral hazard accounted for at least GHC1,328,138 (USD442,712)44 aggregate leakages
or forgone bill in indemnities for the auto-business line of the company’s branch between the
two contract years. From additional back-of-envelope exercises, I find that the forgone bill
43In effect, I am measuring the total rather than marginal contribution from the reform-identified moral
hazard. The approach is technically equivalent to: GHC52×#ofConsumers.
44Prevailing exchange rate 1.00USD ≈ 3.00GHC. See https://www.oanda.com/currency/average
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for the insurance company is GHC11,067,817 (USD3,689,272), and for insurance industry is
GHC52,703,889 (USD17,567,963).45 This analysis highlights the potential soundness of the
National reform because of the implied actuarial gains. As an interpretation: moral hazard
accounted for a significant share of insurance claims, which induced substantial leakages in
claims (inefficiencies). To the extent that the National reform exogenously caused consumers
to switch to less generous contract choices, the reform arguably averted this extent of market
inefficiency.
2.7.4.2 Estimating effects on welfare
The introduction of the policy reform is not only beneficial, but may generate unintended
costs on consumers. Specifically, the no-credit regulation has two potential implications
for welfare. First, because the reform led to lower coverage, it may have negative welfare
implications for consumers. Second, as I highlighted in Section 7.4.1, ending the purchase
of insurance on credit have positive welfare implications for firms via increases in profits
due to reduction in large moral hazard inefficiencies. I compare these two opposite forces to
evaluate whether or not the policy was welfare decreasing, overall.
I use the certainty equivalent as a measure of consumers welfare. Denote by cit(d) =
Payoutsit(d)−Premiumit(d) the net transfer from insurance to consumer i under coverage
d. I assume a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function with coefficient of
absolute risk aversion γ > 0:
u(cit) = −exp−γcit
from consuming a normally distributed cit in contract year t. The certainty equivalent
45For the company, I estimate the forgone bill by dividing the GHC1,328,138 by the best guess of the
share of the company’s headquarters branch where the contracts data came from (12%). For the industry,
this is derived by dividing the company’s bill by its share of the entire insurance market (21%).
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= µc − 0.5γ × σ2c
where µc and σc are the actual mean and standard deviation of c. These are estimated
using the empirical realization of net insurance transfers to consumers, separately before and
after the policy reform. I then derive changes in certainty equivalents 4CE by subtracting
the estimated certainty equivalents post-reform from that of pre-reform. The results are
displayed in Table 2.13 for different plausible values of absolute risk aversion γ. Relative risk
aversion parameters between 2-5 are considered reasonable, so I divide this by the average
annual earnings in Ghana in 2013/2014 to get reasonable values for γ.46 These calculations
indicate that the loss in consumer welfare attributable to the no-credit reform is between
GHC111,559 (USD37,186) to GHC178,341 (USD59,447).
Next, I examine changes in firm profits due to the policy reform. Let piit = Premiumit−
(1 + λ) × Payoutsit represents the per-customer profit to the insurer. The total profit per








where λ = 0.25 denotes the loading factor on payouts: typically, reflects the adminis-
trative costs of processing claims. Similar to the certainty equivalent calculations, I used
the empirically observed premiums and payouts to compute changes in profits 4pi pre- and
post-reform. As shown in Table 2.13, the gain in producer welfare attributable to the pol-
icy reform restricting the sale of insurance contracts on credit is between GHC1,023,168
(USD341,056) to GHC9,210325(USD3,070,108). Taken together, for reasonable values of
consumer risk aversion, enforcement of credit arrangements and insurance loading, the anal-
ysis suggests that restricting the sale of insurance on credit have both negative and positive
46The estimate of average annual earnings in Ghana was GHC5,346.9 (GSS, 2013/2014). The implied
parameter values are very close those provided in Cohen and Einav (2007). From the automobile insurance
in Israel, the authors estimate mean absolute risk aversion of 0.0019; and a median 0.0000073.
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welfare implications but the loss in welfare do not outweigh the gains. The loss in cer-
tainty equivalents represents approximately 11% of the gain in profits for cases where some
proportion or all premium debts are eventually repaid before the expiration of contracts.
Varying the loading factor λ. I evaluate the sensitivity of the welfare results to λ. The
results are displayed in Table 2.14. Results for three parameter values: λ = 0.00 (no loading),
λ = 0.15 and λ = 0.35 (i.e., high claim processing costs to firms) are displayed. Qualitatively,
the evidence from all cases suggest similar findings: the gain in producer welfare outweighs
the loss in consumer welfare.
Finally, it is useful to note that the welfare results reflect a market context where prices
are regulated. In both the pre and post reform regimes, insurance firms were effectively not
allowed to price coverage, which is a first source of market distortion. Firms responded to
this distortion by selling insurance on credit, amplifying moral hazard in the market. The
no-credit regulation was then introduced to stop firms from providing insurance on credit,
which is another potential source of market distortion. Perhaps, muting these regulatory
distortions and allowing insurers to price coverage more expensively could have corrected
the moral hazard induced in the market.
That being said, distortionary regulations are prevalent in several market contexts, es-
pecially, in developing countries. I study a context with two unique features: prices are
regulated, and consumers are usually faced with credit constraints. These features are com-
monly shared in several environments, particularly in low-income and developing countries.
For the specific policy reform, several countries including Nigeria and Gambia have im-




In this paper, I argue that contractual arrangements that defer the payment of insurance
premiums to a future period, not only increase demand but induce large moral hazard and
welfare effects. The coexistence of moral hazard and adverse selection, possibly multidimen-
sional in nature, presents a challenge in learning about moral hazard alone. I disentangle
moral hazard from selection by exploiting a natural experiment coming from the introduction
of an insurance reform, whereby it became impossible to buy insurance on credit, making
lower coverage contracts more attractive. By requiring that car insurance premiums be paid
upfront, the demand for higher coverage decreased by 6 percentage points.
The random variation created by the policy reform allows me to construct an instrument
to identify the causal effect of coverage choice on claim amounts and loss occurrence—moral
hazard—and eliminate contaminations that may be due to selection. I empirically investigate
the identifying power of the weaker restriction that, on average, consumers that select higher
coverage contracts will not increase their supply of effort. I find a convincing and robust
evidence of moral hazard in this market. Moral hazard led to a 46 percent increase in average
size claims or 22 percent increase in the number of claims. The analysis also establishes that
moral hazard induced significant leakages in insurance claims and that monitoring can be
an additional effective tool in curbing moral hazard.
I discuss two potential mechanisms that could be responsible for the moral hazard results:
binding credit constraints versus changes in relative prices, and find evidence in favor of the
former. In principle, this is equivalent to examining the channels through which the policy
reform may shift choices of insurance contracts and thus moral hazard. Heterogeneity anal-
ysis suggest that the results likely operate through a constraint in “credit” that was imposed
by the policy reform, where moral hazard is greater for the more credit constrained. This
result establishes an important connection between incentive effects and credit constraints.
Finally, insurance firms may alter the pricing of contracts to maintain certain profit levels as
a response to the policy reform. For example, decrease (increase) the premiums for higher
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(lower) coverage contracts to encourage (discourage) their uptake. I find no evidence across
multiple tests for such differential pricing.
Examining the impacts of “buying on credit” on car insurance demand, credit and moral
hazard has applications for other types of insurance. First, consider the case of personal
insurance which is widely offered by private insurance companies. This insurance requires
individuals to pay premiums upfront. The results in this paper directly imply that customers
who face the risk of credit constraints are less likely to be responsible. In this case, an
alternative policy to reduce moral hazard would be to make lower coverage contracts more
attractive to the potentially credit constrained customers.
There are two additional indirect applications: social and index insurance. For social
insurance programs, no upfront premium payments are involved but may embody potential
moral hazard and liquidity aspects. Examples include unemployment insurance and social
interventions. Studies and design of social programs tend to consider moral hazard and
liquidity as separate entities (Chetty 2008). The results in this paper indicate a potential
linkage between the two; thus extending our knowledge about moral hazard and liquidity
for program designs. For weather index-based insurance, moral hazard is largely absent—
since contract payments are based on an exogenous publicly observable index, such as local
rainfall, paying out on the basis of too much or too little rain—but liquidity constraints may
be present to impede uptake (Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014). A conventional policy
may overcome credit constraints to induce insurance uptake (Casaburi and Willis 2017),
but as shown in this paper, it is crucial to consider the potential moral hazard aspects
when present. For this reasons, policy instruments e.g., loan programs, that aim to increase
demand will require full benefit-cost assessment to justify their implementation.
From a policy perspective, two aspects are notable. First, this paper illustrates how
regulation can be used to fix insurance market imperfections, particularly, insurance in de-
veloping countries. The moral hazard effect translates to about a 12% decline in firm profits,
but such inefficiency was averted by the policy reform. The reform adjusted the market and
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made insurance outcomes better, highlighting the potential importance of corrective regu-
lation in such contexts. However, because the reform led to lower coverage, it may have
negative welfare implications for consumers. Second, this paper provides an indirect evalua-
tion of a policy that restrict “buying on credit”. Purchasing arrangements to pay later boost
retail trade in many developing countries (IMF 2012). But the ability to buy insurance
on credit can yield large and economically substantial moral hazard effects in the market.
Finally, estimated gains from the policy via reduction in moral hazard may extend to the
functioning of markets in other settings.
This paper provides a first step in understanding the impacts of buying insurance on
credit and the potential role of credit constraints for moral hazard. Ongoing research em-
bodies four extensions of it. First, governments and regulators across other countries have
either adopted a similar “no premium, no cover” reform or considering its adoption. I aim to
consider the implications of the proposed approach and findings in other developing countries
that currently have such insurance reforms in force: Nigeria and Gambia. The underlying
legal and financial institutions are different, which may well matter for the functioning of
the existing insurance markets and enforcement of contracts. Evidence from these varying
contexts will therefore provide additional external validity and a further evaluation of the
growing insurance policies, including the impacts on firms’ balance sheets, potential market
fraud and re-insurance behavior.
Second, consumers might have reduced their driving speed in response to this insurance
regulation since coverage and the occurrence of losses were reduced. I aim to examine the
co-impacts of the policy on local air quality, appealing to the literature on the effects of
regulation on air pollution (Greenstone 2004; Davis 2008). I have done some preliminary
analysis suggesting modest reductions in air pollution as measured by particulate matter
at the policy cutoff. Next, the results show that moral hazard is largest among the credit
constrained customers, but that link was non-monotonic. I aim to explore the nonlinear
link between liquidity constraints and moral hazard effects, as this could have important
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implications for the design of contracts and policies to alleviate moral hazard. Finally, I
plan to investigate whether interlinking credit with insurance markets can induce adverse
selection, and the implied welfare implications. There are indications from preliminary
analysis that consumers who bought insurance on credit signal as bad risk-types, as compared
to their counterparts who paid contracts upfront.























Note: The intermediaries category include insurance brokers and agents
DIRECT INTERMEDIARIES
Notes : Figure shows the different channels that insurance policies are sold. Many insurance
contracts are acquired through agency channels: market intermediaries.
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05/2013   08/2013    12/2013   03/2014
Months before April 2014 implementation
NOTES: (1) Intercept = 0.27 & (2) Raw Data








































05/2013   08/2013   11/2013   03/2014
Months before April 2014 implementation
NOTES: (1) Apr2013 = 0.22; (2) Controls for consumer observables
(b) PROBIT REGRESSION OF TAKE-UP STATUS WITH CONTROLS
Notes : Figure is based on a probit regression of an indicator for buying insurance on credit
against monthly dummies, with and without controls for consumer characteristics. The
month-by-month coefficients are displayed with the 95% confidence intervals. In both cases,
vertical lines are used to indicate the timing of the regulation.
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PERCENT %
Contract issue date: percent premium outstanding
(b) PERCENT OF PREMIUM IN DEBT
Notes : Figure shows the distribution of outstanding premiums at the time contracts are
signed. The amount of premium debt is shown in (a), maxing at GHC600000. In (b), the
premium debt expressed a percentage of total premium is displayed. This ranges between
0.2% to 100%.
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PERCENT %
INTERMEDIARIES DIRECT
Contract source: percent premium outstanding
Notes : Figure shows the percent of outstanding premiums across the two channels of selling
insurance policies: direct from the insurance firm versus intermediaries. The individual
distributions are superimposed on each other. As shown, premium debts can range from
0.2% to 100% of premiums; many customers are more likely to initiate 100% premium debt
contracts with intermediaries, compared to contracts from the insurer.
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% amount in debt start
% amount in debt end
Repay amount rate
(b) DEBT REPAYMENT BEFORE CONTRACT EXPIRES (INTEN-
SIVE)
Notes : Figures show the repayment rates for insurance premium debts prior to the
no-credit policy. (a) Extensively: percent of consumers who began their contracts with
credit and ended their coverage with/without some credit. (b) Intensively: percent of total




























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes : Figure shows the insurance choice probabilities for comprehensive contracts, before
and after the regulatory reform. This is derived using the insurer’s data set and a frequency
estimator. The 95% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates.
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01oct2013 01jan2014 01apr2014 01jul2014 01oct2014
NOTE: Conditional on contract space
Year of vehicle manufacture around Policy date



















01oct2013 01jan2014 01apr2014 01jul2014 01oct2014
NOTE: Conditional on contract space
Seat−capacity around Policy date
(b) SEAT CAPACITY OF VEHICLE
Notes : Figures display the distribution of the various customer characteristics (age of ve-
hicles; seat capacity of vehicles) around the policy cutoff. In all cases, the 95% confidence
intervals are displayed around the estimates.
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01oct2013 01jan2014 01apr2014 01jul2014 01oct2014
NOTE: Conditional on contract space
Cubic capacity of vehicle around Policy date
(a) CUBIC CAPACITY OF VEHICLE
Private (%) Commercial (%)
Pre-reform 88.44 11.56
Post-reform 88.49 11.51
Private includes: individual + corporate
(b) POOL: SHARE OF PRIVATE VS BUSINESS-TYPE
VEHICLES
Notes : Figure shows the distribution of vehicles cubic capacity around the policy cutoff.
The 95% confidence intervals are displayed around the estimates.
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01oct2013 01jan2014 01apr2014 01jul2014 01oct2014
NOTE: Conditional on contract space
Riskiness around Policy date
(b) CONSUMER RISKINESS SCORE
Notes : Figures show the distribution of the various customer characteristics (no-claim dis-
count for premiums; riskiness scores) around the policy cutoff. In all cases, the 95% confi-
dence intervals are displayed around the estimates.
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Figure 2.10: Distribution of Customer Characteristics
(a) DISTRIBUTIONS: X|Z
(b) DISTRIBUTIONS: X|(Z,D)
Notes : Figures display the distributions of customers characteristics conditional on time and
choice of insurance contracts. (a)– similar distributions on observables across time t. (b)–


















































































































CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test
Notes : Figure shows the predicted distribution of claims before and after the no-credit
regulation. The distribution in dash corresponds to realizations after the policy z = 1. The
distributions reflect strictly positive claim amounts. The no-moral hazard test holds for any
realization of y.
Table 2.4: Naive Estimates: Lower Bound ∆l
OUTCOME Bounds 95% CI Selection Effect
LOSS 0.035 [0.0075, 0.082] 0.026
CLAIMS 381.70 [25.15, 782.89] 329.70
Notes : Table reports “naive” lower bound estimates on moral hazard separately for loss,
and claims outcomes. Estimations are based on a naive lower bound estimator that neglects
adverse selection. CI denotes confidence interval. lb denotes lower bound on moral hazard.
The 95% confidence intervals are based on 999 nonparametric bootstrap resamples for the
various objects of interest.
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CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test











CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test
(b) PSOT-POLICY VS UNCONDITIONAL:Fˆ (y|z = 1) vs Fˆ (y)
Notes : Figures shows the predicted distribution of claims. In (a) the pre-policy (z = 0)
outcomes are compared with the overall claims. In (b) the post-policy (z = 0) outcomes are
compared with the overall claims. The distributions reflect strictly positive claim amounts.
The no-moral hazard test holds for any realization of y.
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Note: Examples include crash to trees & partial theft of vehicle contents
Claim Events Not Covered by [Liability] Basic Contract
PRE−POLICY POST−POLICY























Note: Examples include third party injuries
Claim Events Covered by Both Contracts
PRE−POLICY POST−POLICY
(b) EVENTS COVERED BY BOTH CONTRACTS
Notes : Figures show the distribution of specific claim events before and after the policy
reform. (a) shows the changes in the frequency of claim events that are not covered by basic
contracts (i.e., covered by only comprehensive contracts). In (b), the distribution is shown
for events that are covered by both contracts, which excludes the events in (a).
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Figure 2.14: Credit: Purchase Probabilities
(a) DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT PROBABILITIES
(b) DISTRIBUTION OF CREDIT PROBABILITIES BY CONTRACT
Notes : Figures show the distribution of the estimated credit probabilities: ranging between
0-41%, exclusive. The overall distribution is displayed in (a). In (b), I condition this on the
contract space. There is much higher probability of buying comprehensive contracts with










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.15: Firm Price Response
Notes : Figures show the distribution and differential changes in insurance premiums before
and after the regulatory reform. The overall distribution is shown in the top panel. In the
bottom panel, I show the differential changes across the two different contracts. The 95%






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes : Figure reflects the raw annual distribution of insurance premiums after customer-
level fixed effects are removed from the data. The figure is shown for the period before and
after the National policy reform. The sample includes all policy holders. Strip-plots show
whiskers containing inner 1.5×inter-quartile range of the observations (Turkey 1977).
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Note: Study−company is SIC Ltd.
Top 6 Companies

















2010 2012 2014 2016
Year
POST−POLICY Premiums
Note: All Non−life Insurance Contracts: Motor/Car, Fire, Accident, Marine & aviation
(b) INDUSTRY TOTAL PREMIUMS
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CALCULATIONS: Combine historical reports from NIC & financial statements of insurance companies
Industry: Motor Contracts SIC Ltd.: Motor Contracts
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CALCULATIONS: Combine historical reports from NIC & financial statements of insurance companies
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CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test
Notes : Figure shows the predicted distribution of claims before and after the no-credit
regulation. The distribution in dash corresponds to realizations after the policy z = 1. The
distributions reflect strictly positive claim amounts. The no-moral hazard test holds for
any realization of y.
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CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test











CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test
(b) TIME WINDOW 2: 4 MONTHS BEFORE & AFTER REFORM
Notes : Figure shows the predicted distribution of claims before and after the no-credit
regulation across different time windows around the policy. The distribution in dash
corresponds to realizations after the policy z = 1. The distributions reflect strictly positive
claim amounts. The no-moral hazard test holds for any realization of y.
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CDFs defined over strictly positive part of Yit support; evidence against no moral hazard
No Moral Hazard Test
Notes : Figure shows the predicted distribution of claims before and after the no-credit
regulation for 95% winsorized data. The distribution in dash corresponds to realizations
after the policy z = 1. The distributions reflect strictly positive claim amounts. The
no-moral hazard test holds for any realization of y.
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2.10 Appendix
A.1 Supplementary results: estimation & zero-interest credit for
premiums
A.1.1 Firms: zero-interest credit for premium
I illustrate that a zero-interest rate on insurance premium is a possible outcome in equilib-
rium, when premiums are regulated. Consider two competing profit maximizing firms (i, j).
Let τ denote the interest rate on the premium’s credit. Firms (i, j) are faced with following
per-unit demand functions
Di = a− pi + pj
Dj = a− pj + pi
No price differentiation is allowed. The firms have two price instruments at their disposal:
(pk; τk), k = i, j. The loss in revenue for providing insurance on credit is simply −τkpk and
the firms have (independent) constant costs c(Di) = c(Dj) = c(D).
Program: Since the premium is fixed pi = pj = p, firms influence premiums by giving
away credit as they compete. In particular, the firms choose (τi, τk) individually and simul-
taneously (apply Bertrand strategies). Firm i’s (similarly j’s) objective function is given
by
pii = (1 + τi)pi[−(1 + τi)pi + (1 + τj)pj)]− τipi − c(D)
≡ (1 + τi)p[−(1 + τi)p+ (1 + τj)p)]− τip− c(D)
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where the second line uses the fact that the premium is given and fixed. The FOCs (with
respect to τk) yield the following best-reply functions
τk(τk′) =
a+ (1 + τk′)p− 2p− 1
2p






For certain parameter values of a and p it is possible to have an equilibrium interest rate
that is zero (or negative). For instance, such outcome is trivially achieved when a ∈ {0, 1}.
In addition, when p is really close to a, zero-rate can be achieved. Finally, I note why such
a zero-interest rate may coexist with outside credit markets that have higher interest rates:
the “credit risk” is much lower in the former. So, higher interest rates from outside channels
may reflect their higher default rates, including other reasons (e.g., possibly larger loan sizes,
compared to insurance premiums).
A1.2 Estimation illustration
I directly estimate the bounds: ∆ˆl and ∆ˆu. For example, Y = CLAIMS
∆ˆl = 51.95GHC =
supz {
̂E[DY | Z = z] + ̂E[(1−D)Y | Z = z]} = 118.71
inf
z
{ ̂E[DY | Z = z] + ̂E[(1−D)Y | Z = z]} = 66.75
∆ˆu = 108171.7GHC =
infz {
̂E[DY | Z = z] + ̂(1− P (z))Gu} = 108224.83
sup
z
{P̂ (z)Gl + ̂E[(1−D)Y | Z = z]} = 52.81
Finally, I bootstrap (nonparametrically) to compute the confidence intervals of ∆ˆl and
∆ˆu.
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A.2 Derivation of proposition 1
I consider the following triangular system
Yi =g(e
∗
i (Di, αi), α
y
i , εi)
Di = σ(αi, Z)
This has a direct structural interpretation. σ(., .) the same economic interpretation provided
in Section 3.1. In the empirical application the instrument Z should be taken to be policy
changes or major events that exogenously induce changes in choice of insurance contracts.
The logical indicator Di equals 1 whenever Yi is observed; and Di equals 0 whenever Yi is
not observed, as in the treatment effects or potential outcomes literature. Next, I write the
probability of Di = 1 given Z = z as P (z). P (z) is an identified nonparametric index, and
captures the insurance probability for individuals with characteristics z. The main object of
interest is ∆ = E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|Z] but this is not identified due to nonrandom selection. The
selection problem emanates from the nonrandom assignment of contract choice discussed in
the model section. To proceed, I impose the following set of structural restrictions
(1) g(.) monotonically decreases in e∗i for all (αi, εi)
(2) Z is independent of (αi, εi) and Z enters neither e∗i (., .) nor g(.)
I selectively invoke these restrictions for the identification analysis as needed, in what
follows. Restriction 1 is a monotonicity condition, which requires that exerting higher levels
of effort will not increase claim outcomes for all consumers i. This is a direct consequence of
the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property MLRP (Holmstrom 1979) in Incentive Theory. The
MLRP emerges from the condition required for optimal contract design. In the identification
analysis, I employ a slightly weaker version of this which requires it to hold in expectation
across only some group of customers; not all i. Next, restriction 2 implies an independence
condition Yi(d) |= Z for all d ∈ {0, 1}. Such condition is commonly referred to as an exclusion
restriction: no direct causal effect of Z on Yi.
The approach I adopt requires the timing of the policy to be uncorrelated with selection
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and that the average distribution of contract choice is affected by the instrument (i.e.,
relevance: a nonzero E[D | Z = z]). The bounds approach is particularly useful because it
permits multidimensionality of selection in insurance. Note that, the average moral hazard
estimate may be relevant in comparing policies that uniformly assign all insureds to either
type of insurance policy. Further discussion of the various effects and their relevance are
provided in the paper.
Building on the standard “missing outcomes” representation (Manski and Pepper 2000;
Lee 2002) I begin by rewriting the implied average structural functions ASF of the mixed
model as µz(1):
≡ E[Yi(1) | Z = z] = E
D
[E[Yi(1) | D,Z = z]]
= Pr(D = 1 | Z = z)E[Yi(1) | D = 1, Z = z] + Pr(D = 0 | Z = z)E[Yi(1) | D = 0, Z = z]
= P (z)E[Yi(1) | Di = 1, Z = z] + (1− P (z))E[Yi(1) | Di = 0, Z = z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
not identified
= P (z)E[g(e∗i (1, αi), αyi , εi) | Di = 1, Z = z] + (1− P (z))E[g(e∗i (1, αi), αyi , εi) | Di = 0, Z = z]
and µz(0):
≡ E[Yi(0) | Z = z] = P (z)E[Yi(0) | Di = 1, Z = z]︸ ︷︷ ︸
not identified
+(1− P (z))E[Yi(0) | Di = 0, Z = z]
= P (z)E[g(e∗i (0, αi), αyi , εi) | Di = 1, Z = z] + (1− P (z))E[g(e∗i (0, αi), αyi , εi) | Di = 0, Z = z]
Notice that because Yi = Yi(1) whenever Di = 1, I can write
E[Yi(1) | Di = 1, Z = z] = E[DiYi | Z = z]
P (z)
Similarly, because Yi = Yi(0) whenever Di = 0, I can write
E[Yi(0) | D = 0, Z = z] = E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]
(1− P (z))
Both E[DiYi | Z = z] and E[(1 −Di)Yi | Z = z] are immediately identified from the distri-
bution of the observed data {(Yi, Di, Z)i : i = 1, ..., I}. Particularly, all the terms in µz(1)
and µz(0) are identified or known except E[Yi(1) | D = 0, Z = z] ≡ E[g(e∗i (1, αi), αyi , εi) |
D = 0, Z = z] in µz(1) and E[Yi(0) | D = 1, Z = z] ≡ E[g(e∗i (0, αi), αyi , εi) | D = 1, Z = z]
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in µz(0). Identification therefore hinges crucially on these two unknown terms. These terms
are not identified from the distribution of the observed data since one never observes Yi(1)
for consumers with Di = 0 and Yi(0) for customers with Di = 1 in the data, respectively.
The starting point will be Manski’s “Worst Case” bounds (Manski 1990). Building on these
“Worst Case” bounds, I impose additional restrictions that are governed by agency-theory
to provide bounds on the unknown objects of interest.
Worst case bounds of ∆
Suppose that the object g(.) is bounded above and below,
Gl ≤ g(e∗i (Di, αi), αyi , εi) ≤ Gu
Here Gl and Gu are constant objects and represent the lower and upper bounds on g(.),




, and for all customers




. The condition on g(.) above is therefore
equivalent to setting Gl ≡ y and Gu ≡ y.
Worst Case Bounds
Let the quantity g(.) be bounded as stated above. Section III of Manski 1990, and
Proposition 1 of Manski and Pepper 2000 can be used to establish Worst Case bounds on
4 under the set up as
∆l = sup
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + (1− P (z))Gl} − inf
z
{P (z)Gu + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
∆u = inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + (1− P (z))Gu} − sup
z
{P (z)Gl + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
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where ∆l and ∆u denote lower and upper bounds on ∆, respectively. These are the
worst case best possible bounds, and without further information the bounds are sharp. In
general, this set ∆ ∈ [∆l,∆u] may be wide and thus not very informative. It is useful to
note that these “Worst Case” bounds in themselves do not directly help for the purposes
of identifying moral hazard. I impose additional plausible restrictions that are inspired by
economic theory to tighten the bounds in the next series of identification analysis. Suppose,
for a moment, that one ignores the gains from the intersection of the bounds across all z.
Then the implied width of the ATE bounds above is
∆u −∆l = Gu −Gl
This is derived from substituting for the various objects, and then canceling out iden-
tical terms. To further illustrate that the above set is less informative in the asymmet-
ric information context, consider the canonical binary choice model where Yi ∈ {0, 1}.
In the empirical analysis, one of the outcome of interest is binary: that is, whether or
not an accident (or or loss) occurred. Here, it follows immediately that Gl = 0 and
Gu = 1. Therefore the corresponding lower and upper bounds for the average effect ∆
are ∆l = E[DiYi | Z = z] − (P (z) + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]) and ∆u = E[DiYi | Z =
z] + (1 − P (z)) − E[(1 − Di)Yi | Z = z], respectively. The width of these bounds sim-
plifies to ∆u −∆l = 1. Here P (z) is simply the insurance choice probability for individuals
with characteristics z.
Tightening the bounds of ∆
I investigate the identifying power of certain plausible restrictions. The restriction I impose
is governed by the theoretical considerations of agency models and the empirical application
process considered in this paper.
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Customers’ Effort Supply
In a standard mixed adverse selection and moral hazard model of insurance, customers
who choose higher coverage contracts are more likely to exert lower levels of effort. As in
agency theory, this may in part stem from information and preference asymmetries. Typi-
cally, the principal can observe the outcome; but not the action of the customer. Notwith-
standing, the actions and/or efforts of the customer can be monitored in theory; but in
practice obtaining complete information could be prohibitively expensive: “costly verifica-
tion” (Townsend 1979)47. Next, customer’s preferences (e.g. risk aversion) may differ from
that of the insurer, and so to the extent that the actions of the customer that may be con-
sidered beneficial to the insurer could be costly to the customer, it is likely the consumer
may under supply his level of effort: “un-aligned preferences”. To this end, I formally impose
the inequality restriction that for each customer i
e∗i (1, αi) ≤ e∗i (0, αi)
This implies that customers that select higher coverage contracts or buy insurance will not
increase their supply of effort e.g, via seat-belting or any implied precautionary action in the
automobile insurance context. Combining this with structural restriction 2, I have that for
all customers i
Yi(1) ≥ Yi(0)
g(e∗i (1, αi), α
y
i , εi) ≥ g(e∗i (0, αi), αyi , εi)
Notice that the agency-theory restriction consequently yields a version of the usual monotone
treatment response MTR condition (Manski 1997). That is, choosing a higher coverage
47In this case, the principal may wish to charge more premium to embark on more verification. This,
however, is unlikely to hold. For example, in the empirical setting, insurers have little or no room to adjust
insurance prices. The market including premium setting is highly regulated and controlled by the govern-
ment, where insurance companies are required to follow a proposed premium formula in selling contracts.
The empirics provide suggestive evidence of price rigidity: firms did not quickly adjust prices following the
introduction of reform.
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contract will not increase customer’s outcome. It is also straightforward to see that the
above condition will restrict the sign of the average effect. In the identification analysis,
however, I use a much weaker version of the condition
E[Yi(1) | Di = d, Z = z] ≥ E[Yi(0) | Di = d, Z = z]
for all z ∈ Z and d ∈ {0, 1}. To illustrate, let d = 0, then this condition says E[Yi(1) |
Di = 0, Z = z] ≥ E[Yi(0) | Di = 0, Z = z]. Similarly for d = 1, E[Yi(1) | Di = 1, Z = z] ≥
E[Yi(0) | Di = 1, Z = z]. The use of this condition is motivated by the following. First, the
original restriction is stronger because it must hold for all the customers i. The latter only
need it to hold in expectation across some group of consumers. Identified bounds on the
objects of interest using the weaker restriction actually coincides with that of the stronger
MTR restriction. This can be viewed as an improvement given that weaker restrictions are
generally preferred, and easier to rationalize in practice. Next, because I am interested in
identifying the average moral hazard, the weaker condition is sufficient. Under this weaker
condition, the bounds on the unknown objects are
E[Yi(1) | Di = 0, Z = z] ∈
[
E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]
(1− P (z)) , G
u
]
E[Yi(0) | Di = 1, Z = z] ∈
[
Gl,
E[DiYi | Z = z]
P (z)
]
for all z ∈ Z. Note that the identified bounds for the unknowns above must hold for all
z ∈ Z. This can be viewed as a consequence of restrictions 2. I can therefore intersect the




{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]} ≤ µz(1) ≤ inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + (1− P (z))Gu}
sup
z
{P (z)Gl + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]} ≤ µz(0) ≤ inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
Next, the resulting best possible bounds on the average treatment effect ∆: the main
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object of interest are
∆l = sup
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]} − inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
= sup
z
{E[Yi | Z = z]} − inf
z
{E[Yi | Z = z]}
∆u = inf
z
{E[DiYi | Z = z] + (1− P (z))Gu} − sup
z
{P (z)Gl + E[(1−Di)Yi | Z = z]}
QED
This uses the assumption that Yi(1), and Yi(0) are (conditionally) independent of Z.
First, observe that the lower bound ∆l simplifies to a simple difference estimator. The
width ∆ ∈ [∆l,∆u] is analogously defined, and the expressions further simply under the
binary choice model where Gl = 0 and Gu = 1. Without intersecting the bounds across all
z, the ATE lower bound becomes ∆l = 0. In the empirical analysis, I intersect the resulting
bounds across z using the sup and inf operators, which provide informative estimates for
∆l that are non-zero. Since the inequality restriction provides improvements to the lower
bound, ∆l will be the main focus for the analysis of moral hazard effects.
A.3 Additional Discussions
A.3.1 Why were companies willing to accept credit payments
before the reform?
(1) Premium targets Each local insurance office is given a premium target per contract
period, so there were clear incentives to push credit to customers. These target levels trickle
down to the individual staff.48
(2) Existence of intermediaries: insurance agents and brokers. Commission-motivated
agents developed personal relationships with their clients and provided insurance on credit.
48There is anecdotal evidence that the staff use their family and friends for that purpose. Company
workers served as guarantees to spread insurance premiums for their families and friends, since members
could not afford to pay all at once, especially for the comprehensive cover. Such phenomenon grew overtime:
the sale of insurance on credit was largely overlooked in the companies, even at the top level with no sanctions
against the staff who do same.
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This was not considered a challenge to the companies since the intermediaries have a better
incentive to collect premium debts: most insurance companies would not pay full commis-
sions due the agents and brokers until the premiums are paid.
(3) Client-centric and the norm of keeping business In the past, government orga-
nizations were are among the top insurance clients. However, funding from the government
is usually delayed and so due to their size in the customer space, the provision of insurance
on credit to such institutions was deemed a way of keeping the business of insurance firms.
The insurance companies assumed that government debts will eventually be paid no matter
how long it takes, further promoting the sale of contracts on credit with recent extensions
to individual customers.
A.3.2 Recovering claims for basic-liability contracts
From the insurer’s data, I cannot directly use the observed claim outcomes under Dit = 0,
basic contracts. That is, the data at hand do not allow for direct comparison of the outcomes
under treatment status Dit = 1 versus Dit = 0, particularly for claims. The reason is that
the insurer’s claim dataset reflects liabilities to both own and other parties damages under
the comprehensive insurance, but it excludes the liability to own damages under the basic
insurance. Estimates will clearly be biased upward if this is ignored. I approach this in two
ways:
First, I follow an indirect approach due to Chiappori et al. (2006) to circumvent this
challenge. To illustrate, denote by Y¯it0 the observed claims in the insurer’s dataset (which
excludes the liabilities to customer i’s own damages) and Yit0 the true counterfactual claims
under Dit = 0. The solution is to assume that the distribution of Yit0 conditional on Y¯it0
depends only on customer i’s observed vector of characteristics, Xit. Under this assumption,
one can use the observed claims distribution on Dit = 1, comprehensive contracts for ob-
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servationally similar customers to recover that of Yit0.49 In practice, I construct a customer
level index or score based on the observed characteristics and outcomes. Next, I define the
notion of “similarity” to be customers that have the closest scores. These are then matched
accordingly. This approach is stringent as exemplified by: for Dit = 0 (i) average claim
amount is GHC55.8 compared to a raw amount of about zero; (ii) average loss occurrence
is 0.037 compared to about a zero rate initially. Note that the claim and loss occurrence
information for contract Dit = 1 remain unchanged.
Second, as a robustness check, I analyze moral hazard for claim events that are only
covered under both contracts ignoring the above imputation. These are third-party events
that both comprehensive and basic-liability contracts cover and are directly available for
analysing moral hazard.
A.4 Future work: preliminary results
A.4.2 Co-environmental benefits: did the policy led to lower vehicle
emissions, PM 2.5?
Data: I draw on high resolution satellite database from National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)–MERRA-v2. This is a global reanalysis database that assimilates
space-based observations of aerosols and represent their interactions with other physical
processes in the climate system. MERRA-v2 begins in 1980 with spatial resolution of 50km
in latitude direction. Particulate Matter PM 2.5 (kg/m3), wind (m/s), temperature, and
humidity for the entire country were extracted, and then aggregated to the district level i.
49An important feature about this approach is that it is more stringent and thus should go against the
moral hazard results. The imputation is done for Dit = 0 by borrowing information from the distribution
of Dit = 1 claims. Chiappori et al. (2006) provides additional details.
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I link discontinuity in PM 2.5 to the policy as follows:
PM2.5it = γ0 + γ1Policyt + γ2Xit + it
Where Policyt=1[Date>April 2014]; Xit includes three weather control variables in month t
(wind speed, temperature and humidity), month of year (MOY) dummies, and district-level
dummies. The results are shown in Figure A5.
A.4.1 Selection: do the switchers signal as bad risk-types?
From the perspective of insurance firms, the switchers (consumers who bought insurance
on credit) could be identical to the non-switchers based on the observable characteristics of
consumers. Does this hold for unobservables? In contrast, results in Table A5 and Figure
A6 indicate that the switchers signal as bad risk-types: residual claims (unobserved) are
systematically worse for the switchers, compared to the other various categories of consumers.
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Figure 2.23: Discontinuity in PM 2.5 at Policy Cut-off
(a) RESULTS FOR LOCAL LINEAR REGRESSION
(b) RESULTS FOR QUADRATIC REGRESSION
Notes: Figure (a) displays mean residual PM2.5 on each side of the policy-cutoff by month
and local linear regressions on each side of the cutoff; (b) replicates (a) but for quadratic
regressions on each side of the cutoff. In both cases, there is suggestive evidence of imme-
























































































































































































































































(b) ALWAYS BASIC-LIABILITY CUSTOMERS VS. SWITCHERS
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A.5 Additional results
Figure 2.25: The Model’s Timing
Notes : Figure shows the timing of the mixed-economic model; illustrating the interplay
between multi-dimensional selection and moral hazard. Contract choice depends on selection.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.28: Timelines of Policy
Notes : Figure displays the timelines regarding the policy reform. The NIC agreed on the
policy on October 12, 2013. The implementation/announcement of regulation took place on





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Harmattan Winds, Disease and Gender
Gaps in Human Capital Investment
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Abstract∗
Persistent gender gaps in educational attainment have been examined in the context of
differential parental costs of investment in the education of boys versus girls. This paper ex-
amines whether disease burdens, especially prevalent in the tropics, contribute significantly
to widening gender gaps in educational attainments. We estimate the impact of sudden
exposure to the 1986 meningitis epidemic in Niger on girls’ education relative to boys. Our
results suggest that increases in meningitis cases during epidemic years significantly reduce
years of education disproportionately for school-aged going girls in areas with higher menin-
gitis exposure. There is no significant effect for boys in the same cohort and no effects of
meningitis exposure for non-epidemic years. We use theory to explore different channels,
highlighting income effects of epidemics on households and early marriage of girls in areas
with higher exposure during epidemic years. We also use National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) data to investigate the relationship between climate variables and
the meningitis epidemic and explore how climate change could potentially worsen social in-
equality through widening the gender gap in human capital investment. Our findings have
broader implications for climate-induced disease effects on social inequality.
JEL Classification Codes: I12, I14, I24, J16, J24, O12, O15, Q54
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3.1 Introduction
“In my community work I soon learned more about the barriers for girls
in school. If families are going through a financial rough patch, they’re
more likely to pay fees for boys rather than for girls. If girls drop out
of school, the family is eager to marry them off rather than have them
sit around the house all day.” - Natasha Annie Tonthhola, BBC
News
There is a vast literature on the positive economic impacts of investment in education Becker
et al. 1990. In developing countries, where notable gender gaps in educational attainment
still remain, the potential economic gains from educating girls are significant (Schultz 2002;
Barro and Lee 2013). Though gaps in primary school enrollment have been closing, largely
due to national policies promoting free primary education, gaps in educational attainment
still remain, partly driven by lower primary completion rates and lower secondary school
enrollment rates for girls relative to boys in poorer countries concentrated in Africa and
Asia1. Some of the reasons given for this persistent gap and associated lower investment
of parents in female versus male children have been direct costs related to school fees and
opportunity costs related to early marriage of girls, foregone earnings of girls’ labor, and
gendered expectations of the division of household labor, with girls expected to care for
younger siblings and contribute disproportionately to other unpaid domestic work (Schultz
2002; Hartmann-Mahmud 2011).
Another strand of literature has examined the relationship between health shocks and
investment in human capital with findings showing a negative relationship between dis-
ease/mortality rates and investments in education (Miguel and Kremer 2004; Almond 2006;
Glewwe and Miguel 2007; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 2009). However, the literature
has been thin in understanding how health shocks and disease burdens contribute to dif-
ferences in educational attainment and investment in the human capital of girls relative to
1Source: OECD “Closing the Gender Gap" report
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boys (Glewwe and Miguel 2007). Estimating the contribution of health shocks to differen-
tial human capital investment by gender is especially important for developing countries in
Africa and Asia where the combination of notable gender gaps in educational attainment and
higher disease burdens in the tropics can impose a double cost for economic development.
This paper’s main contribution is to estimate the effect of health shocks on the gender gap
in educational attainment by exploiting a quasi-experiment, the 1986 meningitis epidemic in
Niger, following previous work in Archibong and Annan (2017). We estimate a difference-
in-differences model, interacting an indicator for gender with a continuous cohort-based
measure of meningitis exposure during the 1986 epidemic. We find that higher meningitis
exposure during the epidemic reduced years of education for school-going aged girls at the
time of the epidemic. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in the education of
boys exposed to higher or lower meningitis incidence during the epidemic. These results
have important implications: first, health shocks disproportionately impact investment in
girls’ education with direct and opportunity costs of investing in girls’ education potentially
higher during shocks. Second, a focus on improving attainment through free, mandatory
primary education programs means that most of the investment in the education of girls will
occur at the primary level in poorer countries. So disease shocks will have disproportionate
effects on primary school aged girls, decreasing the likelihood of primary school completion
and resulting in lower attainment for girls relative to boys. Third, our findings highlight
the need for policies targeting both health and education concurrently to close the gap in
educational attainment and maximize economic returns from the associated gains in human
capital investment, particularly for poorer countries located in higher disease burden areas
in the tropics.
Another contribution of the paper2 is to highlight the mechanisms through which health
shocks might affect gender gaps in human capital investment. We use theory to explore
different explanations for the results, citing direct and indirect channels through which epi-
2Going beyond work presented in Archibong and Annan (2017).
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demics might affect gender gaps in educational attainment (Bjorkman-Nyqvist 2013; Islam
and Maitra 2012; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 2009). We explore direct (through health
and mortality) and indirect (through income and consumption) effects of meningitis epi-
demics and provide evidence for the primacy of indirect channels here. Specifically, we show
evidence for higher rates of early marriage of girls in districts with higher meningitis expo-
sure during epidemic years. Our results lend support to the health shock as negative income
shock channel highlighted in the literature, with girls being “sold" by households for bride
price transfers and to reduce the consumption burden on the household during epidemic
years (Islam and Maitra 2012; Corno, Voena et al. 2015; Corno et al. 2016; Loaiza Sr and
Wong 2012). We also show evidence, supported by a vast literature, for a robust positive
association between the age at first marriage and educational attainment for girls (Ashraf
et al., 2016).
Finally, given the growing evidence on the social and economic impacts of climate, a
third contribution of the paper is to investigate the linkages between the Harmattan season
and meningitis outbreaks to explore the potential implications of Harmattan and associated
climate variables on the observed gender gap in human capital investment. Previous work
has documented the relationship between yearly variability in meningitis outbreaks and
relevant climate variables during the most intense part of the dry season, the Harmattan,
from October to December across sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia-Pando et al. 2014; Perez
Garcia Pando et al. 2014; Yaka et al. 2008). We use an instrumental variable approach
to link educational attainment to harmattan-induced meningitis outbreaks. The IV results
provide further support for our OLS findings.
We conduct a number of robustness checks to validate our results, with the results robust
to alternate specifications of meningitis exposure and placebo testing with unaffected cohorts.
A potential concern for our proposal of the indirect economic channel as the main mechanism
at work, is the lack of data on mortality rates by gender that would allow us to test for any
differential biological effects of meningitis by gender. We refer to the health literature on
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meningitis impacts as evidence against the direct biological mechanism as the main channel
here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical predictions that
we test in the data. Section 3 provides background on the 1986 meningitis epidemic in
Niger. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 outlines our empirical specification, and
Section 6 provides quantitative estimates on the impacts of the epidemic on the gender gap
in human capital. Section 7 discusses the potential effect of the Harmattan season on the
occurrence and incidence of meningitis outbreak for the following year. Section 8 explores
direct and indirect channels, examines the impact of the epidemic on early marriage of girls
and evaluates alternative explanations for the results. Section 9 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
This paper tests the hypothesis that aggregate health shocks can have differential impacts
on male and female human capital investment choices and outcomes. There are two primary
channels through which health can differentially affect human capital, broadly categorized
as direct, through health and biology, and indirect channels, through economic impacts on
households. Through the direct channel, a health shock like a meningitis epidemic can
have different biological effects on male and female infected persons. If, for instance, girls
are biologically more likely to die from meningitis, then the evidence could show lower
years of education during the epidemic year for girls relative to their male counterpart
(Janghorbani et al. 1993; Sen 1998; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney 2009). Another way
the direct health channel could operate is if there are differential effects by gender on cognitive
development from the disease, resulting in lowered educational attainment for girls relative
to boys (Almond, Edlund, and Palme 2009).
Through the indirect channel, a health shock like a meningitis epidemic has income
effects on the household. The household is modeled as a unitary household with liquidity
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and credit constraints and the health shock acts as a negative income shock for the household,
raising health expenditures, resulting in missed work days/foregone income and raising the
costs of domestic care for sick household members. This leads the household to attempt to
smooth consumption by reducing expenditure on certain consumption bundles and selling
off available assets (Islam and Maitra 2012). In many communities, these “assets” include
female children where early marriage of girls can increase in response to a negative income
shock in bride price societies where income and wealth transfers are made from the groom’s
family to the bride’s family upon marriage (Corno, Voena et al. 2015; Corno et al. 2016).
Corno et al. (2016) outline a model and provide evidence for an increase in early marriages
(a reduction in the age at first marriage) in response to income shocks in bride price societies.
Lowered age at first marriage is associated with lower educational attainment with girls often
dropping out of school or completing less schooling at the time of marriage, and the early
marriage channel could then explain a widened gender gap in attainment in response to the
meningitis epidemic.
We present a simple framework on the relationship between health shocks and the gender
gap in educational attainment as follows. Following the unitary household model, within
each family i, parents maximize discounted expected utility over two periods and choose to
invest in schooling for girls (denoted sg) and boys (denoted sb). In period 1, the child works
at home, goes to school or both. In period 2, the child is an adult and works for a wage.







ci1 = y1 − peib − peig + ηb(1− sib) + ηg(1− sig)
and






where ais = αissis; sis ∈ [0, 1]; yai= ωsais (ωb > ωg and γb > γg); θs= δγsωs and θg < θb
and cit is the parent i’s consumption in period t, u is a concave utility function and δ is a
discount factor. ais are cognitive skills with αis denoted as the learning efficiency of a child
of sex s in family i and which is assumed to be equal for boys and girls. sis is the fraction
of time in period 1 spent in school by a child from family i of sex s and defined over the
interval 0,1. yt is (exogenous) parental income and p is the schooling price for a child. eis is
an indicator variable that takes 1 if family i sends a child of sex s to school. ηs(1 − sis) is
the income provided from home production in period 2 and γsyais is the share of the child’s
income transferred to her parents. ωs is the return to education of a child of sex s. Given
simple restrictions on the parameters above and outlined in Bjorkman-Nyqvist (2013), the
first order condition for household i, after maximizing the parent’s expected utility will be:
FOC : −u′(c1)ηs + αisθis ≤ 0 for ss ∈ [0, 1]
and parents will choose to invest in schooling for a child up to where the marginal cost of
more schooling, in the form of forgone time for domestic production or foregone income from
early marriage for girls, is equal to the marginal benefit, in the form of higher transfers from
a more educated and subsequently higher paid (using a standard Mincerian model of returns
to education) adult. An implication of the Bjorkman-Nyqvist (2013) model is “if both sb
and sg are greater than 0, a reduction in parental income, y1, will on the margin only reduce
investment in girls’ education.
We use data on higher health costs associated with meningitis outbreaks and early mar-
riage of girls to provide suggestive evidence for the indirect income channel as outlined above
in this paper.
3.3 1986 Meningitis epidemic in Niger
Niger is located in the so-called ‘meningitis belt’ that runs across sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
extending from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia in the far east as shown in Figure 1. Over 95%
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of the Nigerien population resides in the meningitis belt, which is the less desert ecological
region of the country where most epidemics of meningococcal meningitis occur LaForce et al.
2009. The epidemic3 form of meningitis is caused by the bacterium Neisseria meningitidis
and infection is associated with fevers, pain, reduced cognitive function, and in the worst
cases, permanent disability and long-term neurological damage and death. The epidemiology
of the disease is complex and though incidence is often associated with higher wind speeds,
dust concentrations and lower temperatures that come with the onset of the dry, Harmattan
season in SSA, the mechanisms of transmission are not fully understood. Direct transmission
is through contact with respiratory droplets or throat secretions from infected individuals
and the disease itself is ‘an infection of the thin lining surrounding the brain and spinal cord’
(LaForce et al. 2009; Garcia-Pando et al. 2014). The Harmattan season generally extends
from October till March, with the harshest part of the season in the first few months from
October to December (Garcia-Pando et al. 2014). The season is characterized by hot, dry
northeasterly trade winds blowing from the Sahara throughout West Africa; dust particles
carried by the Harmattan winds make the mucus membranes of the nose of the region’s
inhabitants more sensitive, increasing the risk of meningitis infection (Yaka et al. 2008).
In Niger, Yaka et al. (2008) show that 25% of the year to year variance in meningitis
incidence can be explained by the Harmattan, winter climate. Though vaccines have been
introduced to combat the spread of the disease since the first recorded cases in 1909 for SSA,
effectiveness of the vaccines has been limited due to the mutation and virulence tendencies
of the bacterium (LaForce et al. 2009).
Niger has experienced six epidemics since 1986, with the largest lag between epidemics
occurring between the 1986 and subsequent 1993 epidemic as shown in Figure 24. The
periodicity of epidemics in Niger is around 8-10 years, with epidemic waves in the meningitis
belt occurring every 8-14 years (Yaka et al. 2008). The 1986 epidemic was severe with
3Where epidemics are defined in the SSA context as greater than 100 cases per 100,000 population
nationally within a year by the World Health Organization (WHO) (LaForce et al. 2009).
4Though there is no subnational record of epidemics available prior to 1986, historical records suggest
that the last epidemic prior to 1986 occurred in 1979 in Niger (Yaka et al. 2008; Broome et al. 1983).
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15,823 reported cases per 100,000 population and a mortality rate of about 4%5, as shown
in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Young children and teenagers are particularly at risk of infection
during epidemic years, a fact that puts, and has historically placed, a major share of Niger’s
population6 at particular disadvantage during epidemics. Domestic, interdistrict migration
is limited in Niger7 and population size across districts has been stable with the distribution
almost entirely unchanged since 1986 and a correlation of .99 and .97 (p < .001) between
1986 district populations and 1992 and 1998 populations respectively8. We assess individual
exposure to the 1986 meningitis epidemic based on a geographically based assignment at the
district level, given low levels of interdistrict migration in the country.
3.4 Data and cohorts
We combine district level records on meningitis cases per 100,000 population from the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Public Health in Niger with individual and
district level data on education and demographics from the Nigerien Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS). The district level DHS data is available for 2 survey rounds in 1992 and 1998
and provide records for individuals in all 36 districts across the country including the capital
at Niamey. Education measures the number of years of education that an individual has
completed, and we limit our sample to the cohort born between 1960-1992 which allows us
to include cohorts that were school going age during the 1986 meningitis epidemic. Figure 4
also shows the distribution of meningitis cases by district for the epidemic year, 1986 versus
a non-epidemic year, 1990. Using data from Niger also allows us to exploit homogeneity in
religious, ethnic and income characteristics across individuals in the country to more cleanly
5Calculated from WHO data, details presented in Section 4.
6Where the median age has remained at 15 years old for over a decade. Source: DHS and UNICEF
statistics.
7With most migration consisting of young male seasonal migrants in the northern desert regions, traveling
internationally to neighboring countries for work during during dry months (Afifi 2011).
8Source: Authors estimates from DHS data.
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capture the effect of meningitis epidemic exposure9. District level data on mortality rates
from meningitis are available in aggregate form only, and not available by gender.
We rely on information about the birth year to construct school-aged specific cohorts
and their exposure to the 1986 meningitis epidemic. Three categories are defined which
include ages 0-5, 6-12 and 13-20 with reference to 1986. These age bands reference the
Nigerien school going requirements/context where 6-12 and 13-20 age categories correspond
to primary and secondary school going ages respectively, and 0-5 are non-school going. While
the mandatory school going start age is 7, we allow our primary school category to start from
6 to control for early school going children. The bands contain enough observations to ensure
that estimations are not done on empty cells and also help to control for age misreporting
in the sample.
Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample and schooling along with a snapshot of
variable means for our meningitis cohort-case measure (MENIN) and years of education, our
outcome variable, by cohort and gender. Notably, our sample is fairly distributed across age
cohorts and gender. About 24% of the sample is contained in 0-5 ages, 19% in 6-12 ages and
17% in 13-20 age categories. This distribution is even similar conditional on gender. For
example, about 20% of the sample is contained in 6-12 ages for females, compared to 19% for
males. For educational attainment, the 0-5 age category has an average of about 1.1 years,
the 6-12 ages averaged 2.1 years while the 13-20 category averaged 2.0 years of schooling.
The distribution is also similar conditional on gender. Our overall results are insensitive to
marginal changes in the age cutoffs.10 We predict that the largest magnitudes in reduction
of female education during the epidemic will be for primary school aged going children given
statistics on low secondary school enrollment rates in the country11. Conversely, we should
see no or little effect of meningitis exposure on years of education for non-school aged girls
9Niger is 98% muslim, over 50% Hausa and has a majority poor, agricultural population. Source: US
Department of State, CIA.
10In Figure 10 of the Appendix, we display the density functions of educational attainment across the
various cohorts and gender. The figures visually demonstrate similar distributional patterns across gender,
similar to the average schooling results shown in Table 1.
11Source: UNICEF statistics.
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(between ages 0-5) during the epidemic year.
We appeal to the scientific literature documenting the linkages between the Harmattan
season and meningitis outbreaks in the meningitis belt to explore the potential implications
of Harmattan and associated climate variables on the observed gender gap in human capital
investment. We use data from NASA’s Modern Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and
Applications (MERRA-2)12. Following the environmental health literature on the climate
factors associated with meningitis incidence in Niger, we examine district monthly mean
wind speeds (measured in m/s) temperatures (Kelvin) and dust concentrations (kg/m3).
Perez Garcia Pando et al. (2014) highlight the importance of the previous year October-
December cycle of these variables, and wind speed in particular, as important climatic
predictors of meningitis outbreaks. The distribution of these variables against meningitis
case data during the epidemic year (1985-1986) versus a non-epidemic year (1989-1990) is
shown in Figure 5. Consistent with the results in Perez Garcia Pando et al. (2014), wind
speeds peak in the more intense part of the Harmattan season preceding the epidemic year
(October-December), falling during the less intense part of the Harmattan season (January-
March) during the epidemic year. The trend is much weaker during the non-epidemic years,
as shown using the 1989-1990 test case in Figure 5. Figure A2 depicts district level mean
wind speeds during the more intense part of the Harmattan season (October-December)
versus the less intense part of the Harmattan season (January- March) during the epidemic
period.
To test hypotheses on the risk of early marriage of girls rising during meningitis epidemic
years and leading to lowered educational attainment, we use data from the DHS men’s and
women’s subsamples with summary statistics provided in Table 10.
12MERRA-2 is an atmospheric reanalysis data product that assimilates historical observation data over
an extended period. https://disc.sci.gsfc.nasa.gov/datasets.
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3.5 Empirical Framework
For our main results, we estimate panel regressions of school-aged specific cohorts a linking
years of education for individual i in district d at survey round r to measures of meningitis
exposure MENINadt that are interacted with the gender of the individual femaleig:
educationiadrg = βgfemaleig + βaMENINadt + γagMENINadt × femaleig + µd + δr + δt + iadrg
where t and g index the birth year and gender respectively. This specification includes
district fixed effects µd which capture unobserved differences that are fixed across districts.
The birth year and survey round fixed effects, δt and δr respectively, control for changes in
national policies (e.g. immunization campaigns), potential life cycle changes across cohorts
and other macro factors. Note that the birth year fixed effect subsumes cohort specific
dummies since cohorts are defined based on birth year and the meningitis reference year
1986. The model also includes uninteracted terms for gender and meningitis exposure.
Our key parameter of interest is γag, which is allowed to vary across cohorts. This
measures the impact of MENIN on female respondents’ education relative to their male
counterparts, using variation across districts and the 1986 meningitis epidemic and identi-
fied based on standard assumptions in a difference-in-differences model. MENIN is measured
in two ways. In the first case, we calculate the mean weekly cases of meningitis per 100,000
population recorded in a district (MENIN Cases). The second case modifies the first mea-
sure by interacting it with the number of months for which meningitis incidence is strictly
positive (MENIN Intensity). The implied key variable of interest is therefore constructed
by interacting the MENIN measures with gender. Estimations are done using OLS and
standard errors are clustered at the district level. Robustness checks and falsification tests
on our identifying assumptions are presented in the results section.
To test hypotheses concerning age at first marriage and meningitis exposure, we estimate
OLS regressions of meningitis cases per 100,000 population on age at first marriage using
district, year and year of birth fixed effects where possible.
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3.6 Results
Table 2 reports estimates from two specifications for our two measures of meningitis exposure
(i.e., MENIN Cases; MENIN Intensity) using 1960-1992 cohorts. Columns 1a and 1c display
results for the linkages between educational attainment, gender and meningitis exposure at
cohorts-level. The gender variable is negative and significant in both columns, documenting
the existing gender gap between males and females in favor of males. Meningitis exposure
across almost all cohorts is negative and insignificant. It is barely significant at 10% only in
the MENIN Intensity measure for primary school cohorts.
Our main results are in columns 1b and 1d of Table 2 where we interact the meningitis
exposure measures with gender to examine gender-differentiated impacts of the meningitis
burden on educational investments. Gender is negative and significant. What is striking is
that only interaction terms for the school going cohorts are negative and strongly signifi-
cant at conventional levels. The interaction estimates are economically large in magnitude
especially in the MENIN Cases measure. Interpreting the results from the MENIN Cases
measure in column 1b, a case increase in the mean weekly meningitis cases per 100,000
population in each district is associated with a reduction of -.044 years of schooling or a 3%
to 4% decrease in years of education13 per case exposure, relative to the mean for female
respondents of primary school going age during the epidemic year. Primary school aged fe-
male respondents in higher case exposure districts experience significant reductions in their
years of education relative to their counterparts in lower case exposure districts during the
epidemic year. Similar results are found for the secondary school aged female sample, with
increases in meningitis case exposure associated with a reduction of -.03 years of schooling
or 2% to 3% decrease in years of education, per case exposure relative to the mean for
the female cohort. Reassuringly, the interaction is not significant for non-school going aged
female respondents at the time of the epidemic.
We conduct various falsification/sensitivity tests. First, the results are robust to small
13Relative to the unconditional and conditional mean years of education respectively.
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changes/modifications in cohort age cutoffs (Table 3). Our main results are derived using
the definition of cohorts based on the 1986 epidemic. In alternate specifications presented in
Table 4, we examine school going and non-school going aged cohorts based on the 1990 non-
epidemic year. Table 4 reports estimates for cohorts defined based a reference non-epidemic
year 1990. We find no effect of meningitis exposure for the primary school aged category
across all relevant specifications, which is what we would expect14. There is evidence of effects
for the secondary school aged category. The secondary cohorts are essentially capturing
effects of initial exposure to the 1986 epidemic when such cohorts were in primary school15.
The sign on the 0-5 group is significantly positive which suggests positive investment in
education during non-epidemic years16. These robustness checks and falsification results
make it less likely that we are picking up any spurious/confounding effects in our main
results.
Our results suggest that meningitis epidemic health shocks disproportionately impact
investment in girls’ education potentially due to increases in the direct and opportunity
costs of parental investment in girls’ education during epidemic years. Epidemic years and
higher than expected meningitis exposure might mean a contraction of the household budget
constraint due to lost wages and increased health costs associated with the epidemic. Direct
costs associated with fees might be higher when the household budget constraint shifts
inward. Opportunity costs might rise with girls’ labor increasingly commanded to care for
sick family members or act as substitute labor for sick family members during the epidemic
years17. One way that parents might respond to rising costs is by selling off “assets”, or female
children, to reduce consumption burdens and accrue income from bride price transfers from
14Note since attainment is cumulative, some of this effect captures a long run effect of initial exposure in
1986. The primary school-aged cohort in 1990 includes some of the non school-aged populations in 1986.
15Again due to slight serial correlation between 1986 and 1990 exposure as explained in the previous
footnote.
16It could also suggest a reversal in district exposure during the 1993-1996 epidemics for respondents
from these districts who would be in the primary school aged categories during that period. We address the
subject of cumulative effects in ongoing work.
17Hartmann-Mahmud (2011) documents this phenomenon in her case study research interviewing Nigerien
women.
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grooms’ families to brides’ families as discussed in Section 2 and Corno et al. (2016).
3.7 Harmattan-induced Meningitis and educational
gender gaps
Though the causes of meningitis epidemics and the mechanisms of disease transmission are
not well understood, the environmental health literature has identified climatic variables as
explaining up to 30% of the intra and inter country variation in meningitis exposure in certain
countries within the meningitis belt (Garcia-Pando et al. 2014; Perez Garcia Pando et al.
2014; Yaka et al. 2008). In Niger, Garcia-Pando et al. (2014) find that wind speeds18 and
dust conditions during the harmattan months from October to December in the year prior
to the meningitis year, correlate significantly with meningitis outbreaks in the proceeding
year.
In this section, we directly investigate how Harmattan induces variations in meningitis
to explain the observed gender gaps in educational attainment. We use an instrumental
variable approach to link educational attainment educationiadrg to our cohort-level meningitis
exposure and gender:
educationiadrg = γagMENINadt × femaleig + µd + δr + δt + iadrg
MENINdt = ρHarmdt + cd + νdt
whereHarmdt contains the previous year (1985) Harmattan winds and dust concentration,
as well as the current year (1986) weather or climate variables: temperature and precip-
itation. A set of unrestricted district dummies, denoted by cd, are included to capture
time-invariant district factors such as closeness to health amenities. Our key parameter of
interest γag is identified by district-level variation in Harmattan season variablesHarmdt19,
which are presumably exogenous since we use the previous year Harmattan realizations while
18Zonal winds and meridional winds, and zonal winds in particular (Garcia-Pando et al. 2014).
19I.e., From baseline district differences and the 1986 meningitis epidemic exposure.
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controlling for contemporaneous weather changes. All other terms are defined similarly as
in previous sections.
3.7.1 First stage: link between Harmattan and Meningitis
The season of Harmattan in the previous period is a strong instrument and induces significant
variation in households’ exposure to meningitis. Tables 5 and 6 report the first-stage F-
statistics both for meningitis cases and intensity, respectively. For each meningitis scenario,
we present three sets of results that reflect three different candidate instruments. The
instruments include (i) the average wind and dust concentration from 1985 (column 1), (ii)
the average wind and dust concentration in the last quarter of 1985 (column 2), and (iii)
the actual monthly wind and dust observations from the last quarter of 1985 but excludes
district fixed effects (column 3).
Our preferred specification is column (2): averages the Harmattan variables over the
Harmattan season (i.e., the last quarter of the previous year) with controls for district
level climate and potential unobserved heterogeneity. In general, the winds are correlated
with the dry season which starts in September. Thus, focussing on the last quarter of the
previous year allows us to overcome concerns about other climatic events and seasons, and
lends support for the validity of the Harmattan instrument. The null hypothesis that all
coefficients of the Harmattan season and climate or weather variables are jointly zero can
be easily rejected at conventional significance levels. All F-statistics in columns (1) and
(2) are above 10, satisfying the usual cutoff value for weak instruments, in all meningitis
scenarios. Since the first stage F-statistic is less than 10 in our third measure of Harmattan,
we do present results for this instrument in our second stage analysis that examines the
relationship between meningitis and educational gaps by gender.
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3.7.2 Second stage: Harmattan-induced Meningitis and
educational gender-gaps
We used two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) to estimate the above equations, and report the
second stage results in Tables 7 and 8. The columns follow the same layout as the previous
baseline tables. Columns (2) and (4) include the interaction terms between gender and
meningitis exposure at cohorts-level while columns (1) and (3) omit the interactions. In all
cases, the gender variable is negative and significant at conventional levels. The estimated
impact of Harmattan-instrumented meningitis exposure on female respondents’ education
relative to their male counterparts is negative and statistically significant for the school
going aged cohorts, but not significant for the non-school aged cohorts (0-5 years) based on
clustered standard errors. For the school going cohorts, the impacts range from -0.053 to
-.060 (for MENIN cases); with an average estimate of about -0.057. On the other hand, the
estimates range between -0.0054 to -0.0059 for MENIN intensity. Notice that the first stage
F-statistics reported in Tables 5 and 6 are all above the usual cutoff point of 10 for concerns
of weak instruments.
The estimated impacts for MENIN cases imply that a case increase in the mean weekly
meningitis cases per 100,000 population in each district is associated with an average re-
duction of -0.057 years of schooling or about 4.7% to 4.9% decrease in years of education
per case exposure, relative to the mean for female respondents of primary school going age
during the epidemic year. Our 2SLS results suggest significant gender-differentiated negative
impacts (disproportionately against school-aged cohort females) of meningitis induced by the
Harmattan season. The 2SLS results re-affirm our baseline OLS estimates in Table 2 (i.e.,
in terms of the sign of the relevant coefficients), but the estimated impacts under the 2SLS
are slightly larger suggesting a slight downward bias of the estimated baseline impacts by
gender. Together, the 2SLS analysis allows us to adjust for this potential bias while examin-
ing how exogenous variation in meningitis exposure induced by Harmattan could propagate
into differential human capital investments by gender.
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Estimating the reduced form link: Other diseases are omitted variables in explaining
education, and are likely correlated with both Harmattan and meningitis. For example,
dusts carried by Harmattan may cause asthma, or possibly affect other channels such as
agricultural productivity with direct effect on education. This confounds the estimated
causal link between Harmattan-meningitis-education. For this reason, we assess the potential
role of Harmattan via the reduced form link between Harmattan and education. We regressed
educational outcome on our preferred measure of Harmattan seasonality (with the cohort
interactions). Results are reported in Table 9. The coefficient of the ’female’ variable is
negative across all model specifications, suggesting significant gender gaps in education.
The interaction between female and Harmattan variables (dust concentration, wind speed) is
never significant for non-school age going cohorts. However, it is negative and significant for
the school age going cohorts. Overall, the evidence is consistent with climate or Harmattan
playing a significant role in the incidence of meningitis and contributing to the widening of
gender gaps in human capital, with disproportionate negative impact on investment in girls’
education.
3.8 Indirect and direct Channels: economic and health
responses
Section 2 outlined the expected direct and indirect channels through which health shocks like
the meningitis epidemic might be expected to affect gender gaps in human capital investment.
The following subsections explore these mechanisms and find evidence in favor of the indirect
economic channel. The high economic costs of disease burdens during epidemic years induce
households to marry off their daughters at earlier ages.
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3.8.1 Indirect channels: economic responses and gender Gaps
Documented data on health expenditure on other countries in the meningitis belt suggest
that the indirect channel, through increased direct and opportunity costs following a meningi-
tis expenditure might be the primary channel through which the epidemics affect differential
household investment in girls’ and boys’ education (Colombini et al. 2009). In Burkina Faso,
Niger’s neighbor in the meningitis belt, households spent some $90 per meningitis case, 34%
of per capita GDP in direct medical and indirect costs from meningitis infections over the
2006-2007 epidemic (Colombini et al. 2009). In affected households with sequelae, costs rose
to as high as $154 per case. Costs were associated with direct medical costs from spending
on prescriptions and medicines20 and indirect costs from loss of caregiver income (up to 9
days of lost work), loss of infected person income (up to 21 days of lost work) and missed
school if attending (12 days of missed school) (Colombini et al. 2009). In the presence of
these high costs, studies have documented that one way parents try to smooth consumption
is to reduce investment in girls’ human capital relative to their male siblings (Barcellos,
Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney 2014; Corno et al. 2016). We examine one important method
of doing this which is through increased early marriage of girls in the next section.
3.8.1.1 Meningitis epidemic, early marriage and educational attainment
Niger has the highest rates of early marriage in the world, with 75% of girls married before
the age of eighteen (Loaiza Sr and Wong 2012). Niger is also part of a number of countries
in the world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, that engages in bride price transfers of
wealth from grooms’ families to brides’ families at the time of marriage. Previous studies
have documented increases in the risk of early marriage following negative income shocks
to households, and we provide evidence of this following the epidemic (Corno et al. 2016).
First, we confirm findings from the literature on age at first marriage and document positive,
20Vaccines are technically free during epidemics, however information asymmetry among health care
workers and shortages of vaccines often raise the price of medication (Colombini et al. 2009).
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significant associations between age at first marriage and years of education for school going
aged female populations during the epidemic (1986) and non-epidemic (1990) years in Table
11. The coefficients remain stable, strongly significant and positive at around .3 for school
going aged female populations during the epidemic and non-epidemic years as shown in
columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6). Interestingly, for the male sample, while there is a significant,
positive but much smaller coefficient of association (around .06) between age at first marriage
and years of education for males who where school going aged during the epidemic year, there
is no significant association between age at first marriage and years of education for males
who were school going aged during the non-epidemic year as shown in column (8) of Table
11. The results suggest that the association between age at first marriage and years of
education is much stronger for women than men in the sample.
Next, to explore the relationship between age at first marriage and meningitis exposure,
particularly during epidemic years, we chart age at first marriage cumulative hazards with
results shown in Figure 6. Figure 6 shows age at first marriage cumulative hazard for male
and female school going aged populations by meningitis exposure in epidemic (1986) and non-
epidemic years (1990). In above the national meningitis districts (denoted as ‘High Menin’ in
the figure), hazard rates are noticeably higher for both male and female respondents during
the epidemic year. The magnitude is larger for female respondents during the epidemic year,
who are typically also married at earlier ages (the mean age at first marriage is about 15 years
old as shown in Table 10 for women versus about 21 years for men in the school going aged
cohort during the 1986 epidemic year) than their male counterparts. Quantitatively, female
respondents who were school going aged during the 1986 epidemic year are almost two times
more likely to marry earlier in high (above the national mean) meningitis exposed districts
than in low (below the national mean) meningitis exposed districts. The trend in the 1990
non-epidemic year is reversed with age at first marriage higher in high meningitis exposed
districts for school going aged males and females during the 1990 non-epidemic year. Given
these trends in the raw data we assess significance, estimating regressions with OLS, with
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results shown in Table 12. The first set of results in column (3) of Table 12 show significant
negative associations (about -.024) between meningitis cases and age at first marriage for
the female school going aged sample as of the time of the epidemic, with no significant effect
for the comparable male sample. In contrast, there is no significant association between
meningitis cases and age at first marriage for either the female or male school going aged
samples during the non-epidemic test year, 1990 as shown in column (6). The results provide
support for the indirect channel discussed in Section 2 and Section 8 where the epidemic
acts as a negative income shock leading households to smooth consumption by “selling" their
daughters for a bride price, reflected in the lowered age at first marriage during epidemic
years but not non-epidemic years and with the effects significant for girls but not boys.
3.8.2 Direct channels: health and gender gaps
On the direct, health channel, given the lack of data on infection and mortality rates by
gender, we refer to the epidemiology and health literature on the biology of meningitis
infection. First, there is little documented evidence on differential infection and mortality
rates of meningitis by gender (Trotter and Greenwood 2007). A simple regression on the
female share by district and mortality rates during the epidemic year reveals no direct trends
as shown in Table 9, although this is unsurprising given that the magnitude of the mortality
effect to see a response in female populations would have to be extremely large. Another way
the direct health channel might operate is if girls, when they are sick, are less likely to be
treated or as quickly treated as boys due to gender bias in parental investment in children as
has been documented in other studies (Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney 2014). This
might also lead to differential mortality by gender during the epidemic, though the size of
this effect is difficult to estimate given the paucity of data. Similarly, if treatment or time to
treatment differs by gender, then there might be more incidences of long-term neurological
damage in girls over boys which might affect school investment choices and lead to lower
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attainment as well.21
In addition, there could be effects on kids who were exposed to some form of Meningitis
at a very young age (i.e., pre-school), deteriorating their cognitive abilities and affecting
later educational outcomes. Table 2 provides a test for such biological channel, whereby it is
rejected. If this channel is meaningful, then one would expect the effect of 1986 Meningitis
exposure on education to be large and significant for the 0-5 age cohort. The effects are
nearly zero and rejected at all conventional levels of significance.
3.8.3 Evaluation of alternative hypotheses
This section further evaluates the robustness of the estimated effects of meningitis exposure
on the gender gap in years of education, and the relationship between the age at first marriage
and meningitis exposure.
3.8.3.1 Impact of concurrent shocks
One potential hypothesis is that concurrent rainfall shocks, common in SSA, might explain
the relationship between meningitis and the gender gap in years of education identified in
this paper. To test this, we re-estimate our baseline specification by interacting the various
cohorts with precipitation shocks. Precipitation shocks are defined as average district level
precipitation differenced from the national mean during the 1986 epidemic year. The results
are reported in Table 13. Each column in the table denotes different model specifications,
with and without controls for temperature22. The results show no effect of precipitation
21While it is possible that young girls are less taken care of when ill as compared to boys, in bride price
societies where healthy girls may be more valued, that effect may seem less significant, perhaps explaining
why mortality rates are not significantly different across gender. Note that our assessment of the various
channels is by no means exhaustive.
22Controlling for temperature is important since it is correlated with precipitation (Schlenker and Roberts
2009).
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shocks on gender gaps in education across all cohorts, lending further support to the esti-
mated effect of meningitis exposure during the epidemic year.
3.8.3.2 Meningitis, wealth and age at first marriage
In section 8.1, we argue that the primary channel underlying the differential gender impacts
of meningitis is that girls are married off, particularly at early ages. This will be especially
true for liquidity constrained households. We reaffirm this by estimating a model that links
age at first marriage with liquidity. Using data on assets from the DHS23 , we construct
a wealth index and define liquidity or asset constrained households as those located in
the lower parts of the asset distribution. The results are reported in Table 14. The first
column excludes interactions between meningitis and asset quintiles; the second includes the
interactions. As expected, column 1 shows that age at first marriage for female respondents
is likely higher in the less liquidity constrained households (above the third quintile) as
compared to the constrained. There is a significant negative effect of sudden exposure to
meningitis on the age at first marriage for women belonging to asset constrained households.
Estimates from the second column show that the impact of meningitis exposure on asset
constrained households is significantly larger. In particular, meningitis has limited impact
on the age at first marriage for the less constrained. Note that the estimate for the less
constrained categories are similar in both specifications. Finally, columns 3 and 4 replicate
the analysis using a non-epidemic year, 1990. There is no evidence of meningitis impact on
the age at first marriage of female respondents and its interaction with wealth/asset status,
lending further support for the early marriage channel following meningitis epidemics.
23The wealth index is based on ownership of the following 20 assets in the DHS women’s sample: electric-
ity, durables (e.g. radio, tv, fridge, car, bicycle), water and sanitation infrastructure and housing structure
(e.g. dirt floor, cement floor). For lack of DHS data for 1986, we proxy the wealth status using available
data for 1992 and 1998. This assumes that the wealth of current respondents is strongly correlated with
their previous households. This might be a strong assumption but seems reasonable in Niger since distri-




Our analysis of the effects of exposure to the 1986 meningitis epidemic on educational attain-
ment of school aged girls in Niger, reveals that the gender gap widened during the epidemic
year. The effect is particularly significant for primary school aged girls at the time of the
epidemic, since most of the investment in education happens at the primary level. We find
a significant decrease in years of education for school aged female respondents at the time of
the epidemic with no significant effect for their male counterparts. Given the evidence on the
intergenerational returns to female education and the potential economic returns to closing
the gender gap, these results highlight the need for dual policy addressing both education
and health to target the gender gap in educational attainment. We also provide evidence on
the links between meningitis outbreaks and Harmattan season intensity, prompting further
discussion on the role of climate-induced disease on worsening social inequality.
We provide evidence for the an indirect economic channel where the epidemic acts as
a negative income shock prompting households to smooth consumption by cutting back
on education expenditures of girls and selling daughters in exchange for bride price wealth
transfers. A consequence of this is lowered age at first marriage for girls during epidemic
years and less years of education, which would explain the widened gender gap during the
epidemic year. An important contribution of the paper is to show that disease burdens and
health shocks contribute significantly to widening gender gaps in educational attainment
with associated implications for development in poorer countries. This line of research has
broader implications for climate-induced disease effects on social inequality.
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Figure 3.1: Areas with Frequent Epidemics of Meningococcal Meningitis (“Meningitis Belt”)
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Table 3.2: Difference in Difference Estimates of the Differential Impact of Meningitis Expo-
sure on Education (1986 Epidemic Year), MENIN x Female
Notes : Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
district. Dependent variable is years of education across all specifications. MENIN cases
is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable defined as average district level weekly case
(per 100,000 population) exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1986 epidemic
year. MENIN intensity is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable measured as district
level case exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1986 meningitis epidemic year
multiplied by number of months of exposure (with greater than zero cases). Mean level of
education in the sample is 1.22, and the standard deviation is 2.7. Mean level of education
for boys in the sample is 1.51 and the mean level of education for girls in the sample is 0.94.
The estimates represent 3% to 4% and 2% to 3% reduction in education for girls in the
primary school going age sample (ages 6-12) and secondary school going age sample (ages
13-20) respectively relative to the unconditional and conditional means. ***Significant at
the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3.3: Difference in Difference Estimates of the Differential Impact of Meningitis Expo-
sure on Education (1986 Epidemic Year), Robustness Check
Notes : Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
district. Dependent variable is years of education across all specifications. MENIN cases
is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable defined as average district level weekly case
(per 100,000 population) exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1986 epidemic
year. MENIN intensity is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable measured as district
level case exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1986 meningitis epidemic year
multiplied by number of months of exposure (with greater than zero cases). ***Significant
at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 3.4: Difference in Difference Estimates of the Differential Impact of Meningitis Expo-
sure on Education (1990 Non-Epidemic Year), Robustness Check
Notes : Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
district. Dependent variable is years of education across all specifications. MENIN cases
is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable defined as average district level weekly case
(per 100,000 population) exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1990 non-epidemic
year. MENIN intensity is the meningitis exposure explanatory variable measured as district
level case exposure for cohort at specified ages during the 1990 non-epidemic year multiplied
by number of months of exposure (with greater than zero cases). Mean level of education in
the sample is 1.22, and the standard deviation is 2.7. Mean level of education for boys in the
sample is 1.51 and the mean level of education for girls in the sample is 0.94. ***Significant
at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent
level.
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Table 3.5: Meningitis Incidence (Cases) and the Harmattan Season
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of meningitis cases on previous Harmattan
season and current weather variables: temperature and precipitation at the district level.
Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included variables. Column (1) includes the average
wind and dust concentration from 1985, column (2) includes the average wind and dust
concentration in the last quarter of 1985 (Harmattan season), while column (3) includes
the actual monthly observations from the last quarter of 1985 but excludes the district fixed
effects. Errors are clustered at the district level. Significant at the 1 percent level, Significant
at the 5 percent level, Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3.6: Meningitis Incidence (Intensity) and the Harmattan Season
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of meningitis intensity on previous Har-
mattan season and current weather variables: temperature and precipitation at the district
level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included variables. Column (1) includes the aver-
age wind and dust concentration from 1985, column (2) includes the average wind and dust
concentration in the last quarter of 1985 (Harmattan season), while column (3) includes the
actual monthly observations from the last quarter of 1985 but excludes the district fixed ef-
fects. Errors are clustered at the district level. Significant at the 1 percent level, Significant













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Reduced Form: Harmattan and Educational Gender Gaps
Dependent Variable: Years of Education
VARIABLES Winds, m/s Dusts, kg/m3
Female -0.6222*** -0.3439*** -0.6274*** -0.3804***
(0.05062) (0.0823) (0.0556) (0.0767)
Harmattan at ages 0-5 -0.0820* -0.0708 242233.8 288659.6
(0.0439) (0.0431) (527181.7) (528353.8)
x Female -0.018215 -139158.7
(0.0185) (259727.9)
Harmattan at ages 6-12 -0.4648 -0.4159 -228145 387979.2
(0.2901) (0.2942) (991882.1) (1026905)
x Female -0.0984*** -1307362***
(0.0199) (304792.7)
Harmattan at ages 13-20 -0.8467 -0.7677 -704554.9 275932.9
(0.5667) (0.5521) (1237784) (1244591)
x Female -0.1123*** -1610260***
(0.0182) (317255.8)
Constant -58.4782** -61.2189** -69.9017*** -69.8805 ***
(24.1090) (23.84826) (5.445593) (9.5391)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of birth fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Current weather controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Harmattan correlate control Dusts, kg/m3 Dusts, kg/m3 Winds, m/s Winds, m/s
3.23e+07*** 3.26e+07*** -0.3338*** -0.3510***
(1979867) (1940469) (0.0334) (0.0356)
Observations 43,814 43,814 43,814 43,814
R2 0.215 0.218 0.210 0.213
Notes : Reduced form link between educational outcomes and Harmattan. Table reports
the results from regressions of educational attainment on Harmattan season at the district
level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the inclusion of interaction terms and weather con-
trols. Columns (2) and (4) include the interaction terms between cohort level Harmattan
season variables (1985Q4: winds and dust) and gender, while columns (1) and (3) omit the
interactions. Errors are clustered at the district level.Errors are clustered at the district
level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant
at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3.10: Mechanism Check: Correlation Between District Mortality Rate During 1986
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Figure 3.6: Age of First Marriage Cumulative Hazard for School-Going Aged (SGA) Popu-
lations by Meningitis Exposure in Epidemic (1986) and Non-epidemic (1990) Years
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Table 3.14: Impact of Precipitation Shocks on Education (1986 Epidemic Year), Robustness
Check
Notes : Regressions estimated by OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
district. Dependent variable is years of education across all specifications. The Precipitation
exposure explanatory variable is precipitation deviation exposure, defined as average district
level precipitation in 1986 differenced from national mean level precipitation for cohort at
specified ages during the 1986 epidemic year. Precipitation units are in kgm−2s−1. Mean
level of education in the sample is 1.22, and the standard deviation is 2.7. Mean level of
education for boys in the sample is 1.51 and the mean level of education for girls in the
sample is 0.94. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level,
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 3.15: Meningitis Exposure, Wealth and Age at First Marriage for Female School-
Going Aged Respondents Married during Epidemic (1986) and Non-Epidemic (1990) Years,
Robustness Check
Notes : OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. De-
pendent variable is age at first marriage for school going aged respondents (between 6 and 20
years old) during the 1986 epidemic and 1990 non-epidemic years. SGA is School going aged
sample. Meningitis Cases are mean weekly meningitis cases by district for 1986 and 1990.
Wealth quintiles are estimated from wealth scores from principal components analysis. WQ1
is dropped as the comparison group. ***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at
the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 3.7: Age of First Marriage Survival Probability for School-Going Aged (SGA) Pop-
ulations by Meningitis Exposure in Epidemic (1986) and Non-epidemic (1990) Years
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Table 3.16: Difference in Difference Estimates of the Impact of Repeated Meningitis Expo-
sure on Education (relative to 1986 Epidemic Year), Robustness Check
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Table 3.17: Mechanism Check: Impact of Meningitis Exposure on Number of Wives for
School-Going Aged Respondents Married during Epidemic (1986) and Non-epidemic (1990)
Years
Notes : OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by district. De-
pendent variable is number of wives for school going aged respondents (between 6 and 20
years old) during the 1986 epidemic and 1990 non-epidemic year for the male (M) and female
(F) DHS samples. SGA is School going aged sample. ***Significant at the 1 percent level,
**Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of Schooling across Cohorts and Gender
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Chapter 4
Informal Risk Sharing and Index




(joint with Bikramaditya Datta♠)
Abstract∗
When does informal risk sharing act as barrier or support to the take-up of index-based
insurance? We evaluate this substitutability or complementarity interaction by considering
the case of an individual who endogenously chooses to join a group and make decisions about
index insurance. The presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement reduces his risk
aversion, termed “Effective Risk Aversion”— a sufficient statistic for index decision making.
Our analysis establishes that such reduction in risk aversion can lead to either reduced or
increased take up of index insurance. These results provide alternative explanations for two
empirical puzzles: unexpectedly low take-up for index insurance and demand being particu-
larly low for the most risk averse. Experimental evidence based on data from a panel of field
trials in India, lends support for several testable hypotheses that emerge from our baseline
analysis.
JEL Classification Codes: D7, D14, D81, G22, Q14
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“...and when basis risk is large, having an informal network can help by
providing insurance against basis risk. Thus the presence of informal
risk sharing actually increases demand for index-based insurance in the
presence of basis risk...” -- World Development Report (2014)
4.1 Introduction
The business of agriculture is inherently risky, particularly for the poor, due to a myriad
of unpredictable weather and climate events. Recently, innovative index-based weather in-
surance has emerged as a way to help society insure against weather related events.1 A
standard index-based contract pays out when some constructed-index falls below or above
a given non-manipulable threshold.2
The justification for index insurance is that it overcomes several market frictions e.g.,
moral hazard, that plague traditional indemnity-based insurance and financial instruments.
Index-based insurance differs in the sense that the contractual terms (premiums and payouts)
are based on publicly observable and non-manipulable index (local weather). However, this
innovation comes with a cost: “basis risk”. In particular, there is a potential mismatch
between the payouts triggered by the local weather and the actual losses associated with
weather realizations of the insurance policy holder. This mismatch or “basis risk” arises
because weather realized on an individual farm unit may not perfectly correlate with the local
weather index—whose construction is typically based on observations recorded at weather
1The design and coverage for index-based weather insurance can be wide ranging. Hazell et al. (2010)
cites at least 36 pilot index insurance projects that were underway in 21 developing countries. Examples
include: India–rainfall insurance (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013); Ethiopia–rainfall (Hazell
et al. 2010; McIntosh et al. 2013; Duru 2016); China–drought and extreme temperature (Hazzel et al. 2010);
Mexico–drought and excess moisture (Hazell et al. 2010); Ghana–rainfall (Karlan et al. 2014); Kenya and
Ethiopia–“livestock” weather-insurance (Jensen et al. 2014).
2See Carter et al. (2017) for a recent survey about index insurance in developing countries.
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stations that surround the policy holder.3
Empirical studies about weather index-based insurance are growing (e.g., Cai et al. 2009;
Giné and Yang 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014), which in turn have noted
two fundamental puzzles. The first is that, demand for index products has been lower
than expected. The second is that, the demand seems to be especially low from the most
risk averse consumers. Despite its promise, scaling up index insurance will require our
understanding about the various constraints to its take-up. Several candidate reasons for
the low demand have been offered including: financial illiteracy, lack of trust, poor marketing,
credit constraints, present bias, complexity of index contracts, “basis risk” and price effects.
Another suggested explanation for the thin index insurance market in poor populations is
pre-existing informal risk-sharing arrangements. Indeed, the extent to which informal risk-
sharing networks affect the demand for index-based insurance remains an open question, both
empirically and theoretically. In this paper, we focus on microfounded reasons underlying
the relation between informal risk schemes and formal index insurance. Specifically, we ask:
When does an informal risk sharing scheme impede or support the take-up of formal index
insurance? We analyze this question in an environment where an individual endogenously
chooses to join an informal group and make purchase decisions about index insurance. Our
analysis show that the presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement reduces his
risk aversion — a phenomenon we term “Effective Risk Aversion”. The paper documents
that “Effective Risk Aversion” is a paramount statistic that underlies individual’s purchase
decisions about index-based insurance.
Appealing to “Effective Risk Aversion”, it is shown that informal schemes may either
reduce or increase the take-up of index insurance. The main intuition follows from the
simple observation that in the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement, an individual’s risk
tolerance is higher.4 This has two implications for the take-up of index insurance. First,
3Satellite measurements are used in some cases (e.g., Carter et al. 2017; IRI 2013). Even so, the
individual weather realizations is not perfectly correlated with the satellite index.
4This intuition is comparable to Itoh (1993), who studies optimal incentive contracts in a group. He
shows that side contracts can serve as mutual insurance for members in a group and can induce effort at
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the individual being more risk-tolerant makes him less willing to buy insurance. Second, the
individual becomes more tolerant to the basis risk, and so is more likely to take-up. These
two forces have opposite effects on the decision to purchase index insurance. Consider the
case of a highly risk averse individual who will not buy index insurance if acting alone because
of his sensitivity to basis risk. Being in a group reduces his risk aversion “effectively” making
him more tolerant towards basis risk and thus more likely to purchase index insurance. Now
consider the case of an individual with intermediate risk aversion who would buy index
insurance if acting alone. The presence of informal insurance may crowd out his take-up for
index insurance due to his lower willingness to pay. Our analysis thus has implications for
informal schemes acting as a substitute or complement to index insurance.
Several testable hypotheses emerge from our theoretical analysis, which are useful for
the design of index insurance contracts and understanding the development or commercial
success of such innovative financial products. We develop a tractable empirical framework
to investigate these hypotheses using data from a panel of field experimental trials in rural
India. First, we provide empirical evidence that the overall effect of informal risk-sharing on
the take-up of index insurance is ambiguous. There is evidence that informal risk sharing
schemes may support take-up, finding that when downside basis risk is high, risk-sharing
increases the index demand by approximately 13 to 40 percentage points. In addition,
we provide evidence that the existence of risk-sharing arrangement makes individuals more
sensitive to price changes, with an estimated increased elasticity of about 0.34.
Finally, we show that an increase in the size of risk-sharing groups decreases take-up.
This effect is stronger once we have conditioned on basis risk – a counter force. Strikingly,
this result stand in contrast to standard information diffusion models, in which an increase
in exposed group size should facilitate uptake of index insurance (e.g., Jackson and Yariv
2010; Banerjee et al. 2013). For example, Banerjee et al. (2013) show that information
passage or diffusion within a social network increases the likelihood of participation in a
a cheaper cost when members of the group can monitor each other’s effort by coordinating their choice of
effort. While Itoh (1993) looks at effort decisions, we analyze insurance decisions.
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microfinance program across 43 villages in South India. Similarly, Cole, Tobacman and
Stein (2014) attributed the observed increase in take-up of index insurance to information
generated by village-wide insurance payouts. Our analysis documents that the effective
reduction in risk aversion following individuals’ exposure to risk-sharing group treatments
explains the findings.
Our paper is related to the broader literatures on risk sharing (e.g., Itoh 1993; Townsend
1994; Munshi 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009 and many subsequent others), take-up of
index insurance (e.g., Giné, Townsend and Vickery 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012;
Cole et al. 2013; Cole, Stein and Tobacman 2014; Karlan et al. 2014; Clarke 2016; Casaburi
and Willis 2017) and the linkages between informal institutions and formal markets (e.g.,
Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Kranton 1996; Duru 2016). Clarke (2016) studies the relation
between individual risk aversion and the take-up of index insurance. He finds that demand is
hump-shaped with demand for the index being higher in the intermediate risk averse region.
Unlike Clarke (2016), we incorporate pre-existing risk-sharing arrangements to study their
effect on the take-up.
Perhaps, most related is Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), who show that the existence
of informal risk-sharing networks increases demand for index insurance, consistent with their
empirical analysis. Our paper is distinct in several ways. Our model is microfounded, allow-
ing for heterogeneity among individuals and endogenous decisions to join risk sharing groups.
Results are based on the notion of “Effective Risk Aversion”—a consequence of efficient risk
sharing. This allows us to identify new channels underlying the effect of informal schemes on
demand for formal index insurance, and provides novel explanations for the two empirical
puzzles based on their interactions. As mentioned previously, one of our channels relates to
the increase in tolerance to basis risk, implying an increase in take-up - this reaffirms previ-
ous results found in Mobarak and Rosenzweig suggesting that informal risk sharing schemes
support take-up of formal index insurance. The additional channel is connected to the in-
crease in tolerance to aggregate gambles, implying a reduced demand for index insurance.
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Finally, we analyze the take-up of index insurance at the extensive margin, unlike Mobarak
and Rosenzweig (2012) and Clarke (2016) who looked at the intensive margin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Results from
several analysis are contained in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 presents testable hypotheses
from our model and investigates them empirically using field experimental data for a specific
index contract “rainfall insurance”. Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs, tables and figures
are relegated to the Appendix.
4.2 The Model
To investigate the coexistence and interactions between pre-existing (informal) institutional
risk sharing and (formal) index-based insurance, it is crucial to specify preferences, shocks
and informal arrangements in the economy.
Setup
We consider an individual i with absolute risk aversion parameter γi > 0 and receive utility
ui(z) = −e−γiz from consuming income z. The individual faces uncertain income realization
according to
zi = wi + hi
where wi and hi denotes the deterministic and the stochastic component of the indi-
vidual’s income. The stochastic component consists of two parts, hi = εi + v: where εi is
the individual’s idiosyncratic risk (e.g., disease shocks), and v is the aggregate shock (e.g.,
drought, rainfall). As we describe below, εi corresponds to the part of the stochastic compo-
nent which can be insured via informal risk-sharing while v corresponds to the portion that
can be insured via formal index insurance. We assume the following
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εi ∼ N(0, σ2i )
v =

0 with probability 1− p
−L with probability p
Informal risk sharing: There exists a group g that individual i has the option to join.
We think of the group as a representative agent with a CARA utility function and absolute
risk aversion denoted by γg. We denote the income realization of that group as
zg() = wg + hg
where wg and hg ∼ N(0, σ2g) denotes the deterministic and the stochastic component of
the group’s income. In this case, the stochastic component can only be insured through
risk-sharing arrangements. Following Udry (1990), we assume perfect information: group-
idiosyncratic variances are public information and the realizations of shocks are also perfectly
observed by all individuals when they occur in the society. This provides enforcement for
the informal relationships.
Individual i has the choice of entering into a risk-sharing arrangement with the group.
An unmatched individual receives his random income. If the individual joins the group, he
can enter into a binding agreement prior to the realization of their incomes, specifying how
their pooled income is going to be shared. 5
5The model thus reflects several practical contexts including the case where cooperatives buy index
insurance for their members. To illustrate: an index contract package was designed for groundnut farmers in
Malawi for a 1 acre of production. Eligibility requires a farmer to be within 20km of one of the meteorological
stations in the program. This package consists of a loan (of about 4500 Malawi Kwacha or US$35) that
covers the cost of groundnut seed (of about US$25, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics [ICRISAT] bred), the index insurance premium (about US$2), and tax (about US$0.50). After
signing the paperwork, the farmer receives a bag of groundnut seed which is deemed sufficient for 1 acre
of production and an insurance certificate for a payout policy that maxes at the loan size plus interest
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Index Insurance: There are no financial markets allowing any individual to insure him-
self against his idiosyncratic risks. However, with the introduction of index-weather based
insurance it is possible to insure against v. Aggregate shocks can be insured by formal
index-based insurance which is subject to basis risk (e.g., Cole et al. 2013). We model basis
risk as in Clarke (2016):
(~US$7). Prices vary by the weather station and crop. In this program, farmers are organized into joint
liability “groups” of about 10-20 members. Farmers plant the groundnut seed, and then at the end of the
production season provide their yields to the farm association or cooperative, which markets the yields. The
proceeds and insurance payouts are then used to pay for the loan, and any remaining profits are returned to
the farmer–net of any loan deductions. Similar contract developments involving groups decisions are ongoing











































Where in Table 1: individual i suffers aggregate risk which can take the value 0 with
probability 1− p or −L with probability p. There is also an index which can take the value
1 (i.e., payout) with probability q or 0 (i.e., no payout) with probability 1− q. As usual, the
index may not be perfectly correlated with the aggregate risk and so there are four possible
joint realizations of the aggregate risk and index. In this case, r denotes the probability that
a negative aggregate shock is realized but the index suggests no payouts. This corresponds
to the downside basis risk faced by the consumer if he purchases index insurance. Similarly,
q + r − p corresponds to an upside basis risk where an insured agent does not suffer an
aggregate shock and yet payouts are triggered. Note that both downside and upside basis
risks are increasing in r. We also assume that the index is informative about the aggregate
loss that is Prob(v = 0, I = 0)×Prob(v = 1, I = 1) > Prob(v = 0, I = 1)×Prob(v = 1, I =
0) which implies that r < p(1− q).
4.3 Demand for Index Insurance: no informal access
Suppose that individual i is faced with the choice of either buying index insurance, denoted
by 1 or not, denoted by 0. We first consider the case where the individual does not have
access to an informal risk-sharing arrangement. In order to determine demand for index
insurance, we compare the certainty equivalents for buying versus not buying the index.
Formally, consider individual i whose income process is given by
z0i () = wi + εi + v
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where the independent shocks are
εi ∼ N(0, σ2i )
v =

0 with probability 1− p
−L with probability p
If individual does not buy the index: the expected utility of individual i is







2 ([1− p] + peγiL)
For individual i with CARA utility function with income zi, we derive the certainty
equivalent (CEi) according to:
−e−γiCEi = E(−e−γizi)
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If the individual buys insurance he pays a fixed premium pi and receives a stochastic payout
η which depends on the level of coverage and on the value of the index. If the individual
buys index insurance and the Index=1, the insurance company pays the individual βL. For
Index=0, there is no transfer from the insurance company to the individual. Thus, the ac-
tuarially fair premium is qβL. Due to loading, administrative costs and lack of competition,
the premium is typically not actuarially fair. This is captured as pi = mqβL for m > 1.
If the individual buys insurance, his income process is now given by:
z1i () = w
′ + εi + v′
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where w′ ≡ wi − pi and v′ ≡ v + η. Thus v′ and εi are independent and the distribution
of v′ is given by
v′ =

0 with probability 1− q − r
−L with probability r
βL with probability q + r − p
−L+ βL with probability p− r
So, if the individual buys the index: the expected utility is







2 ([1− q − r] + reγiL + [q + r − p]e−γiβL + [p− r]e−γi(−L+βL))
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Thus, the individual buys insurance if CE1i ≥ CE0i . Using the expressions for CEs from














log([1− p] + peγiL)
−mqβL− 1
γi
log([1− q − r] + reγiL + [q + r − p]e−γiβL + [p− r]e−γi(−L+βL)) ≥ − 1
γi
log([1− p] + peγiL)
− 1
γi
log([1− q − r] + reγiL + [q + r − p]e−γiβL + [p− r]e−γi(−L+βL)) + 1
γi
log([1− p] + peγiL) ≥ mqβL
where the second inequality uses w′ ≡ wi− pi. Observe that − 1γi log([1− q− r] + reγiL +
[q + r − p]e−γiβL + [p − r]e−γi(−L+βL)) = CEi(v′) i.e., the CE for individual faced with v′
gamble. Equivalently:− 1
γi
log([1 − p] + peγiL) = CEi(v). Thus the individual buys index
insurance if
CEi(v
′)− CEi(v) ≥ mqβL
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We obtain the individual’s decision to buy the index in two ways: small losses (analytically)
versus large losses (numerically).
4.3.1 Small Losses:
Let’s suppose losses are small. Then, we can approximate the CEs as follows












where the variances of v and v′ are σ2v and σ2v′ respectively. This means the individual





v − σ2v′) ≥ (m− 1)qβL
Since m > 1, the RHS is always positive. For σ2v′ ≥ σ2v the LHS is non-positive and hence
the individual will not buy index insurance. σ2v′ captures two parts: reduction in variance
from buying insurance and an increase in variance due to the presence of basis risk. It is
therefore possible for σ2v′ ≥ σ2v depending on these effects. However even for σ2v′ < σ2v the
individual may not buy index insurance for low values of γi. Thus, there exist a threshold
γ∗ = max(0, 2(m−1)qβL
σ2v−σ2v′
) such that the individual with risk aversion parameter γi < γ∗ will
not buy the index insurance. Since the index insurance is actuarially unfair m > 1 the
individual suffers a reduction in expected income. However, there is a change in variance
from buying index insurance. The individual compares these two forces. If the variance does
not decrease then nobody buys the index. But if the variance decreases, then individuals
with high risk aversion will assign more weight to this reduction in variance; hence will buy
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the index. Whereas for individuals with low risk aversion, this reduction in variance may
not be enough to compensate for the loss in expected income; hence will not buy the index.
The above discussion is summarized in Proposition 1 below
PROPOSITION 1: Consider an individual with CARA utility function and risk aver-
sion parameter γi > 0. Under small losses and actuarially unfair index insurance m > 1, the
following two results hold.
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So far we have been analyzing the implications of informal arrangements on the decisions
to buy index insurance assuming small losses. In this subsection, we extend the analysis to
the case of large losses. It is still the case that an individual with risk aversion γi if acting
individually chooses to buy the index insurance if
CEi(v
′)− CEi(v) ≥ mqβL
which is equivalent to
− 1
γi
log([1− q − r] + reγiL + [q + r − p]e−γiβL + [p− r]e−γi(−L+βL)) + 1
γi
log([1− p] + peγiL) ≥ mqβL
We illustrate the condition numerically in Figure 1. The red curve represents the left
side of the inequality that is the difference in the CEs while the green line represents the
right side of the inequality: mqβL. The x-axis represents different values for risk aversion,
indicating that individuals with risk-aversion levels in between the two vertical black lines
purchase index insurance. Unlike the case of small loses, the decision to buy index insurance
is bounded between two γ− thresholds. Within this interval, the above inequality is satisfied
and individuals purchase the index cover. Next, observe that individuals with sufficiently
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high or low risk-aversion will choose not to buy index insurance. The simple intuition is
that high risk-averse individuals do not buy because of the basis risk while low risk-averse
individuals choose not to buy because of loading of premium (m > 1). This is similar to
the findings of Clarke (2016) who examines purchases of index insurance at the intensive
margin.
4.4 Demand for Index Insurance: informal group access
4.4.1 Informal Risk Sharing
This subsection discusses the informal risk sharing arrangements before the introduction
of index insurance. Since our set up has a non-transferable utility (NTU) representation,
we first show that the model has a transferable utility (TU) representation under certainty
equivalents (CE). The set-up is NTU because of the heterogeneity in risk-aversion where one
unit of income yields utility ui(1) = −exp(−γi) for an individual i with risk aversion γi, but
utility ug(1) = −exp(−γg) 6= ui(1) for a representative agent acting for the group g with risk
aversion γg. We work with certainty equivalent units, which allows for TU representations.
This is stated in the following Lemma.
LEMMA 1: The NTU model has a TU representation, where CEs are transferable across
individuals (i, g).
Next, since CE is transferable, we also have the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Suppose individual i decides to join the group g and risk is shared efficiently
between them. Then under transferable CEs we can think of the pair (i, g) as a representative





. This implies that γi∗ < min(γi, γg).
Lemma 2 allows us to conveniently analyze the decision of individual i to take index in-
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surance in the presence of risk sharing arrangements. It also shows that the risk aversion of
the individual i will be effectively lower if he is in a group, as compared to if he was acting
as an individual. The latter is summarized in Definition 1 below.
DEFINITION 1: γi∗ as “Effective Risk Aversion”: This refers to the risk aversion pa-
rameter for a representative agent i∗ representing group consisting of (i, g) that shares risk
efficiently.
REMARK: We can now examine whether it is optimal for individual i to join the group g.
To do this we compare the CE of the group if they were sharing risk efficiently to the sum
of CEs for the individual i and group g if they were acting separately. Indeed, joining the
group provide welfare gains to the individual (and the group). The argument is similar to
Wilson (1968). For contradiction: suppose that i and g are un-matched, then i and g can
form a pair where each consumes his income. In this case, each is at least as well-off in the
pair, as compared to remaining unmatched. However, by the mutuality principle, both can
be better-off when in the group. This requires their income shares to rise and fall together
with the independent random part of their incomes. The following lemma formally shows
that if is efficient for i and g to form a pair.
LEMMA 3: Suppose risk is shared efficiently within a group. Then it is efficient for
individual i to join group g.
4.4.2 Extensive Margin 0-1: with informal group access
Consider now the demand for index insurance for the individual who has access to informal
risk-sharing arrangement. From LEMMA 2, this is the same as the demand for index







Thus, we can apply the preceding analysis to evaluate the decision of an individual in a
group to purchase index insurance.
The representative agent’s income process in the absence of index insurance is given by
z0i∗ = wi + wg + hg + εi + v
If individual does not buy the index: the expected utility of representative agent is
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and the certainty equivalent with no index insurance is given by
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Next, if individual buys index insurance, the group’s income process is now given by:
z1i∗ = w
′ + hg + εi + v′
where w′i∗ ≡ wi + wg − pi and v′ ≡ v + η.
If the individual buys the index: the expected utility of the representative agent is
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log([1− q − r] + reγi∗L + [q + r − p]e−γi∗βL + [p− r]e−γi∗ (−L+βL))
Thus, the individual buys insurance if CE1i∗ ≥ CE0i∗ which we can rewrite as
CEi∗(v
′)− CEi∗(v) ≥ mqβL
where − 1
γi∗
log([1 − q − r] + reγi∗L + [q + r − p]e−γi∗βL + [p − r]e−γi∗ (−L+βL)) = CEi∗(v′)
and− 1
γi∗
log([1− p] + peγi∗L) = CEi∗(v).





v − σ2v′) ≥ (m− 1)qβL
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The next result evaluates the impact of informal risk sharing arrangement on the take-up
of index insurance.
PROPOSITION 2: Consider an individual with risk aversion parameter γi who joins a
group with parameter γg. Then, under small losses and actuarially unfair index insurance
m > 1, the following results hold.
(1) Independent of his presence in the group, the individual i will not purchase index
insurance if γi < γ∗.
(2) Independent of his risk aversion parameter γi, the individual i will not purchase index
insurance if γg ≤ γ∗.
(3) However, the individual may buy index insurance if γi ≥ γ∗ and γg ≥ γ∗ are satisfied.
Particularly, he buys the index cover in the presence of the group if σ2v′ < σ2v and γi∗ =
γiγg
γi+γg
> γ∗ = max(0, 2(m−1)qβL
σ2v−σ2v′
) .
Proposition 2 shows that informal risk-sharing arrangements can impede the discrete (0-1)
take-up of index insurance. The intuition is based on the fact that the “effective” risk aversion
of individuals forming a group are lower than the risk aversion of the individuals if they were
acting individually. Essentially the group lowers the individual’s aversion to risk (Lemma
2) which in turn might move the individual from a purchase zone to the non-purchase zone
based on γ∗.
4.4.3 The Case of Large Losses
The results from Proposition 2 can be modified to fit the case of large losses. When losses
are small, an individual i′s decision to not buy index insurance remain unchanged in the
presence of informal arrangements. However if losses are large, our theory suggests that
informal insurance might facilitate in taking up of index insurance. This happens for instance
if an individual is initially too risk averse to buy index insurance on his own, however in
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the presence of informal arrangements his effective risk aversion might be such that he
ends up purchasing the index cover. To illustrate, consider Figure 1. An individual with
risk aversion parameter 6 would not have purchased the index insurance if he was acting
individually. However if he pairs with a group that brings his effective risk aversion to the
range (0.8, 4.7), then he chooses to purchase the index cover. We also see that it is possible
that informal insurance acts as a barrier to take up. For example, consider an individual
with risk aversion parameter 3. Acting individually, he will buy the index insurance, however
if the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement reduces his effective risk aversion to below 0.8,
then he will choose not to buy the index insurance. The analysis provides explanations and
predictions for several empirical findings which are discussed in the next section.
4.5 Model-Implications and Experimental Evidence
Our theoretical evaluation of the interaction between informal risk sharing schemes and de-
mand for index insurance provide several testable hypotheses with implications for the design
of index insurance contracts. This section discusses the emerging hypothesis and explores
them empirically combining field experimental data from multiple sources for a specific in-
dex contract “rainfall insurance”. We begin with a discussion of the testable hypotheses, and
then follow this with a description of the data and experimental design. For each hypothesis,
we present the testing procedure and the resulting empirical results.
4.5.1 Discussions, and testable implications
First, why might more risk averse individuals not take up index insurance? Our framework
suggests a plausible answer. Absent risk-sharing arrangements, low take-up among high risk
averse individuals may be due to aversion to basis risk (Clarke 2016). However, another
plausible reason may be due to the presence of informal risk sharing groups (i.e., based on
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our theory, Section 4). The presence of risk sharing groups leads to effective reduction in
an individual’s risk aversion, making him more tolerant towards aggregate risk and more
sensitive to the price of index insurance. For this reason, more risk averse people may end
up not buying index insurance, as compared to an individual with the same risk aversion
parameter who might take it up if the individual was unmatched.
Second, why is the take-up for index insurance unexpectedly low? Possible answers lie in
the role of existing informal arrangements. In particular, (1) When does informal arrange-
ment support the index take up? Our analysis suggests that high risk averse individuals in
risk sharing arrangements containing intermediate risk averse members are more likely to
purchase index insurance. Acting alone, basis risk will act as a disincentive to the take-up
of index insurance; however, the presence of the group makes the individual more tolerant
to basis risk; (2) When does informal pairing not-support index take up? From our anal-
ysis, low to intermediate risk averse individuals that enter any risk sharing group are less
likely to purchase index insurance. Their effective risk aversion is lower, and thus has lower
willingness to pay for index insurance. The above discussions lead to the following sets of
predictions.
Prediction #1: The link between informal risk-sharing and the take of index insurance
is ambiguous. This is because of the existence of the two identifiable forces: sensitivity to
either basis risk or price of the index contract. Ultimately, the overall impact of informal
risk-sharing schemes on the demand for index insurance depends on which of these two forces
dominate.
Prediction #2: Informal risk-sharing is more likely to complement the take-up of index
insurance in regions with high aggregate (especially, if un-insurable by group) and basis
risk. This follows because the presence of an informal risk sharing group helps to make the
individual more tolerant to the basis risk, holding other forces constant. In addition, in the
presence of risk-sharing arrangements, the sensitivity of index demand to price changes is
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higher, as individuals become effectively less risk averse.
Prediction #3: The take-up for index insurance may be higher if the size of the group
is smaller. This is because smaller groups are likely more risk averse, all else equal. For
instance, under small losses (e.g., relative to w and ε), villages where there are more informal
transfers, which can be proxied by the number of pairs in our model, are likely to see lower
take-ups once price and basis risk are controlled for. With controls for price effects and basis
risk, individual’s risk aversion from joining the larger group may be effectively lower leading
to less demand for insurance. This prediction contradicts those that connect information
diffusion and group size.
4.5.2 Data and sources
Ideally, we require data about the demand for index insurance contracts, informal risk shar-
ing, a measure of basis risk, insurance premiums, and risk aversion. For this purpose, we
draw on available data sets from a panel of experimental trials that were conducted across
randomly selected rural farming households and villages in Gujarat, India.6 Data on risk
aversion come from Cole et al. (2013), which is based on field experiments across 100 villages
in 2006/2007. The measure of risk aversion follows Binswanger (1980), whereby respondents
are asked to choose among cash lotteries varying in risk and expected return. The lotteries
were played for real money, with payouts between zero and Rs. 110. The lottery choices
are then mapped into an index between 0 and 1, where high values indicate greater risk
aversion.7
6All villages are located within 30km of a rainfall station. Design of rainfall insurance contracts uses
information from these rainfall stations.
7A value 1 is assigned to individuals that choose the safe lottery. For those who choose riskier lotteries,
the [0, 1) mapping indicates the maximum rate at which they are revealed to accept additional risk (standard
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From Cole, Tobacman and Stein (2014), we obtain data about the take-up of index
insurance, premiums, and premium discounts available between 2006-2013 for 60 villages
cumulatively. Most of these villages and households overlap with the 100 villages in Cole et
al. (2013). This allows us to match households and villages between the two data sets. Our
final data are merged from these two sources. We summarize the timeline of the rainfall-index
insurance experiments and the available data in Figure 2.
4.5.2.1 Rainfall-index contracts and experimental setting
The specific index insurance contract that we examine is “rainfall insurance” whose payouts
are based on a publicly observable rainfall index. This contract provides coverage against
adverse rainfall events (i.e., covering drought and flood) for the summer (“Kharif”) monsoon
growing season. Design of this contract is based on daily rainfall readings at local rainfall
stations, specifying payouts as a function of cumulative rainfall during fixed time periods
over the entire June 1-August 31 Kharif season. Typically, the maximum possible payout
for a unit-policy is about Rs. 1500. Households have the option to purchase any number of
policies to achieve their desired level of insurance coverage. The contracts are offered and
paid-out year-to-year, whereby a marketing team visits households in the selected sample
each year in April-May to offer the insurance policies. Households are required to opt-in to
re-purchase each year to sustain their coverage.
“Group Identity” as risk-sharing proxy: The marketing teams for rainfall insurance
used multiple strategies to sell the policies. Their strategies include the use of flyers, videos,
and discount coupons, and involved randomization of these three marketing methods at the
household level. More importantly, flyers were randomized along two dimensions with the
aim of testing how formal insurance interacts with informal risk-sharing arrangements (cf:
deviation) in return for higher expected return ( ∆EΔrisk ). Additional details are available in Cole et al. (2013).
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Cole et al. 2013). The flyers emphasized and provided cues on “group identity”, which has
been found to be key for informal risk-sharing (Karlan et al., 2009). The treatments for
group identity included:8
Religion (Hindu, Muslim, or Neutral): A photograph on the flyer depicted
a farmer in front of a Hindu temple (Hindu Treatment), a Mosque (Muslim
Treatment), or a neutral building. The farmer has a matching first name,
which is characteristically Hindu, characteristically Muslim, or neutral.
Individual or Group (Individual or Group): In the Individual treat-
ment, the flyer emphasized the potential benefits of the insurance product
for the individual buying the policy. The Group flyer emphasized the value
of the policy for the purchaser’s family.
Note that the use of cues on group identity as a proxy for risk-sharing has been used in
previous literature (e.g., Cole et al. 2013), which we follow here. While such approach may
have the downside of not capturing actual risk-sharing since people generally choose who to
group and share risk with (possibly, over and beyond religious and family lines), it has an
empirical appeal: it allows for randomization of risk-sharing which is extremely useful for
identification purposes, at least, as compared to cases where groups form endogenously and
share risk.
4.5.2.2 Measuring basis risk
Each season, households were asked if they had experienced crop loss due to weather in
the household panel experiments. We combine this with unique market information about
whether the household i located in village v in a contract year t received an insurance payout
8More details of the data and group treatments are available in our two primary sources of data: Cole
et al. (2013); Cole, Tobacman and Stein (2014).
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to define a measure of basis risk
briskDOWNSIDEivt = 1(lossivt > payoutivt)
briskUPSIDEivt = 1(lossivt < payoutivt)
which are indicators that capture the potential mismatch or discrepancy between insur-
ance payouts and the actual crop loss or income loss suffered by the policy holder prior to
the payout decisions. For instance, this may be due to the fact that the measured rainfall
index is imperfectly correlated with rainfall at any individual farm plot. As illustrated,
our measure of basis risk allows for the distinction between upside and downside risks, and
follows directly from previous discussions in Section 2.9
4.5.2.3 Summaries
The summary statistics of all relevant variables in our sample are reported in Table 2. The
first two moments and order statistics of each variable are displayed. As shown, the data
is made up of information about the demand for rainfall-index insurance, premium and
randomized discounts, crop and revenue loss experience of households, treatments for risk-
sharing as proxied by cues on “group identity”, and basis risks, respectively. The overall
data spans 2006-2013, covering 645 households across a pool of 60 villages. Considerable
variations exist among the variables which we shall exploit for identifying variation. Our
main outcome of interest is binary, denoted “Bought”. Bought is defined based on whether
9Since crop losses (but not payouts) are self-reported, there is a potential tendency for households to
misreport, e.g., overstate losses, and thus might impact our measurement of basis risk up/down. To assess
such potential misreporting, we regress households reported-crop loss experience on a vector of seventeen
(17) household characteristics: spanning socio-demographics, educational level, asset holdings, access to
formal insurance, per capita monthly expenditure, risk aversion, and indicators for whether a respondent
has a muslim name and irrigates the farm. Results are reported in Table 15. None of these 17 variables
is statistically significant at conventional levels, an evidence inconsistent with misreporting. The evidence
is more consistent with a reporting behavior whereby crop losses occur due to weather shocks and then
households report them as such. This finding hold across the wide range of model specifications, which differ
based on the included controls.
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households purchased index insurance in given market year. In our sample, about 39% of
households bought rainfall-index insurance over the entire panel period.
The average risk aversion is 0.53 with a standard deviation of about 0.32. The overall
share of households that received cues on Group, Hindu and Muslim treatments are about
4.0%, 2.8% and 2.9%, respectively. Our measure of basis risk that relies on the mismatch
between pre-insurance crop losses and index payouts suggest higher relative frequency for
downside basis risk (25.5%), as compared to upside basis risk (8.2%). For our basis risk
measure that relies on the mismatch between pre-insurance revenue losses10 and index pay-
outs, the relative frequency of downside and upside basis risks are quite close. A visual
illustration for both downside and upside basis risks are shown in Figure 3. Empirical tests
for the various predictions combine these variables with exogenous variations induced by the
random assignment of price discounts and risk-sharing marketing treatments.11
4.5.3 Empirical tests and results
The testing procedure and empirical results are presented in this section. Additional robust-
ness checks on our main results are discussed.
10Revenue is measured for market years in which households reported a crop loss, and captures the
“amount” of crop loss: calculated as the difference between that market year’s agricultural output and the
mean value of output in all previous years where crop loss was not reported.
11Ensuring balance across risk-sharing treatment groups e.g., assignment of group, Hindu and muslim
cues is crucial for the experimental results. We ascertain balance using observable characteristics of the
households. In Table 16 of the Appendix, we test whether the various household characteristics significantly
differ across the risk sharing treatments. The results provide strong evidence in favor of balance (except for
about two variables which are barely significant at 10% level).
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4.5.3.1 Empirical strategy and results: predictions #1 and #2
To test predictions #1 and #2, we estimate a model that links changes in take-up for index
insurance Divt = 1(bought = Y es)ivt to the vector of risk-sharing treatments RShareivt
and their unrestricted interaction with basis risk briskivt and exogenous variation in the
price for insurance Discountivt
Divt = θRShareivt × briskivt + βdDiscountivt + µi + δt + ivt
Divt = θRShareivt ×Discountivt + βbbriskivt + µi + δt + ivt
where i, v and t index the household, village and market year respectively. This spec-
ification includes a set of unrestricted household dummies, denoted by µi, which capture
unobserved differences that are fixed across households such as access to other forms of in-
surance. The market-year fixed effects, δt control for aggregate changes that are common
across households, e.g. prices, and national policies. Our key parameter of interest θ is
identified by household-level exogenous variation in the various treatments for risk-sharing
and their interactions with the two forces: basis risk and insurance premium. Errors are
clustered at the village level to allow for arbitrary correlations.
The results are reported separately for the two measures of basis risk: crop-loss mismatch
with index payouts versus revenue-loss mismatch with index payouts. For the first Equation,
which interacts risk sharing with basis risk, Tables 3 and 4 contain the estimates for crop-
mismatch while Tables 5 and 6 contains the estimates for revenue-mismatch. Columns differ
based on the included risk-sharing treatments and interactions with basis risk, and controls
for premium discount and upside basis risk. In Tables 3 and 5, columns (2)-(4) include the
various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the interactions. However, in Tables 4
and 6, column (1) includes the various interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a
control for premium discount, while column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts
and upside basis risk.
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Downside basis risk is negative and significant at conventional levels, upside basis risk is
significantly positive, and premium discount is significantly positive across all specifications.
The estimated price discount effects range between 0.0032 - 0.0035; with an average estimate
of about 0.0034. An average estimate of 0.0034 implies that a 10 percent decline in the price
of index insurance increases the probability of purchase by 0.034 percentage points, or 0.113
percent of the conditional mean take-up rate (~0.30). The implied elasticity is 0.0113. While
households negative demand-response to downside basis risk is substantial, this is less than
their positive response to upward basis risk. Turning to our key coefficients of interest, there
is evidence that informal risk-sharing significantly supports the take-up of index insurance,
and that when downside basis risk is high risk-sharing increases the index demand by 13.0%
points (column 4; Table 3) to 40.1% points (column 4; Table 6).
Next, for the second Equation, which interacts risk sharing with exogenous changes in
premium, the results for crop-mismatch are contained in Tables 7 and 8, and those for
revenue-mismatch are in Tables 9 and 10. Again, across all model specifications, downside
basis risk is significantly negative, upside basis risk is positive and large, and premium
discount is positive. For our main coefficients of interest, there is evidence that the existence
of risk-sharing arrangement makes individuals more sensitive to price changes since both
the direct and interaction terms on discount are positive. For example, when group cues
are combined with discounts (Table 7; column 4), the sensitivity increases by about 10.1
percentage points which implies an increased elasticity of 0.337.
In addition, there is evidence that informal risk-sharing significantly either support or
not-support the take-up of rainfall-index insurance. For instance, while Group cues has
negative effect on index take-up (column 4; Table 7), Group cues treatment combined with
Muslim cues has a significant positive effect on take-up (column 3; Table 8). However, when
the various risk-sharing cues are combined with premium discount, most of the terms have
significant positive effect on the take-up of insurance.
Taken together, these results (i.e., Tables 3-10) provide evidence that informal risk-
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sharing has ambiguous effects on index take-up, empirically. With high downside basis
risk, informal networks increase take-up, but under price effects, informal networks may
have negative effect on take-up; making the overall impact of risk-sharing on the take-up of
index insurance ambiguous. As shown in Proposition 2, risk aversion plays a central role
in explaining these effects. Thus, we turn to the role of risk aversion in the subsequent
analysis.12
4.5.3.2 Empirical strategy and results: prediction #2
We modify previous specifications to investigate how risk aversion (effective) interacts with
the two forces: sensitivities to either basis risk or insurance premium
Divt = θriskAversionivt × briskivt + βdDiscountivt + µi + δt + ivt
Divt = θriskAversionivt ×Discountivt + βbbriskivt + µi + δt + ivt
where all the terms are defined similarly as in previous sections, and errors are clustered
at the village level. The results are reported in Table 11. Columns differ based on the
included interactions with risk aversion. Column (1) uses market year dummies to control
for potential sensitivity to changes in premium, and includes an interaction between basis
risk and risk aversion. This interaction allows us to focus on the response of basis risk to
changes in risk aversion I.e., we ask whether increase in risk aversion alter the demand-
12Since our theoretical analysis relies on CARA (with a simplifying property of no wealth effects), we
examine how sensitive or robust our main results are to potential wealth effects. To do this, we re-estimate
our empirical model with an additional control for households wealth. We used Factor analysis to esti-
mate the wealth of housholds based on eight (8) asset holdings or ownership: 1(Electricity=Yes), 1(Mobile
Phone=Yes), 1(Sew Machine=Yes), 1(Tractor=Yes), 1(Thresher=Yes), 1(Bull cart=Yes), 1(Bicycle=Yes),
and 1(Motorcycle=Yes); where 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument in the bracket
is true, and 0 otherwise. Figure 5 shows the estimated distribution of wealth. The implied results are also
shown in Tables 17 and 18. The estimate on wealth is positive but not significant. However, the estimates for
our key parameter of interest γ are similar to the main results (i.e., very close and well within the confidence
intervals of the main estimates).
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response to basis risk. In columns (2)-(3), we directly control for potential sensitivity to
basis risk, and include interactions between premium discounts and risk aversion to evaluate
how households sensitivity to prices respond to changes in risk aversion.13
Note that the direct coefficient on risk aversion is not estimable (but its interaction
with other variables are) since we included household-level dummies which soaks-up any
fixed household-level terms. From column (1), downside basis risk has significant negative
effect on take-up (-12.0% points); its interaction with risk aversion is also negative (but not
significant at conventional levels). This seems to suggest that, after controlling for price
effects, an increase in individual’s risk aversion increases the negative sensitivity of index
take-up to increases in basis risk. The result that basis risk when combined with risk-
sharing cues positively affect take-up (Table 3 and 6; Muslim cues) can be explained by this
negative effect of risk aversion on basis risk . Recall that joining a group effectively reduces
individual’s risk aversion (LEMMA 2).
The results in columns (2)-(3) show that premium discounts have significantly positive
impact on take-up, increasing index take-up by 0.369 to 0.396 percentage points (similar
to previous estimates). The interaction with risk aversion is negative. The negative sign
implies that increasing risk aversion has negative effect on the positive impact of premium
discounts on insurance demand (although not statistically significant) and vice versa. This
likely explains the positive effect of premium discount when combined with the various risk-
sharing cues on index take-up (Tables 7-10), when combined with the result in LEMMA
2.
13There is an empirical appeal to use the observed risk aversion values here (rather than the theory-derived
risk aversion values). The sample is at the individual household level with larger size for the observed values.
We do not have to calculate risk aversion values at the village level–which is an approach we will have take
to obtain the theory-based values. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of observed vs theory-derived risk
aversion values.
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4.5.3.3 Empirical strategy and results: prediction #3
We evaluate prediction #3 by linking observed changes in take-up for index insurance to a
measure of group-size while controlling for the effect of basis risk and variations in insurance
premium at the village level,
Dvt = θGSizevt + βbbriskvt + βdDiscountvt + µv + δt + vt
where group size, GSizevt, is defined as the number of households that received cues
on “group identity” per village. µv are village-level fixed effects, capturing time-invariant
potential unobserved heterogeneity. The results for alternative model specifications are re-
ported in Tables 12-14. Our preferred specification is column (4), which examines the effect
of group size on the demand for index insurance along with full controls for downside basis
risk, upside basis risk and premium discounts. These additional controls are meant to soak-
up household sensitivities to both basis risk and insurance premium within the framework
of our theoretical model.
Consistent with prediction #3, the estimate on group size is negative, statistically sig-
nificant across all specifications, and hold across alternative measures of group size which
are based on the various risk-sharing treatments. Estimates from our preferred specification
suggest that providing cues on “group identity” for an additional household in a village will
result in about 2.8% points decrease in index take-up, all else equal (column 4; Table 12).14
This represents 5.9% reduction in insurance insurance take-up, relative to the conditional
mean defined over the entire sample period. The negative effects of group size on take-up
are much larger in the model specification that controls for only downside basis risk (col-
umn 1). This is expected and can be understood based on our theory: the countervailing
force to reduced index demand is “upside basis risk” when individuals become effectively less
risk averse following more group exposure. Thus, controlling to eliminate this force should
14We examine the sensitivity of our main results to potential wealth effects by including wealth as a
control. Results are displayed in Tables 19 and 20. The estimate on wealth is positive but hardly significant.
However, the estimates on group size are negative, significant and very close to our baseline results.
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yield larger negative effects of increasing group size. Next, as expected, the results indicate
that downside basis risk significantly reduces the demand for index insurance (about 10%
points), upside basis risk increases index take-up (about 62% points), while offering premium
discounts significantly increase the take-up (approximately 0.33%).
These results are inconsistent with theoretical and empirical findings in studies of infor-
mation diffusion which will predict increased uptake of index insurance with an increase in
exposed group size (e.g., Jackson and Yariv 2010; Banerjee et al. 2013).
4.6 Conclusion
Our evaluation of the effect of informal risk sharing schemes on the take-up for index in-
surance, documents that the effects are ambiguous and driven by two forces: sensitivities
to basis risk and insurance premium, which operate through risk aversion. In our model,
we consider the case of an individual who endogenously chooses to join a group and make
decisions about index insurance. The presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement
reduces his risk aversion, termed “Effective Risk Aversion”. We appeal to this phenomenon of
“Effective Risk Aversion” to establish that such reduction in risk aversion can lead to either
reduced or increased take up of index insurance, and emphasize how these results provide
alternative explanations for two empirical puzzles: unexpectedly low take-up for index insur-
ance and demand being particularly low for the most risk averse. Our model provide several
testable hypotheses with implications for the design of index insurance contracts. Drawing
on data from a panel of field experimental trials in India, we provide evidence for several
predictions that emerge from our analyses.
Our study is an initial step towards the broader understanding of the linkages between
informal risk-sharing and the market for formal index insurance. In ongoing research, we
test the predictions from the model both in the laboratory and the field. Further, we aim
to draw on the literature on network analysis and multi-dimensional matching to analyze
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the interactions between index insurance and informal arrangements to inform the design of
policy and index contracts. This line of work has broader implications for the design and
introduction of insurance and financial contracts that aim at mitigating environmental risks
among low-income societies.
Figure 4.1: Index Take-up under Large Losses
Notes : Assumptions underlying Figure 1 are as follows: p = q = 1
3
, L = 1, r = 1
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, β =
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(b) REVENUE LOSS: DOWNSIDE VS UPSIDE BASIS RISK
Notes : Figures display the distribution of basis risk measured as the mismatch between
households experience of pre-insurance loss in crops or revenue and receiving an index payout,
respectively. This shown for both downside and upside basis risks. Revenue is measured
for market years in which a crop loss is reported, and captures the “amount” of crop loss:
calculated as the difference between that market year’s agricultural output and the mean
value of output in all previous years where crop loss was not reported.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Notes : Table reports the summary statistics of the panel data used for our empirical analysis.
This include information about take-up of rainfall-index insurance, premium and randomized
discounts, crop and revenue loss experience of households, multiple treatments for risk-
sharing, proxied by cues on “group identity”, and basis risks respectively. 1(.) is a logical
indicator that takes the value 1 whenever the argument in the bracket is true, and zero
otherwise. The merged data spans 2006-2013, covering 645 households across a pool of 60
villages. These are located in three districts in the state of Gujarat, namely: Ahmedabad,
Anand and Patan.
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Table 4.3: Crop Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk, and controls for premium discount and upside basis risk.
Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the inter-
actions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Crop Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk and premium discount. Columns (1) includes the various
interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a control for premium discount, while
column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts and upside basis risk. Errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
212
Table 4.5: Revenue Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk, and controls for premium discount and upside basis risk.
Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the inter-
actions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Revenue Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk and premium discount. Column (1) includes the various
interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a control for premium discount, while
column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts and upside basis risk. Errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Normalized risk aversion rA
Observed, individual level
Calculated, group level
Oberved individual rA vs Theory−derived effective rA
Notes : Figure shows the distribution of risk aversion elicited (i.e., observed) in the 2006/2007
baseline household surveys. For each village group level v, we apply our theoretical rule that
says that the effective risk aversion γi=v∗ is less than the minimum of all members risk
aversion in that village to derived the distribution of effective risk aversion. This is jointly
displayed with observed values of risk aversion.
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Table 4.7: Crop Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount, and controls for both downside and upside basis
risks. Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the
interactions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Crop Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount and basis risk. Column (1) includes the various
interaction terms with premium discount, column (2) adds a control for [downside] basis
risk, while column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside basis risks. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Revenue Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount, and controls for both downside and upside basis
risks. Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the
interactions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.10: Revenue Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount and basis risk. Columns (1) includes the various
interaction terms with premium discount, column (2) adds a control for [downside] basis
risk, while column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside basis risks. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.11: Examining Two Forces: Basis Risk vs Price Sensitivities
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium and their
interactions with risk aversion at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the
included interactions with risk aversion. Columns (1) use market year dummies to control
for sensitivity to changes in premium, and includes an interaction between [downside] basis
risk and risk aversion, while column (2)-(3) directly controls for sensitivity to basis risk, and
include interactions between premium discounts and risk aversion. Errors are clustered at
the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.12: Group cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Group” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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(b) WEALTH QUINTILES
Notes : Figures display the distribution of household wealth. Wealth is estimated using Fac-
tor analysis and based on eight (8) household asset holdings: 1(Electricity=Yes), 1(Mobile
Phone=Yes), 1(Sew Machine=Yes), 1(Tractor=Yes), 1(Thresher=Yes), 1(Bull cart=Yes),
1(Bicycle=Yes), and 1(Motorcycle=Yes). 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever
the argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Q3 is missing, as there are few to no
households in this bracket.
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Table 4.13: Hindu cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Hindu” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.14: Muslim cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Muslim” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
224
Table 4.15: Reported-Crop Loss Experience on Household Characteristics
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of reported-crop loss experience on a
vector of household characteristics. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the
argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(5) differ based on the
included controls. Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics, column (2) adds
a control for educational level, column (3) adds controls for household assets, column (4)
adds an indicator for whether the household has any formal insurance, while column (5)
adds controls for per capita monthly expenditure, risk aversion, and indicators for whether
respondent has a muslim name and irrigates farm. Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 4.16: Balance on Household Characteristics
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of risk-sharing treatment groups on a
vector of household characteristics. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the
argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns include the set of all seventeen
(17) demographic characteristics. Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Stars indicate
significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.17: Wealth Control: Index Demand-Group Identity linkages
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium, and inter-
actions with risk-sharing treatments, while controlling for potential wealth effects. Columns
(1) and (2) differ based on how basis risk is defined: mismatch between payouts and crop
losses in column (1) versus mismatch between payouts and revenue losses in column (2).
Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.18: Wealth Control: Index Demand-Group Identity linkages
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium, and inter-
actions with risk-sharing treatments, while controlling for potential wealth effects. Columns
(1) and (2) differ based on how basis risk is defined: mismatch between payouts and crop
losses in column (1) versus mismatch between payouts and revenue losses in column (2).
Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.19: Wealth Control: Does Larger Group lead to Lower Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size, along with controls for basis risk, exogenous changes in premium and potential
wealth effects. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument in the bracket
is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on how group size is defined. In column
(1), group size refers to the number of households that received “Group” cues. In column
(2), group size refers to the number of households that received “Hindu” cues. In column
(3), group size refers to the number of households that received “Muslim” cues. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4.20: Nonlinear Wealth Control: Does Larger Group lead to Lower Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size, along with controls for basis risk, exogenous changes in premium and potential
nonlinear wealth effects (i.e., include wealth quintile dummies: Q1-Q5 with Q1 being omitted
category). The coefficient on Q3 is not estimable, since there are no households in the third
quintile of the distribution. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument
in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on how group size is
defined. In column (1), group size refers to the number of households that received “Group”
cues. In column (2), group size refers to the number of households that received “Hindu”
cues. In column (3), group size refers to the number of households that received “Muslim”
cues. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The proof for Lemma 1 is similar to arguments in Wang (2014).
Let zi and zg denote the income of individual i and representative individual g. Suppose
i and g form a pair. We denote the combined income of the pair, zi∗ ≡ zi + zg. If i
wishes to promise utility ξ to his partner g, then the corresponding efficient sharing rule
(zi′ − s(zi∗ , ξ), s(zi∗ , ξ)) must satisfy
s∗(zi∗ , ξ) ≡ arg max
s
Eui(zi∗ − s) s.t. Eug(s) ≥ ξ (4.1)
Varying ξ, the solutions s∗ describe the set of efficient sharing rules.
Let f(zi∗) denote the joint density function for combined income. Plugging in the utility






−e−γgs(zi∗ )f(zi∗)dz ≥ −e−ξ
The inequality in the constraint will hold with equality since transferring income to
individual g comes at the cost of reducing i’s income.
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where as individual g’s expected utility can be written as
Eug(ξ) = −e−ξ
For individual i with CARA utility function with income zi, there is a simple relation
between the certainty equivalent (CEi) and the expected utility:
−e−γiCEi = E(−e−γizi)
which gives us
CEi = − 1
γi
logE(e−γizi)


















Thus we observe that increasing certainty individual of individual g by one unit leads to a
reduction in certainty equivalent of individual i by one unit. Hence certainty equivalents are
transferable across individuals and since expected utility is a monotonic transformation of
certainty equivalent, we get that the expected utility is transferable as well. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 1.
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Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Lemma 1, we found that if risk is shared efficiently then we get



















With TU, the sum of the CEs correspond to the joint maximization of the group (i, g)’s
welfare. From the last equality, this is identical to the maximization problem of a represen-











Proof of Lemma 3
Let CE0g , CE0i∗ denote the certainty equivalent for the group g without individual i and the





i . Notice that:









log([1− p] + peγi∗L)
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Hence it is sufficient to show that







































log([1− p] + peγiL)













Proof: This follows from observing that γi∗ < min(γg, γi) by lemma 2.
CLAIM 2: − 1
γi∗
log([1− p] + peγi∗L) > − 1
γi
log([1− p] + peγiL)
Proof: This follows from observing that the LHS is the CE for a representative agent with
risk aversion γi∗ for a gamble v while the RHS is the CE for an individual with risk aversion
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